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1 Einleitung 1 
 
1 Einleitung 
 
In meiner Dissertation „Actions and Outcomes: The Evaluative Function of Moral 
Emotions.” beschäftige ich mich mit moralischen Emotionen, ihren vorauslaufenden 
kognitiven Bedingungen und nachfolgenden Verhaltenskonsequenzen. Hierbei ist die 
Unterscheidung zwischen moralischen und nicht-moralischen Emotionen von besonderer 
Bedeutung. Ich werde darlegen, wie die Bewertung von Handlungen (actions) und 
Ergebnissen (outcomes) zur Unterscheidung zwischen moralischen und nicht-moralischen 
Emotionen beiträgt und dass diese Bewertungen mit unterschiedlich hohem kognitiven 
Aufwand (gemessen anhand von Reaktionszeiten) verbunden sind. 
Insgesamt berichte ich Ergebnisse aus 10 empirischen Studien und einem Review-
Artikel. In Kapitel 2 erfolgt eine Einführung in das Thema. Hierzu berichte ich die 
wichtigsten Ergebnisse eines bereits veröffentlichten empirischen Artikels sowie eines 
Review-Artikels, bei denen ich Co-Autorin war. Die Kapitel 3 bis 6 beschreiben aktuelle 
Forschungsergebnisse. Eine Version des Kapitels 4 wurde bereits zur Publikation 
eingereicht. Versionen der Kapitel 3, 5 und 6 werden in Kürze zur Publikation eingereicht. 
Bei diesen Publikationen (Tscharaktschiew & Rudolph, 2014a-c sowie Tscharaktschiew, 
Schindler, & Rudolph, 2014) bin ich Erstautorin. In Kapitel 7 integriere ich die 
Erkenntnisse aus den vorherigen Kapiteln zu einer umfassenden Klassifikation von 
moralischen und nicht-moralischen Emotionen und arbeite die wichtigsten Merkmale 
moralischer Emotionen heraus, die aus den vorgestellten empirischen Ergebnissen 
resultieren.  
Die Kapitel 2 bis 7 sind in englischer Sprache verfasst, gefolgt von einer deutschen 
Zusammenfassung in Kapitel 8. Grundlegende statistische Analysen wurden mit dem 
Computerprogramm SPSS (IBM Corp., 2011, 2012) durchgeführt. Weitere 
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Computerprogramme, die zur Erstellung von Online-Fragebögen, zur Steuerung von 
Laborexperimenten sowie zur Durchführung weiterführender statistischer Analysen 
(Mediationsanalysen, Strukturgleichungsmodelle) verwendet wurden, werden bei der 
jeweiligen Beschreibung der Forschungsmethodik in den Kapiteln 3 bis 6 benannt. 
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2 An Introduction to Moral Emotions: Summary of Published 
Articles 
In this chapter I briefly summarize the results of two published articles I coauthored 
(Rudolph, Schulz, & Tscharaktschiew, 2013; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014). These 
two articles constitute the basis for the following chapters. Several research questions 
arising from these two basic papers (see Chapter 2.3) will be addressed in the 
subsequent chapters of my dissertation. (The full text of the summarized articles is 
included on the enclosed CD. Please refer to this CD for detailed methodological and 
statistical background.) 
 
2.1 A First Empirical Analysis of Moral Emotions 
I first became interested in the topic of moral emotions when I was a coauthor of an 
empirical research article entitled “Moral Emotions: An Analysis guided by Heider’s Naïve 
Action Analysis.“ (Rudolph et al., 2013). 
Conducting a general literature review, we found that 23 emotion words had been 
labeled as a ‘moral emotion’ by at least one author in the fields of psychology and 
philosophy. In alphabetical order, these emotions are: Admiration, anger, awe, contempt, 
disgust, elevation, embarrassment, empathy, envy, gratitude, guilt, indignation, jealousy, 
pity, pride, regret, remorse, respect (including self-respect), schadenfreude (joy in the 
misfortune of others), shame, scorn and sympathy (see Rudolph et al., 2013). 
Interestingly, it became clear that there are no straightforward criteria to identify moral 
emotions, and that existing approaches often considered a rather limited set of moral 
emotions or even single emotions only. For example, much research had been conducted 
concerning the subgroup of ‘self-conscious’ emotions, that is, shame, guilt, 
embarrassment, and pride (see e.g., M. Lewis, 2008; Tangney, 2002; Tangney & Fischer, 
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1995; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). However, it was far from clear whether 
the criteria described for these emotions – for example, that they refer to specific aspects 
of a person’s self versus a person’s behavior – can also be applied to other moral 
emotions. In short, there were no criteria for identifying moral emotions and distinguishing 
them from other (non-moral) emotions. Thus far, different authors provided different lists 
of moral emotions. The most prominent and also most comprehensive analyses have 
been provided by Haidt (2003; 15 emotions) and Weiner (2006; 12 emotions). However, a 
comprehensive classification of moral emotions as well as a common definition suitable 
for all (or at least a wide range of) moral emotions was still missing. 
 
2.1.1 Towards a Classification of Moral Emotions 
Rudolph et al. (2013) suggested two concepts to classify moral emotions on empirical 
grounds, namely (1) target (i.e., whether an emotion is directed at an acting person 
her/himself or at an observed person) and (2) ‘morally evaluative function’ (i.e., whether 
an emotion evaluates a person’s behavior as morally right and praiseworthy vs. morally 
wrong and blameworthy). 
These suggestions were well supported by our data (four studies including 247 
participants). First of all, (1) results reveal that moral emotions are directed at different 
persons or targets: They are either directed at the person experiencing the respective 
moral emotion her/himself, as is the case for shame or guilt, or they are directed at 
another person, as is the case for admiration or sympathy (see also Haidt, 2003; 
Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007; Weiner, 2006). In the following, I refer to the former 
group as moral actor emotions and to the latter group as moral observer emotions (see 
also Rudolph et al., 2013). Furthermore, with regard to their antecedent conditions, there 
is common agreement that moral emotions arise after the violation of moral standards or 
norms (e.g., Haidt, 2003; Tangney et al., 2007) and that they refer to “a consideration 
concerning good and bad, right and wrong, and ought and should” (Weiner, 2006, p. 87). 
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Moreover, moral emotions regulate social behaviors (e.g., Fiske, 2002; Haidt, 2003, 2007; 
Tangney et al., 2007). In conclusion, we proposed that moral emotions (2) contain a 
morally evaluative function, that is, they evaluate a person’s own (moral actor emotions) 
or other person’s behavior (moral observer emotions) as morally praiseworthy or 
blameworthy. For example, pride functions as a positive evaluation of a person’s own 
behavior (e.g., when experienced after a successfully passed exam, given that high effort 
had been expended beforehand), whereas guilt functions as a negative evaluation of 
one’s own behavior (e.g., when experienced after failing an exam, given that the failure 
was caused by lack of effort). Similarly, persons feel admiration towards their friends or 
family members for successfully passing an exam due to high effort (which now functions 
as a positive evaluation of other’s behavior) or anger in case of failure, when this failure is 
ascribed to other person’s lack of effort (now functioning as a negative evaluation of 
other’s behavior). 
 
2.1.2 Cognitive Antecedents of Moral Emotions 
How exactly do these positive versus negative emotional evaluations arise? We found that 
Heider’s (1958) Naïve Action Analysis provides a promising tool in this regard. According 
to Heider, the attainment of goals is influenced by effort, ability, task difficulty and luck. 
That is, for example, people can attain goals (e.g., becoming a millionaire) simply because 
of good luck (e.g., by winning in a lottery). Other goals, for example becoming a famous 
musician, may be influenced by ability or musical aptitude as well as by effort expenditure. 
Moreover, the attainment of goals varies depending on task difficulty (obviously with a 
greater likelihood of attainment in case of easy as compared to difficult tasks). Generally, 
luck and task difficulty are regarded as external forces (i.e., located outside the person), 
whereas ability and effort are regarded as internal forces (i.e., located within the person). 
Furthermore, with regard to internal forces, ability is regarded as rather stable (and thus 
rather uncontrollable to the person), whereas effort is regarded as unstable (and thus 
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controllable to the person) (see also Weiner, 1995, 2006). Within the moral domain, in 
addition to goal attainment, those forces that are under are person’s volitional control are 
of special interest. Besides effort expenditure, another element of Heider’s (1958) Naïve 
Action Analysis is important in this regard, namely the concept of ‘ought’: 
Ought is described as the moral standard of a specific situation or goal, which can 
be positive or negative from a moral point of view. That is, for example, helping the poor is 
usually regarded as morally positive, whereas betraying one’s partner is regarded as 
morally negative. Thus, ought is an impersonal normative concept referring to what 
“ought” to be done (see also Turiel, 1983, 2002), independent from personal wishes and 
desires (see Heider, 1958). Persons are free to choose morally positive versus morally 
negative goals – consequently, as we will see – different positive versus negative moral 
emotions are elicited depending on whether the pursued goal is good versus bad. 
Furthermore, Weiner (e.g., 1985, 1995, 2006) pointed out that effort – as an 
important element of Heider’s naïve action analysis – is closely related to perceived 
controllability: Typically, people are free to expend high versus low effort to attain their 
goals. Investing high effort to attain a morally positive goal (e.g., passing an exam, helping 
others, being good parents, etc.) has also been described as ‘the norm of’ effort’ (e.g., 
Matteucci, 2007; Matteucci & Gosling, 2004). Thus, adhering to the norm of effort is 
regarded as praiseworthy and – as we will see – elicits positive moral emotions, whereas 
violating the norm of effort is regarded as blameworthy and elicits negative moral 
emotions. The evaluation of effort varies with the concept of ought, as becomes apparent 
when considering morally negative goals as compared to morally positive goals: Investing 
effort to attain morally negative goals is regarded as blameworthy. However, not investing 
effort to attain a morally negative goal still results in a negative evaluation of the overall 
situation, as pursuing negative goals is sufficient for eliciting moral emotions. Furthermore, 
not investing effort to attain morally positive goals is regarded as blameworthy, as the 
norm of effort is violated. 
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2.1.3 Empirical Data 
To test our assumptions that positive moral emotions are positive signals for morally 
positive or praiseworthy behavior, whereas negative moral emotions are negative signals 
for morally negative behavior, we varied ought (positive vs. negative gal), goal attainment 
(attained vs. not attained) and effort (high vs. low) using hypothetical (Studies 1 and 2) as 
well as realistic (Studies 3 and 4) scenarios in four paper and pencil studies and analyzed 
the influence of these cognitive antecedents on moral actor (Studies 1 and 3) and moral 
observer (Studies 2 and 4) emotions. By means of 3-way within-subjects ANOVAs we 
found that ought, goal-attainment and effort explain large amounts of variance with regard 
to the genesis of moral emotions. 
Results confirmed that admiration, pride, respect and sympathy (as positive moral 
observer emotions) as well as pride (as a positive moral actor emotion) arise as positive 
evaluations of morally positive behavior, whereas anger, contempt, indignation, disgust 
and schadenfreude (as negative moral observer emotions) as well as guilt, shame, 
embarrassment and regret (as negative moral actor emotions) arise as negative 
evaluations of morally negative behavior.  
2.1.3.1 Positive Moral Observer Emotions 
More precisely, admiration, pride (as an observer emotion), respect and sympathy are 
most likely in case of positive goals and given that effort was expended to attain these 
goals, even more so, when the goal was actually attained (with the exception of sympathy 
being elicited for non-attained positive goals only). Here, we clearly see that the morally 
evaluative function of these emotions refers to the positive evaluation of both pursuing 
morally positive goals as well as expending effort to attain these goals. Furthermore, 
admiration, pride and respect are also elicited in case of attained positive goals, given that 
effort was not expended. Again, we see a positive evaluation of pursuing positive goals. 
However, in the absence of effort, people probably infer that these goals must have been 
attained because of high ability, as ability and effort are regarded as compensatory in the 
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process of goal attainment (Binser & Försterling, 2004; see also Heider, 1958). Thus, in 
the absence of effort, success (i.e., goal attainment) is ascribed to high ability, which also 
gives rise to positive emotional evaluations. These results corroborated previous findings 
that admiration and pride are experienced in relation to high effort and/or high ability (e.g., 
Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Haidt, 2003; Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Weiner, 2006) and extended 
these existing approaches by explicitly pre-defining the positive moral standard of a given 
situation or goal. Furthermore we also included respect into the category of positive moral 
emotions, as this emotion also clearly shows positive evaluations of both pursuing morally 
positive goals and high effort given morally positive goals. Additionally, inferences of high 
ability and resulting positive evaluations can also be assumed for respect. Furthermore, 
our results suggest that sympathy also contains a positive evaluation of effort expenditure 
(given morally positive gals), which complemented earlier views that sympathy is rather 
related to low ability (i.e., arising when goals could not be attained because of lack of 
ability, see e.g., Weiner, 2006). 
2.1.3.2 Negative Moral Observer Emotions 
Anger, indignation, contempt, disgust and schadenfreude are most likely when morally 
negative goals are pursued (relatively independent from their attainment and the 
respective extent of effort, with the exception of schadenfreude predominantly occurring 
for non-attained negative goals). Furthermore, anger, indignation, contempt and 
schadenfreude are also elicited given that effort had not been expended to attain morally 
positive goals. For anger and indignation this applies to both attained and non-attained 
goals. For contempt and schadenfreude this applies to non-attained goals only. Thus, 
these results suggest that both pursuing morally negative goals as well as not investing 
effort to attain morally positive goals elicit negative emotional evaluations, which illustrates 
the negative morally evaluative function of these emotions. 
The alert reader may be wondering why sympathy is classified as a positive moral 
emotion, whereas schadenfreude is classified as a negative moral emotion. The morally 
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evaluative function of an emotion refers to the evaluation of the underlying behavior – not 
to the hedonic quality (i.e., whether an emotion feels good or bad, see e.g., Ben-Ze’ev, 
2000) of an emotion. In this regard, sympathy and schadenfreude have been described as 
‘discordant’ emotions (e.g., Heider, 1958): Despite the fact that it feels bad to experience 
sympathy, this emotion communicates a positive evaluation of another person’s behavior 
or state (e.g., that the observed person’s behavior was good or that she/he deserves 
help). Similarly, despite the fact that experiencing schadenfreude feels good, this emotion 
communicates that another person’s behavior was wrong and, for example given a failure 
or misfortune, it communicates that he/she deserves this misfortune (see also Rudolph & 
Tscharaktschiew, 2014).  
2.1.3.3 Positive Moral Actor Emotions 
As its observer counterpart, pride (as an actor emotion) is also most likely given that effort 
had been expended to attain a morally positive goal. However, when evaluating our own 
actions, pride is predominantly felt for attained goals and hardly arises after non-attained 
positive goal. Here, it also arises given low effort, which again suggests inferences to high 
ability. As the positive evaluation of effort is mainly restricted to attained goals, the 
influence of goal attainment on the emergence of pride is comparatively stronger for this 
moral actor emotion as compared to moral observer emotions. We will return to this issue 
in Chapter 3. Generally, these findings underline previous approaches suggesting that 
pride refers to both high ability and high effort, which have also been described as ‘alpha’ 
(pride in self) versus ‘beta’ (pride in behavior) - components of pride (see e.g., Tangney, 
1990; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney et al., 2007). 
2.1.3.4 Negative Moral Actor Emotions 
Similar to negative moral observer emotions, shame, guilt, regret and embarrassment are 
also most likely given morally negative goals or given lack of effort when pursuing morally 
positive goals. However, in contrast to their observer counterparts, negative moral actor 
emotions hardly arise given lack of effort in case of attained goals. Shame, guilt, regret 
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and embarrassment are likely when morally positive goals are not attained, despite the 
fact that effort had been invested. Thus, as was the case for positive moral emotions (both 
actor and observer), inferences to ability are likely: As the non-attainment of the goal 
cannot be ascribed to lack of effort, it is probably ascribed to low ability, which also has 
been found to elicit negative moral emotions (e.g., Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney et 
al., 2007). (We will return to ability as an eliciting condition for moral emotions in Chapter 
5). 
As was the case for pride (as an actor emotion) again, we found a comparatively 
stronger influence of goal attainment on negative moral actor emotions as compared to 
negative moral observer emotions. 
 
2.1.4 Cluster Analyses of Moral Emotions 
We conducted cluster-analyses to analyze how the moral actor and moral observer 
emotions group together based on the mean values obtained for each emotion in each of 
the eight experimental conditions constituted by the respective variations of ought, goal 
attainment and effort. Cluster analyses were conducted separately for actor vs. observer 
emotions.  
Results revealed that moral observer emotions can be divided into two meaningful 
clusters (containing positive vs. negative moral observer emotions), each of which can be 
further distinguished into sub-clusters (see Figure 2.1): The cluster of positive observer 
emotions showed that admiration, pride and respect are very similar moral emotions 
forming one subgroup of positive moral observer emotions. We will later refer to these 
emotions as ‘other-rewarding emotions’ (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, sympathy enters 
the cluster of positive moral emotions at a later stage showing that there is less, but still 
considerable similarity with regard to the positive evaluative function of these emotions. 
Contempt and disgust are the most similar emotions forming a subgroup within the 
cluster of negative moral observer emotions. A further subgroup consists of anger and 
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indignation. These four emotions merge into a larger cluster of negative moral observer 
emotions. Schadenfreude is the last emotion entering this group.  
With the exception of disgust, all of these negative observer emotions will be 
addressed as ‘other punishing emotions’ (see chapter 5). We excluded disgust from 
further studies on moral emotions as this emotion is predominantly experienced in rather 
specific contexts, for example in situations related to the regulation of bodily functions 
(including sexual behavior and defecation), contamination, purity or divinity (e.g., Rozin, 
Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; see also Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). 
 
Figure 2.1 Moral Observer Emotions: Results from Cluster Analysis 
 
 
Note. This figure is a slightly modified version of the respective figure in Rudolph et al. 2013. 
 
With regard to moral actor emotions, the cluster of positive moral emotions (see 
Figure 2.2) consists of pride only. (In Chapters 3 and 5 we will also consider self-respect 
as a further moral actor emotion.) Within the group of negative moral actor emotions, 
shame, guilt and regret show the greatest similarities and thus constitute a sub-cluster. 
Regret enters the cluster of negative moral actor emotions at a slightly later stage. 
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Figure 2.2 Moral Actor Emotions: Results from Cluster Analysis 
 
 
Note. This figure is a slightly modified version of the respective figure in Rudolph et al. 2013. 
 
2.1.5 Conclusions 
Our studies confirmed that Heider’s (1959) Naïve Action Analysis provides a useful tool 
for describing the genesis of moral emotions: Moral emotions are elicited by 
considerations of different combinations of ought, goal attainment and effort.  
Furthermore, moral emotions can be distinguished according to their target (i.e., 
being directed at observed versus acting persons). Both moral observer and moral actor 
emotions can further be divided into positive versus negative emotions according to their 
positive versus negative evaluative function. The four groups of moral emotions are 
depicted in Table 2.1. The obtained data lead to a preliminary definition of moral 
emotions:  
“ … moral emotions constitute positive (positive moral emotions) or negative 
(negative moral emotions) evaluations of our own (actor emotions) or other’s 
(observer emotions) actions in the process of goal attainment. These evaluations 
of actions are based on universal moral standards (ought), the attainment of a 
person’s goal (goal attainment), and the invested effort to attain the goal (effort).” 
(Rudolph et al., 2013, p. 88).  
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                      Table 2.1 A Classification of Moral Emotions 
Moral Emotions 
 Actor Observer 
positive 
 
 
 
 
negative 
pride 
 
 
 
 
regret 
guilt 
shame 
embarrassment 
admiration 
pride  
respect 
sympathy 
 
anger 
indignation 
schadenfreude 
contempt 
disgust 
 
2. 2 Integrating Moral Emotions in the Context of Attributional Theories 
The second article in which I am a coauthor is entitled “An Attributional Analysis of Moral 
Emotions: Naïve Scientists and Everyday Judges” (Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014). 
This article provides an analysis of moral emotions from an attributional point of view and 
thus embeds moral emotions into the broader context of attribution theories.  
 
2.2.1 Metaphorical Backgrounds of Moral Emotions 
In his Naïve Action Analysis (see Chapter 2.1) Heider (1958) introduced the metaphor of 
“persons as (naïve) scientists, aiming to understand, predict, and control themselves and 
their environment” (Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014). As already described, causal 
ascriptions (e.g., considerations of effort and ability in the process of goal attainment) 
have a strong influence on the genesis of moral emotions. Moreover, attributional theories 
also suggest that feelings influence subsequent actions. Thus, attributional theories of 
moral emotions have also been labeled as sequence theories: Causal ascriptions elicit 
moral emotions which subsequently encourage specific behaviors. Here, the perceived 
controllability of the respective cause is a decisive factor for eliciting moral emotions as 
well as subsequent actions. That is, for example given a failure or misfortune, lack of effort 
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is regarded as a controllable cause, whereas lack of ability is regarded as a rather 
uncontrollable cause (e.g., Weiner, 1995, 2006). The attributional analysis of help-giving is 
a very well documented example in this regard: When another person’s misfortune is 
perceived as uncontrollable, sympathy is elicited and the likelihood for help-giving is 
increased. In contrast, when this person’s misfortune is perceived as controllable, anger is 
elicited and the likelihood for help-giving is decreased (see also Rudolph et al., 2004). 
Returning to the metaphor of persons as naïve scientists, this implies that if one knows 
another person’s causal ascriptions, one will be able to predict this person’s moral 
emotions – and if one knows another person’s moral emotions, one will be able to predict 
this person’s future behavior. 
Recently, the metaphor of persons as naïve scientists has been supplemented by 
the metaphor of ‘persons as judges in the courtroom of life’ (Weiner, 2006). This new 
metaphor specifically refers to moral emotions from an attributional point of view. It 
describes that in everyday social interactions, people frequently have to make judgments 
of good versus bad and right versus wrong. For example, imagine a teacher judging a 
failing student according to her/his previous actions. The teacher may ask her/himself 
whether the student’s previous actions were right (e.g., given that the student expended 
lots of effort, but nevertheless failed) or wrong (e.g., given that the student did not expend 
any effort to obtain good results; see also Matteucci, 2007) and adjust his own actions 
(e.g., the likelihood of help-giving, reward or punishment) accordingly. As moral emotions 
are also related to such considerations (Weiner, 2006), people’s judgments of good 
versus bad elicit positive versus negative moral emotions in many everyday social 
interactions. That is, for example, the teacher will feel sympathy for the failing student, 
when her/his behavior was morally right (i.e., given that effort was expended). Here, it is 
likely that the failure is ascribed to rather uncontrollable causes, for example when 
concluding the student’s ability is low (see also Binser & Försterling, 2004). In contrast, 
the teacher will experience anger, when the failure is ascribed to lack of effort, which is 
regarded as a controllable cause (see also Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Weiner, 1995, 2006). 
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Subsequent behaviors (e.g., help-giving) are influenced by these judgments as well: In 
case of failures, help-giving is more likely given uncontrollable causes. Furthermore, the 
teacher will be more likely to help the failing student when experiencing sympathy and 
less likely to provide help when experiencing anger (see also Rudolph, Roesch, 
Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004; Weiner, 2006). 
 
2.2.2 Moral Emotions as ‘Stop vs. Go - Signals' 
We have already explained that moral emotions contain a morally evaluative function (see 
Chapter 2.1), as they communicate whether a certain behavior is good and right or bad 
and wrong. The functional value of a moral emotion can be regarded as positive vs. 
negative signals providing information on whether a certain behavior should be stopped 
(i.e., when the behavior is evaluated as wrong) or continued (i.e., when the behavior is 
evaluated as right). In short, moral emotions function as stop and go – signals (see 
Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014).  
 More precisely, admiration, pride (as an observer emotion), respect and sympathy 
provide go-signals communicating that an observed person’s behavior was right and that 
this behavior should be continued (even if it has not yet lead to an intended positive goal). 
In contrast, anger, indignation, contempt; disgust and schadenfreude provide stop-signals 
communicating that an observed person’s behavior was wrong and should be stopped. 
Similarly, pride informs the actor that her/his own behavior was right and should be 
continued (go-signal), whereas shame, guilt, embarrassment and regret inform the actor 
that her/his own behavior was wrong and should be changed (stop-signal). Positive 
signals are perceived as pleasant or emotionally rewarding (e.g., when being the target of 
admiration or being proud of owns own achievements), whereas negative signals are 
perceived as unpleasant or emotionally punishing (e.g., when being the target of 
admiration or feeling guilty about one’s own wrongdoings.  
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2.3 Open Questions 
2.3.1 Distinguishing Moral from Non-Moral Emotions 
So far, we have considered a wide range of moral emotions. However, we cannot assume 
that the concepts we identified to analyze moral emotions (i.e., different combinations of 
ought, goal attainment and effort give rise to specific sets of moral emotions) do not apply 
to other emotions as well. Thus, it is important to identify the specific attributes of moral as 
compared to non-moral emotions. This task is addressed in Chapter 3. 
 
2.3.2 Controllability 
As has been described, the cognitive antecedents of effort and ability do not only give rise 
to moral emotions, but also function as causal ascriptions on which judgments of 
controllability and responsibility are based. These judgments subsequently influence both 
moral emotions as well as subsequent actions (e.g., Weiner, 2006). So far, the concept of 
controllability has not been empirically analyzed in the above studies. Thus, the influence 
of controllability (and the related concept of responsibility, see e.g., Weiner, 1995, 2006) 
on moral emotions and subsequent actions is addressed in Chapters 4 (help-giving) and 5 
(reward and punishment).  
 
2.3.3 Ability as a Further Antecedent Condition Eliciting Moral Emotions 
We already introduced the concept of ability in the context of moral emotions. To the best 
of our knowledge, previous approaches related this concept to rather limited subsets of 
moral emotions only. Thus, in Chapter 5, we analyze how both effort and ability give rise 
to a wide range of moral observer emotions and moral actor emotions. 
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2.3.4 Behavioral Consequences of Moral Emotions 
So far, we have restricted our empirical analyses to the antecedent conditions of moral 
emotions. However, as moral emotions are designed to guide subsequent behavior 
(Tangney et al., 2007; see also Rudolph et al., 2004), we analyze behavioral 
consequences of moral emotions: In Chapter 4, we analyze the relationship between 
shame, guilt, regret, sympathy, anger and schadenfreude on help-giving. Moreover, we 
have already explained that the morally evaluative function of moral emotions is related to 
evaluating people’s behavior as praiseworthy versus blameworthy. In Chapter 5, we 
analyze how positive versus negative moral observer emotions are related to reward (for 
praiseworthy) and punishment (for blameworthy) behavior. Behavioral consequences are 
closely related to the functional value of moral emotions and can thus be regarded as 
behavioral equivalents of stop vs. go - signals (see also Chapter 2.2.2). 
 
2.3.5 Personality 
Up to now, we have referred to moral emotions as general phenomena of human 
experience. However, there is also evidence that experiencing moral emotions may vary 
from person to person depending on specific personality traits. In this regard, the influence 
of empathy (see also Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney, 1991) is addressed in Chapter 
3. The role of perfectionism (see also Tangney, 2002) is addressed in Chapter 7. 
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2.3.6 Cognitive Effort 
According to the Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgment (Haidt, 2001), moral 
emotions can be regarded as quick intuitive judgments that precede moral reasoning. 
However, our own previous research (see Rudolph et al., 2013) suggests that moral 
emotions require quite complex considerations of ought, goal attainment and effort and 
that these considerations are more complex for moral as compared to non-moral emotions 
(see Chapter 3). The extent of mental effort underlying moral versus non-moral emotions 
is addressed in Chapter 6. As a means of operationalization, reaction times for moral 
versus non moral emotions are analyzed. 
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3 On Distinguishing Moral from Non-Moral Emotions. 
 
3.1. Abstract 
We propose an empirical approach for distinguishing moral from non-moral emotions. We 
assume that an emotion’s morally evaluative function is based on calculations of ought, 
goal attainment and effort (see Heider, 1958). In two studies (Study 1: observer emotions, 
N = 231 participants; Study 2: actor emotions, N = 237 participants) we analyze the 
influence of ought (positive vs. negative goals), goal attainment (goal attained vs. not 
attained) and effort (high effort vs. lack of effort) on moral versus non-moral emotions. In 
contrast to non-moral emotions, which are predominantly directed at outcomes, moral 
emotions evaluate a person’s behavior (positive vs. negative). Positive moral emotions 
(observer emotions: sympathy, respect, admiration, pride; actor emotions: pride, self-
respect) communicate that the respective behavior is good or right, whereas negative 
moral emotions (observer emotions: anger, indignation, schadenfreude, contempt, 
disappointment; actor emotions: regret, guilt, shame, embarrassment) communicate that 
the behavior is bad or wrong. Non-moral emotions (positive: joy, relief, envy; negative: 
sadness, disappointment, anger) do not contain this morally evaluative function with 
regard to a person’s behavior, but rather communicate whether an outcome is good or 
bad. Interestingly, disappointment and anger may occur as both moral and non-moral 
emotions, as these can be directed at outcomes of events and a person’s behavior. 
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3.2 Introduction and Theoretical Background 
 
“The classification of each emotion as moral 
[…] or morally neutral is not self-evident and 
sometimes may require the help of empirical 
studies.” (Ben Ze’ev, 2002, p. 149) 
 
“Everyone knows what an emotion is, until asked to give a definition. Then, it seems, no 
one knows” (Fehr & Russel, 1984, p. 464). As we obviously seem to have problems to 
define emotions in general, it is not surprising that the same difficulties arise with regard to 
a special sub-group of emotions, the so-called “moral emotions”. Several authors have 
proposed definitions and classifications of moral emotions (e.g., Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Gray 
& Wegner, 2011; Haidt, 2003; Kroll & Egan, 2004; Rudolph, Schulz, & Tscharaktschiew, 
2013; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007; Weiner, 2006), however, they came to different 
conclusions as to which emotions should be considered as moral emotions. 
Consequently, thus far, there is no clear distinction between moral and non-moral 
emotions. Moreover, none of the existing classifications has provided an empirically based 
tool for distinguishing moral from non-moral emotions. This is the aim of the present 
studies. 
How can we identify moral emotions? We postulate that moral emotions serve a 
particular morally evaluative function, that is, moral emotions evaluate whether a specific 
behavior is right (positive moral emotions) or wrong (negative moral emotions), and 
communicate this evaluation to the acting person (who can be self or other). To explain 
this concept in more detail, let us take a closer look at the special circumstances that elicit 
moral emotions. 
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3.2.1 Identifying Moral Emotions: Cognitive Antecedents 
Moral emotions have been described to contain “a consideration concerning good or bad, 
right or wrong, and ought and should” (Weiner, 2006, p. 87). In addition, we know that all 
emotions are characterized by at least two dimensions, namely valence (positive or 
pleasant vs. negative or unpleasant) and arousal or activation (high vs. low) (e.g., 
Feldman Barrett & Russel, 1998; Russel, 1980, 2003). Appraisal theories of emotion 
identified a huge variety of (predominantly cognitive) antecedents of emotions, for 
example novelty, certainty, fairness, modifiability, pleasantness, predictability, satisfaction 
of goals, goal significance, importance, motive consistence, agency, anticipated effort and 
compatibility with standards (e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1986, 1993; Frijda, 
Kuipers, & terSchure, 1989; Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Roseman, 
Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Roseman & Evdokas, 2004; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; 
Scherer, 1984; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & 
Lazarus, 1993). These (and several other) appraisals give rise to specific emotions (e.g. 
hope, joy, relief, surprise, sadness, distress, frustration, fear, disgust, anger, contempt, 
pride, guilt, regret, shame) and account for qualitative distinctions among them (e.g., 
Arnold, 1960; Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1993; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Roseman 
et al., 1996; for a detailed discussion see e.g., Scherer et al., 2001). 
We argue that (1) evaluation of agency, (2) compatibility with moral standards and 
(3) effort are of special importance in the domain of moral emotions. Therefore, we now 
summarize important findings with regard to these appraisals as their cognitive 
antecedents.  
3.2.1.1 Agency 
Moral emotions are univocally distinguished according to their target (agency): Moral 
emotions are either directed towards the experiencing person (self-conscious emotions, 
self-directed emotions or actor emotions, see Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Haidt, 2003; Rudolph 
et al., 2013; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney et al., 2007; Weiner, 2006) or towards 
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other persons (other-directed or observer emotions, Rudolph et al., 2013; Weiner, 2006; 
see also Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Gray & Wegner, 2011). In what follows, we will refer to 
these as actor emotions (e.g., guilt and shame) vs. observer emotions (e.g., sympathy 
and schadenfreude).  
3.2.1.2 Moral Standards 
From a functional perspective, moral emotions can be regarded as signals for normative 
behavior: More specifically, negatively valenced moral emotions (actor: shame, guilt, 
regret, embarrassment; observer: anger, contempt, disgust, schadenfreude) arise after 
the transgression or violation of moral standards, as is the case for lying, cheating, 
causing harm or other morally negative behaviors related to failing to live up to a society’s 
norms and values (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Bidjerano, 2010; Davidson, 
2006; Gray & Wegner, 2011; Haidt, 2003; Hareli, Moran-Amir, David & Hess, 2013; Hareli 
& Weiner, 2002; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; H.B. Lewis, 1971; 
Miller, 1992; Rozin et al., 1999; Tangney, 2002; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney et al., 
2007; Weiner, 2006). 
In contrast, positively valenced moral emotions (actor: pride, self-respect; 
observer: admiration, pride, respect, elevation, gratitude) are elicited when moral 
standards are met or even exceeded, as is the case for extraordinary skills, talents, 
especially praiseworthy behavior (including successes or achievements caused by both 
high effort and / or high ability) (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Chipperfield, Perry, Weiner, & 
Newell, 2009; Drummond, 2006; Feather, McKee, & Bekker, 2011; Frijda, 1986; Haidt, 
2003; Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Li & Fischer, 2007; Massey, 1983a, 1983b; Mauri, 2011; 
Tangney, 1990, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007; Weiner, 2006). Based on previous research 
on sympathy (e.g., Gray & Wegner, 2011; Rudolph et al., 2013; Weiner, Perry, & 
Magnusson, 1988; Weiner, 2006), we suppose that this emotion is another positive moral 
observer emotion. More precisely, sympathy arises when morally positive goals were 
pursued but not attained, given that effort was expended, see Rudolph et al., 2013). 
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Moral standards have also been described as “ought”, referring to the moral 
valence of a goal, which can either be positive or negative (see Heider, 1958; Rudolph et 
al., 2013). That is, what “ought” to be done or not (i.e., what is regarded as morally 
positive vs. negative) is prescribed by moral principles which are universal and go beyond 
the rules and requirement of a specific society or religion (see also Turiel, 1983, 2002). 
However, moral emotions are not only based on perceptions of ought (wrong vs. right), 
but we also take into account how much we try to seek virtue and avoid vice – and 
whether or not we succeed in doing so. Thus, Rudolph et al. (2013) proposed a 
classification of moral emotions that specifies three basic antecedents of moral emotions 
that are based on Heider’s (1958) naïve action analysis: ought (the moral valence of a 
desired goal), effort (the extent of effort expended by a person to attain the respective 
goal, see below) and goal attainment (the desired goal may be attained or not attained). 
3.2.1.3 Effort 
In addition to having a positive intention (i.e., pursuing a morally positive goal, e.g., 
helping your grandma), a person should also expend effort to realize this positive 
intention: Expending effort to attain one’s (morally positive) goals is regarded as an ethic 
principle (thus similar to moral standards) and has also been referred to as “the norm of 
effort” (e.g., Graham, 1991; Matteucci, 2007; Matteucci & Gosling, 2004; see also Weiner, 
2006). Consequently, one should not only promise to help your grandma (i.e., displaying a 
positive intention or ought) but also expend considerable effort. However, if one does not 
expend effort to fulfill a promise (and thus violates the norm of effort), the behavior will be 
evaluated as morally negative. Negative moral emotions (e.g., guilt or shame) are likely on 
the side of the acting person, while other persons are likely to be disappointed or get 
angry. 
In contrast, pursuing a morally negative goal will always lead to negative 
evaluations of a person’s behavior: That is, for example, if you find out that your partner 
has the intention to be unfaithful to you, you will probably feel anger and disappointment, 
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regardless whether your partner invested a lot of effort to attain this morally negative goal 
or whether the goal has already been attained. In Weiner’s (2006) terms, with regard to 
eliciting moral emotions, the “considerations concerning right or wrong” that are directed 
at a person’s behavior, refer to both the moral valence or standard of the underlying goal 
and the extent of effort expended to attain the respective goal. Consequently, pursuing 
morally negative goals as well as not expending effort to attain morally positive goals 
should elicit negative moral emotions, whereas investing effort to attain morally positive 
goals should elicit positive moral emotions.  
We will now work out important differences between moral and non-moral 
emotions before we turn to some emotions deserving special attendance.  
 
3.2.2 Moral vs. Non-Moral Emotions 
Imagine that your partner is a marathon runner and has trained very hard during the last 
year to win the New-York-Marathon, but nevertheless fails to reach this (positive) goal. As 
the intended goal was not attained, you will probably feel sadness (a negative non-moral 
emotion). Moreover, you will also feel positive moral emotions, for example, admiration 
and respect for your partner for trying so hard. However, you will not feel positive non-
moral emotions (e.g., joy). This example leads us to the most important distinction 
between moral and non-moral emotions: We argue that the decisive difference between 
non-moral vs. moral emotions lies in the primary target of the emotional evaluation. Moral 
emotions contain a morally evaluative function communicating that a person’s behavior 
was right or wrong, (e.g., admiration and respect as positive emotional signals for 
expending effort), regardless whether the respective goal was actually attained or not. In 
contrast, non-moral emotions predominantly evaluate the valence of the outcome of the 
respective situation in which the behavior occurs (e.g., sadness elicited by not attaining 
the goal of winning the marathon). 
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3.2.2.1 Non-Moral Emotions 
We regard joy, relief and sadness, as well as disappointment (outcome-related 
disappointment, see Chapter 3.2.2.2) as non-moral emotions, as these emotions have 
consistently been referred to as basic or outcome-related emotions, (see e.g., Ekman, 
1984; 1992; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987; Tracy & Robins, 2004; Weiner, 
1986; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002). These emotions rather reflect the valence of the 
outcome (good vs. bad) of a respective situation. Please note that in contrast to previous 
research (e.g., Gray & Wegner, 2011) we assume that relief is another (positive) non-
moral emotion. We think that relief is primarily elicited by the positive outcome of a 
previously negative situation, for example, when a negative condition or thread can be 
avoided or removed (see e.g., Carver, 2009; Roseman & Evdokas, 2004; Sweeny & Vohs, 
2012). 
3.2.2.2 Emotions with Both Moral and Non-Moral Qualities 
With regard to its moral character, disappointment is a hybrid emotion. Van Dijk and 
Zeelenberg (2002) distinguish between person- versus outcome-related disappointment: 
Whereas outcome-related disappointment (ORD) emerges when a pleasurable outcome 
was expected but not obtained (see also Frijda, 1986), person-related disappointment 
(PRD) is specifically experienced when the cause of the respective failure is attributed to a 
person. Although van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2002) assume that person-related 
disappointment primarily occurs when another person’s behavior (e.g., spreading rumors 
behind other’s backs) is attributed to the character of this person, we assume that PRD is 
also influenced by considerations of ought and effort: That is, your grandma will be 
disappointed when you promise to help her (positive ought) but actually do not attain this 
(positive) goal due to lack of effort.  
Envy is another emotion deserving special attention. It has been referred to as an 
ability-related negative moral observer emotion (e.g., Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Weiner,
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2006). However, it does not necessarily require a moral transgression or morally negative 
behavior. It exclusively occurs following positive outcomes. That is, envy is elicited 
referring to other person’s achievements due to natural gifts (see also Ben Ze’ev, 2002). 
We thus argue that envy is a positive non-moral emotion reflecting that achievements or 
possessions are regarded as good or highly valued by the observer (and are thus envied). 
We further believe that in contrast to positive moral emotions, envy should not signal a 
positive evaluation of expending effort. 
As (to the best of our knowledge) anger has only been referred to as a moral 
emotion when it is directed at other people (see Chapter 3.2.1.2), we suppose that anger 
as an actor emotion functions as a negative non-moral emotion. Furthermore, anger is 
also regarded as a basic emotion (e.g., Ekman, 1984; Shaver et al., 1987). We further 
assume that anger, joy, relief, sadness, and disappointment may occur as both actor and 
observer emotions.  
3.2.2.3 Discordant Emotions 
The reader may have noticed that we described sympathy as a positive and 
schadenfreude as a negative moral emotion. At first glance, this may cause astonishment 
as everyday experience suggests that sympathy feels bad, whereas schadenfreude feels 
good. However, in contrast to all other negative moral emotions, schadenfreude has a 
positive hedonic quality for the experiencing person, and at the same time sends a 
negative signal to others. Analogously, the hedonic quality of sympathy is also discordant 
(see Heider, 1958) to the signal this emotion provides: For the experiencing person 
sympathy feels bad, however, the emotional signal to the observed person is positive, for 
example, it signals that a negative situation of the observed person is not his/her fault, and 
that his/her behavior was right (see Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014).  
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3.2.3 Towards a Classification 
Our aim is to identify characteristics common to all moral emotions that distinguish these 
emotions from non-moral emotions. In summarizing the above considerations, we suggest 
that: 
(1) Positive moral emotions arise as positive evaluations of behavior, given that the 
behavior was morally right (i.e., investing effort to attain a morally positive goal, regardless 
of whether the goal was actually attained). In contrast,  
(2) we think that positive non-moral emotions predominantly arise given that an 
outcome was positive (i.e., that a positive goal was attained or that a negative goal was 
not attained).  
(3) Negative moral emotions arise as negative evaluations of behavior, given that 
the behavior was morally wrong (i.e., that morally negative goals were pursued or effort 
was not expended in the pursuit of positive goals), whereas 
(4) negative non-moral emotions predominantly arise given that an outcome was 
negative (i.e., that a positive goal was not attained or that a negative goal was attained). 
 
3.2.4 Aims and Expectations 
We now report two studies (Study 1: observer emotions, Study 2: actor emotions) to test 
the proposed distinction between moral and non-moral emotions. Expectations are 
outlined separately for studies 1 and 2.1 
 
                                               
1
Previous research has shown that in addition to ought and effort, goal attainment has a stronger influence on eliciting moral 
actor emotions as is the case for moral observer emotions (see Rudolph et al., 2013). Thus, we regard goal attainment as a 
third important factor eliciting moral actor emotions.  
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3.3 Study 1 
Study 1 investigates the influence of ought (positive vs. negative), goal attainment 
(attained vs. not attained) and effort (expended vs. not expended) on the genesis of both 
moral and non-moral observer emotions. 
(1) We expect that moral emotions are influenced more strongly by judgments of 
ought and effort, whereas non-moral emotions are influenced more strongly by judgments 
of ought and goal attainment. This is because effort belongs to characteristics of the 
person, whereas goal attainment refers more strongly to characteristics of the situation in 
which the person’s behavior occurs. 
(2) We expect that positive moral observer emotions (admiration, pride, respect, 
sympathy) are much more likely given positive behaviors, whereas  
(3) negative moral observer emotions (anger, indignation, contempt, PRD, 
schadenfreude) are more likely given negative behaviors. 
(4) We expect that positive non-moral emotions (joy, relief) are most likely given a 
positive outcome, that is, when positive goals are attained or negative goals are not 
attained.  
(5) Negative non-moral emotions should be more likely given negative outcomes, 
that is, when negative goals are attained or positive goals are not attained. 
 
3.3.1 Method 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
231 persons (170 female, 61 male) participated in the study. Mean age was 27.59 years 
(SD = 11.26), ranging from 16 to 70 years. 163 participants were students at Chemnitz 
University of Technology (80 students of psychology, 83 students of other subjects), 58 
participants were adult persons with diverse professional backgrounds, 5 participants 
3 On Distinguishing Moral from Non-Moral Emotions. 29 
 
were school pupils or trainees, 3 were housewives, 1 person was a retired person and 1 
person was unemployed. Students of psychology received course credit for participation, 
all other participants were volunteers.  
3.3.1.2 Experimental Design 
A 2 (ought: positive vs. negative) x 2 (goal attainment: goal attained vs. not attained) x 2 
(effort: effort expended vs. not expended) between subjects design was used. That is, 
participants received scenarios in which an acting person (called “Max”) pursued a 
positive or negative goal (ought = positive vs. negative; hereafter referred to as O+ vs. O-
). Max either attained or did not attain this morally positive or morally negative goal (goal 
attained vs. not attained, hereafter referred to as GA+ vs. GA-). Furthermore, Max did or 
did not expend effort to attain his goal (effort positive vs. negative, hereafter referred to as 
E+ vs. E-). An overview of the scenarios is presented in the upper part of Appendix A. As 
dependent variables, we assessed the participant’s ratings of admiration, pride, respect, 
sympathy, envy, joy, relief (positive observer emotions), anger, contempt, indignation, 
schadenfreude, disappointment and sadness (negative observer emotions) elicited by the 
respective combinations of ought, goal attainment and effort. 
3.3.1.3 Materials and Procedure 
The study was conducted using an online-questionnaire (by means of the internet-based 
software Testmaker®, see Hartweg, Milbradt, Zimmerhofer, & Hornke, 2012). In the 
introduction, participants were asked to imagine a hypothetical situation containing one of 
the eight different combinations of ought, goal attainment and effort. Positive goals (O+) 
were described as something that is generally highly appreciated, for example a very 
good result at school or university (i.e., a highly appreciated achievement) or a 
praiseworthy pro-social behavior (e.g. helping others). Negative goals (O-) were described 
as something that is generally negatively evaluated, for example a blameworthy social 
behavior (e.g., causing harm to somebody, stealing or lying). Participants’ task was to put 
themselves in the position of an observing person and to imagine the respective situation 
3 On Distinguishing Moral from Non-Moral Emotions. 30 
 
in which an acting person (Max) was involved as vividly as possible. Then, participants 
were asked to indicate the extent to which they would feel each of the observer emotions 
with regard to Max. A 6-point rating scale (labeled with 0 = not at all and 5 = to a high 
extent) was provided. 
At the end of the questionnaire, participants were asked to provide demographic 
data. They were given the possibility to make additional comments and to ask questions. 
The completion of the questionnaire (which was part of a more comprehensive research 
project also containing additional variables) lasted approximately 10 minutes. (A smaller 
proportion of dependent and independent variables addressed in studies 1 and 2 as well 
as additional variables contained in the overall research project was already addressed in 
Merkel & Hermsdorf, 2014). To avoid order effects, the questionnaire was provided in two 
randomized versions.  
3.3.1.4 Data Analysis 
As a first step, between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted for each of the respective 
emotions. The calculation of effect sizes was based on the conventions proposed by 
Cohen (1988). Thus, we will regard effect sizes of η2> .009 as small, ≥ .59 as medium, 
and ≥ .138 as large effects. To further investigate the differences between moral and non-
moral observer emotions, two types of t-tests for independent samples were conducted for 
each of the emotions: (1) To assess the positive or negative evaluation of a person’s 
behavior, the averaged ratings for positive (O+GA+E+, O+GA-E+) vs. negative (O+GA+E-
, O+GA-E-, O-GA+E+, O-GA+E-, O-GA-E+, O-GA-E-) behavior were compared. (2) To 
assess the positive or negative evaluation of the outcome of a situation, the averaged 
ratings for positive (O+GA+E, O+GA+E-, O-GA-E+, O-GA-E-) vs. negative (O+GA-E+, 
O+GA-E-, O-GA+E+, O-GA+E-) outcomes were compared. To correct for the 
accumulation of alpha-errors, the significance level was adjusted to .01 (Bonferroni-
correction). Levine tests for homogeneity of variances were conducted beforehand. T-test 
results are reported accordingly. Furthermore, for each t-test, the corresponding effect 
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size d is provided. According to Cohen (1988), effect sizes d ≥ .20 are regarded as small, 
≥ .50 as medium and ≥ .80 as large effects. 
 
3.3.2 Results 
Women indicated slightly more schadenfreude (d = .32), sympathy (d = .28), anger (d = 
.33), disappointment (d = .42) and sadness (d = .37) as well as slightly less joy (d = -.30). 
Participants receiving the first version of the questionnaire indicated slightly more 
admiration (d = .27) and slightly less relief (d = -.30) than participants receiving the second 
version. We did not observe any effects of age, or other influences of gender or version of 
the questionnaire on the dependent variables. As the observed effects are rather small 
(and not related to the main research questions addressed in the present study), these 
variables will not be considered any further. 
In the following, we will first describe the results of ANOVAs conducted separately 
for each observer emotion. Due to space limitations, we will only refer to the amount of 
variance explained by the respective factors. Complete results of the ANOVAs are shown 
in Table 3.1. Mean values are depicted in Figure 3.1. Next, we report t-tests conducted to 
analyze the evaluative function with regard to positive (O+GA+E+, O+GA-E+) versus 
negative (O+GA+E-, O+GA-E-, O-GA+E+, O-GA+E-, O-GA-E+, O-GA-E-) behaviors as 
well as for positive (O+GA+E, O+GA+E-, O-GA-E+, O-GA-E-) versus negative (O+GA-E+, 
O+GA-E-, O-GA+E+, O-GA+E-) outcomes. The resulting morally evaluative function of 
each emotion is displayed by the respective effect sizes d obtained for the evaluation of 
behavior and can be seen in Figure 3.2. The corresponding results of the t-tests are 
shown in Table 3.2. 
3.3.2.1 Positive Moral Observer Emotions 
As expected, for admiration, pride and respect, the largest proportions of the total 
explained variance (55 %, 57 % and 61 %, respectively) are explained by O (admiration: 
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33%, pride: 32 % and respect: 34 %), followed by E (admiration: 10%, pride: 11 % and 
respect: 16 %) and the interaction of O x E (admiration: 5 %, pride: 11 % and respect: 8 
%). In contrast, sympathy, which is typically felt when some kind of failure or harm has 
happened (i.e., when goals are not attained), is predominantly determined by the 
interaction of O x GA (20 %), followed by GA (9 % explained variance), E (3 % of 
explained variance) and the three-way-interaction of O x G A x E (further 3 %). Small 
amounts of variance are explained by O x E (2 %) and GA x E (2 %). T-tests revealed that 
for all four positive moral observer emotions higher values were obtained for positive than 
for negative behaviors. To a lower degree, admiration, pride and respect also show 
slightly higher values for positive as compared to negative outcomes, whereas sympathy 
is more likely given negative outcomes (i.e., when positive goals are not attained). 
 
Table 3.1 Analyses of Variance: Observer Emotions (N = 231) 
 Ought (O) Goal-Attainment 
(GA) 
Effort 
(E) 
O x GA O x E GA x E O x GA x E 
Emotion F η² F η² F η² F η² F η² F η² F η² 
admiration 167.46*** .33 22.25*** .04 48.17*** .10 15.49*** .03 26.41*** .05 <1 .00 <1 .00 
pride  166.45*** .32 5.61* .01 57.80*** .11 10.73** .02 57.55*** .11 2.00n.s. .00 1.95n.s. .00 
respect 187.95*** .34 8.85** .02 90.14*** .16 6.56* .01 43.29*** .08 1.15n.s. .00 <1 .00 
sympathy 1.27n.s. .00 34.00*** .09 9.56** .03 72.43*** .20 8.93** .02 5.83* .02 11.81** .03 
joy 53.29*** .12 22.74*** .05 21.11*** .05 115.35*** .25 3.80
Ɨ(.053 .008 1.92n.s. .00 12.72*** .03 
relief 5.56* .01 17.79*** .05 1.99n.s. .00 119.62*** .32 1.98n.s. .00 4.36* .01 2.15n.s. .00 
               
anger 101.84*** .29 <1 .00 9.61** .03 6.12* .02 9.01** .03 3.53
Ɨ(.062) .0099 2.35n.s. .00 
indignation 166.01*** .41 <1 .00 1.05n.s. .00 3.82
Ɨ(.052) .009 11.04** .03 3.14
Ɨ(.078) .0077 <1 .00 
contempt 218.21*** .49 <1 .00 1.56n.s. .00 <1 .00 4.85* .01 <1 .00 1.31n.s. .00 
schadenfreude 106.05*** .17 181.84*** .28 2.18n.s. .00 80.54*** .13 28.55*** .04 <1 .00 15.91*** .02 
envy 30.43*** .09 48.17*** .14 9.19** .03 23.20*** .07 3.69
Ɨ(.056) .01 6.95** .02 7.51** .02 
disappointment 25.86*** .09 3.85
Ɨ(.051) .01 <1 .00 24.84*** .09 3.14
Ɨ(.078) .01 <1 .00 <1 .00 
sadness 7.04** .02 21.42*** .07 8.91** .03 31.62*** .10 1.76n.s. .00 15.58*** .05 2.34n.s. .01 
Note. η
2
= amount of explained variance; Ɨ = p < .10, * p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001, n.s. = not 
significant). 
 
3.3.2.2 Positive Non-Moral Observer Emotions 
In line with our expectations, both joy and relief are predominantly characterized by the 
interaction of O x GA (joy: 20 % of the total explained variance of 50 %, relief: 32 % of a 
total of 39 %) followed by GA (joy: 5 %, relief: 5 %) and O (joy: 12 %, relief: 1 %). 
Moreover, as expected, the influence of effort is comparatively small (5 % for joy and 
  
 
Figure 3.1 Mean Values for Observer Emotions (Study 1) 
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Figure 3.1 Mean Values for Observer Emotions (Study 1) (continued) 
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Note. O = Ought, GA = Goal Attainment, E = Effort 
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Table 3.2 T-Test Results Obtained for Behavior and Outcome: Observer Emotions 
 Positive 
Behavior 
Negative 
Behavior 
   Positive 
Outcome 
Negative 
Outcome 
   
 M(SD) M(SD) t df d M(SD) M(SD) t df d 
admiration 2.96 (1.44) .70 (1.06) 10.88*** 75.19 1.95 1.54 (1.73) .97 (1.23) 2.83** 199.50 .38 
pride 2.88 (1.50) .42 (.88) 11.62*** 67.47 2.33 1.25 (1.72) .79 (1.21) 2.34* 198.29 .31 
respect 3.66 (1.28) .83 (1.12) 15.87*** 229 2.45 1.72 (1.83) 1.32 (1.51) 1.82n.s. 215.88 .24 
sympathy 1.79 (1.88) 1.05 (1.29) 2.73** 72.45 .51 .56 (1.01) 1.86 (1.59) -7.44*** 201.98 -.97 
joy 2.30 (1.97) .85 (1.37) 5.15*** 72.66 .95 2.06 (1.87) .39 (.83) 8.74*** 150.75 1.17 
relief 1.46 (1.60) 1.37 (1.72) .36n.s. 229 .05 2.38 (1.72) .47 (1.00) 10.21*** 175.95 1.37 
           
anger .46 (1.11) 2.57 (1.72) -10.68*** 144.76 -1.33 1.79 (1.72) 2.31 (1.90) -2.16* 229 -.29 
indignation .39 (.99) 2.50 (1.77) -11.23*** 169.48 -1.31 1.79 (1.79) 2.18 (1.88) -1.61n.s. 229 -.21 
contempt .09 (.67) 2.21 (1.81) -12.98*** 224.61 -1.32 1.63 (1.74) 1.75 (1.95) -.47n.s. 228.35 -.07 
schadenfreude .07 (.26) 1.09 (1.52) -8.51*** 202.00 -.77 1.36 (1.71) .36 (.76) 5.67*** 150.91 .77 
disappointment .86 (1.51) 1.91 (1.66) -4.43*** 101.11 -.65 1.13 (1.47) 2.14 (1.72) -4.79*** 226.94 -.63 
envy .63 (1.00) .57 (1.13) .32n.s. 229 .05 .88 (1.36) .31 (.67) 3.96*** 159.90 .54 
sadness 1.55 (1.86) 1.36 (1.54) .71n.s. 80.59 .12 .88 (1.35) 1.90 (1.70) -5.04*** 222.46 -.67 
Note. * = Ɨ = p < .10, p < .05, **=p < .01, *** = p < .001, n.s. = not significant  
 
further 2 %, 2 % and 3 % of explained variance for the interactions of O x E, GA x E and 
O x GA x E, respectively; and only 1 % for the interaction of GA x E with regard to relief). 
In line with our expectations, both joy and relief are more likely given positive as 
compared to negative outcomes. Furthermore, for joy slightly higher values for positive as 
compared to negative behavior were found as well. We did not find an effect with regard 
to behavior for relief. 
3.3.2.3 Negative Moral Observer Emotions 
As expected, anger, indignation, contempt and disappointment are predominantly 
characterized by the influence of O (anger: 29 %, indignation: 41 %, contempt: 49 %, 
disappointment: 9 % of explained variance). Furthermore, smaller amounts of explained 
variance are caused by E (anger: 3 %, indignation: 0 %, contempt: 0 %, disappointment: 0 
%) and/or the interaction of O x E (anger: 3 %, indignation: 3 %, contempt: 1 %, 
disappointment: 1 %). As schadenfreude can only emerge in the presence of negative 
events (i.e., non-attained goals), here, the greatest amount of variance is explained by GA 
(28 %), followed by O (17 %) and O x GA (13 %). Furthermore, E exerts influence shown 
by the interactions of O x E (4 %) and O x GA x E (2 %). 
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All negative moral observer emotions are more likely given negative behavior. With 
regard to the evaluation of outcomes, we also found higher values for negative outcomes 
for anger, indignation and disappointment. We did not observe an effect for the evaluation 
of outcomes for contempt. In contrast, for schadenfreude, higher values were obtained for 
positive outcomes (i.e., when negative goals were not attained). 
Figure 3.2 The Morally Evaluative Function of Moral Observer Emotions 
 
Observer Emotions (Study 1) – Effect sizes d obtained for positive vs. negative behavior 
 
  
Joy is excluded from being regarded as a moral emotion, as – in contrast to all positive moral 
observer emotions – it does not occur for non-attained positive goals. Disappointment is written in 
brackets as it may occur as both a moral (PRD) and a non-moral emotion (ORD). Sadness and 
envy are excluded as signals for negative behavior were not obtained. Relief is excluded as signals 
for positive behavior were not obtained.
2
 For all non-moral emotions, higher values were obtained 
for outcome than behavior (joyoutcome: dMean = 1.17, reliefoutcome: dMean= 1.37, envyoutcome: dMean= .54, 
sadnessoutcome: dMean= -.67). 
Note. The strength of the morally evaluative signal is represented by effect sizes d obtained for t-
tests referring to behavior. Positive values represent signals for morally positive behavior, whereas 
negative values represent signals for morally negative behavior. 
 
3.3.2.4 Negative Non-Moral Observer Emotions 
In line with our predictions, GA (envy: 14 %, sadness: 7 %) or O x GA (envy: 7 %, 
sadness: 10 %) explain the largest amount of variance for negative non-moral emotions.  
                                               
2
 As sympathy and schadenfreude may occur for non-attained goals only, obtained values for these emotions 
were counted twice for calculating the averaged morally evaluative function (as for all other emotions, values 
for both attained and non-attained goals may occur). 
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For both envy and sadness, there were no effects with regard to behavior. As 
expected, sadness is more likely given negative outcomes. For envy, higher values were 
obtained for positive as compared to negative outcomes.  
 
3.3.3 Discussion of Study 1 
Despite the fact that all observer emotions are influenced by all three cognitive 
antecedents O, GA and E and/or their interactions, we find considerable differences in the 
distribution of explained variance for moral as compared to non-moral emotions. Thus, (1) 
in line with our expectations, for the majority of moral observer emotions (positive: 
admiration, pride, respect; negative: anger, indignation, contempt), greater amounts of 
variance is explained by O, E and their interaction (ranging from 35 to 58 % as compared 
to 31 to 49 % for O, GA and their interaction). In contrast, for non-moral emotions (joy, 
relief, envy, sadness) greater amounts of variance are explained by O, GA and the 
interaction of O x GA (19 to 42 % as compared to 1 to 17 % for O, GA and their 
interaction). This may serve as a first hint that emotions belonging to the first group may 
be “more moral” than emotions belonging to the latter group.  
At first glance, there are three exceptions: disappointment, sympathy and 
schadenfreude: For disappointment, higher values were obtained for O, GA and their 
interaction (19%). Here, only 10 % of variance is explained by O, E and their interaction. 
However, as disappointment may appear as both moral and non-moral emotion (see also 
van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002), this result is not surprising (for a more detailed discussion, 
see below). Moreover, for sympathy, greater amounts of variance are explained by O, GA 
and O x GA (29 %) than by O, E and O x E (5 %). However, sympathy is predominantly 
characterized by the interaction of O x GA and the main effect of GA (29 %). Thus, as it is 
only experienced vis à vis non-attained goals (see e.g., Weiner, 2006) this result is also 
not surprising. Furthermore, sympathy is also influenced by effort, thus sending a strong 
positive signal for expended effort (as a positive moral behavior, see e.g. Graham, 1991; 
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Matteucci, 2007) in case of non-attained positive goals (see also Figure 3.1). Similar to 
Sympathy, schadenfreude is also experienced given non-attained goals only. 
Furthermore, it is also influenced more strongly by O, GA and the interaction of O x GA 
(58 %) than by O, E and O x E (21 %). However, most importantly, the highest degree of 
schadenfreude is experienced in case of non-attained negative goals, given that effort 
was invested (see Figure 3.1), which reflects a strong negative evaluation of morally 
negative behavior (i.e., pursuing a morally negative goal and expending effort to attain this 
goal). In sum, these findings support the inclusion of sympathy and schadenfreude into 
our definition of moral emotions which is based on their morally positive vs. morally 
negative evaluative function: Sympathy (as a positive moral observer emotion) sends a 
positive signal related to positive behaviors, whereas schadenfreude (as a negative moral 
observer emotion) sends a negative signal related to negative behaviors. 
Corroborating and extending previous research (e.g., Haidt, 2003; Hareli & Weiner, 
2002; Rozin et al., 1999; Rudolph et al., 2013; Weiner, 2006), as expected, (2) for all 
positive moral observer emotions (admiration, pride, respect, sympathy) higher values 
were obtained for morally positive as compared to morally negative behavior. 
Furthermore, (3) for all negative moral observer emotions (anger, indignation, contempt, 
disappointment, schadenfreude) higher values were obtained for morally negative as 
compared to morally positive behavior. Especially, as our results are based on the positive 
versus negative evaluation of other person’s behavior, previous approaches classifying 
admiration and respect as ‘other praising’ or ‘approval emotions’ (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; 
Giner-Soralla, 2012) and anger, indignation and contempt as ‘other condemning emotions’ 
(Haidt, 2003) are underlined. According to our results, all positive moral observer 
emotions signal praise for morally praiseworthy behavior, whereas all negative moral 
observer emotions signal condemnation for morally blameworthy behavior. 
Despite the fact that we also obtained a positive or negative evaluation of 
outcomes for the majority of moral emotions, these effects are smaller than the effects 
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obtained for the evaluation of positive vs. negative behavior. Interestingly, with regard to 
disappointment almost equal effect sizes were obtained for both negative behavior and 
negative outcomes. In our view, this result reflects the distinction between person-vs. 
outcome related disappointment (PRD vs. ORD) suggested by van Dijk and Zeelenberg 
(2002). The highest values for disappointment (PRD, in our view) were obtained for 
morally negative behavior (O- and/or E-). However, the fact that a considerable degree of 
disappointment was also obtained for O+GA-E+ (i.e., morally positive behavior), suggests 
that here, ORD is elicited (sending a negative signal for the negative outcome, i.e., that 
the positive goal was not attained). Thus, according to our results, PRD is a negative 
moral observer emotion, whereas ORD is a negative non-moral observer emotion (see 
below).  
In short, in line with our expectations positive moral emotions are more likely when 
effort is expended to attain morally positive goals, thus communicating that the other 
person’s behavior is right. Negative moral emotions are more likely when negative goals 
where pursued and/or given that effort was not expended to attain morally positive goals, 
thus communicating that the other person’s behavior was wrong. 
As expected, (4) positive non moral emotions (joy, relief) are more likely given 
positive as compared to negative outcomes, thus signaling a positive evaluation of 
positive outcomes. Despite the fact that for joy we also find a positive evaluation of 
positive behavior (i.e., higher values given positive as compared to negative behavior), 
these effects are comparatively small. Moreover, both emotions appear mainly outcome-
oriented restricting the positive signal for effort expenditure only to successful events (i.e., 
higher values when effort was invested only for attained but not for non-attained positive 
goals, see Figure 3.1). These findings support Weiner’s (1986) notion that joy is an 
“outcome dependent affect”. Moreover, relief (and also joy, to a lower extent), are more 
likely when morally negative goals are not attained, thus reflecting a positive evaluation of 
positive outcomes. However, the underlying behavior is negative, as a negative goal is 
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pursued. Thus, in contrast to Gray and Wegner (2011), our results suggest that relief is 
another positive non-moral emotion: As is the case for joy, it is most likely when positive 
goals are attained or negative goals are not attained. 
(5) As expected, negative non-moral emotions (sadness, ORD) are most likely 
given negative outcomes. Sadness becomes especially apparent for non-attained positive 
goals, but is also felt for non-attained negative goals, which also reflects negative 
behavior. Nonetheless, the non-moral character of sadness becomes especially obvious 
by seeing that the highest values for sadness were obtained for non-attained positive 
goals given that effort was invested. Thus, negative evaluations (i.e., higher values for a 
negative emotion) would be send for positive behavior, which clearly indicates that this 
emotion – similar to joy – is mainly directed at outcomes (which is negative in this case) 
not behavior. Thus, in sum, in line with expectations, negative non-moral emotions are 
most likely given non-attained positive goals as well as given attained negative goals. 
Envy deserves special attention: It only occurs for positive outcomes given positive 
goals. Thus, we suppose that a similar mechanism as for sympathy and schadenfreude 
applies: Despite the fact that both the envious as well as the envied person feel bad (Ben 
Ze’ev, 2000, 2002; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014), envy primarily communicates that 
another person’s outcome is positive – especially if it is attained without expending effort. 
Here, we also see discordance (see Chapter 3.2.2.3) between the valence of both the 
person feeling envy as well as the envied person (which is negative) and the 
communicative signal of envy. As this signal is restricted to attained positive goals only, 
we argue that the dominant function of this emotion is non-moral in nature (see also Ben-
Ze’ev, 2002).  
In sum, we classify respect, sympathy, pride and admiration as positive moral 
emotions, and schadenfreude, contempt, indignation, anger and PRD as negative moral 
emotions. Contempt and PRD are mainly influenced by O; schadenfreude, indignation, 
anger as well as all positive moral observer emotions are determined by judgments of 
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effort to a larger extent. Joy, relief and envy are classified as positive non-moral emotions, 
whereas sadness and ORD are classified as negative non-moral emotions. 
 
3.4 Study 2 
As in Study 1, O, GA and E were manipulated as cognitive antecedents of emotions. Their 
influence on eliciting moral as well as non-moral emotions is analyzed.  
(1) We expect that moral actor emotions (positive: pride, self-respect; negative: 
shame, embarrassment, guilt, regret) are strongly determined by the influence of all three 
cognitive antecedents O, GA and E3, whereas non-moral actor emotions (positive: joy, 
relief; negative: sadness, disappointment, anger) are predominantly characterized by the 
influence of GA and O.  
Furthermore, (2) we suppose that positive moral actor emotions are more likely 
given that the actor’s behavior was right, whereas (3) negative moral actor emotions are 
more likely given that the actor’s behavior was wrong. 
In contrast, (4) positive non-moral emotions should predominantly arise given that 
an outcome was good, whereas (5) negative non-moral emotions should be most likely 
when the outcome was bad. 
 
3.4.1 Method 
3.4.1.1 Participants 
237 participants took part in the study (166 female, 69 male, 2 persons did not indicate 
their gender). Their age ranged from 16 to 64 (M = 26.86, SD = 10.05) years (2 persons 
                                               
3
 Previous research has shown that in addition to ought and effort, goal attainment has a stronger influence on eliciting 
moral actor emotions as is the case for moral observer emotions (see Rudolph et al., 2013). Thus, we regard goal 
attainment as a third important factor eliciting moral actor emotions.  
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did not indicate their age). The majority of participants (n = 173) were students at 
Chemnitz University of Technology (90 students of psychology, 83 students of other 
subjects). 51 participants were adult persons from different professions, 8 were school 
students or trainees, 1 person was in maternal leave, 1 person a retired person and 1 
person a housewife. 2 persons did not indicate their area of studies or profession. As in 
Study 1, students of psychology participated in the study as partial fulfillment of course 
requirements, all other participants were volunteers. 
3.4.1.2 Experimental Design 
As in Study 1, a 2 (ought: positive vs. negative) x 2 (goal attainment: goal attained vs. not 
attained) x 2 (effort: effort invested vs. not invested) between subjects design was applied. 
We assessed participant’s ratings of pride, self-respect, sympathy, joy, relief (positive 
observer emotions), disappointment, embarrassment, guilt, regret, sadness, shame and 
anger (negative actor emotions) as dependent variables.  
3.4.1.3 Materials and Procedure 
The (online) questionnaire used in Study 2 was identical to the questionnaire used in 
study 1, except for the following: Participants were now asked to put themselves in the 
position of the acting person. For example, the participants were asked to imagine the 
following situation: “You want to attain a highly positive goal. You fail. You invested a lot of 
effort to attain this goal.” (for other examples please see the lower part of Appendix A). As 
in study 1, Testmaker® (see Hartweg et al., 2012) was implemented for data acquisition.  
3.4.1.4 Data Analysis 
The same statistical procedures and criteria as in Study 1 were applied. Complete 
ANOVA-results can be seen in Table 3.3. Mean values are shown in Figure 3.3. The 
morally evaluative function of each emotion (based on the effect sizes d obtained for the 
evaluation of positive vs. negative behavior) is depicted in Figure 3.4. T-test results are 
presented in Table 3.4. 
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3.4.2 Results 
Women indicated slightly higher values for shame (d = .50), guilt (d = .29), regret (d = .31) 
and embarrassment (d = .35) and slightly lower values for self-respect (d = -.26) than 
man. Furthermore, participants indicated slightly higher extends of regret (d = .27) and 
embarrassment (d = .27) for the first as compared to the second version of the 
questionnaire. We did not obtain any effects for age. As for study 1, we did not further 
consider the obtained (predominantly small) effects of gender and version of the 
questionnaire in the subsequent analyses. 
3.4.2.1 Positive Moral Actor Emotions 
Results of the ANOVAs reveal large main effects of GA for both emotions pride and joy 
(pride: 33 %, self-respect: 18 % of explained variance). Furthermore, both emotions are 
strongly influenced by O (pride: 11 %; self-respect: 14 % of explained variance), the 
interaction of O x GA (pride: 13 %; self-respect: 7 %), E (pride: 3 %; self-respect: 6 % and 
GA x E (pride: 2 %; self-respect: 2 %). Additionally, the interaction of O x E explains 4 % 
of variance in the genesis of self-respect. (For both emotions, we did not find an effect of 
O x GA x E. We also did not obtain an effect for O x E with regard to pride.) 
As can be seen in Table 3.4 and Figure 3.4, for both positive moral actor emotions 
pride and self-respect higher values were obtained given morally positive as compared to 
morally negative behavior, thus indicating a positive evaluation of morally positive 
behavior. We also observed that these emotions are more likely given positive as compared 
to negative outcomes. 
3.4.2.2 Positive Non-Moral Actor Emotions 
Both joy and relief are almost exclusively determined by GA (joy: 43 %; relief: 23 % of 
explained variance) and the interaction of O x GA (joy: 19 %; relief: 26 %). For joy, further 
4 % are explained by O (which does not exert an influence on relief). There are no effects 
of E or its interactions for any of the two emotions. T-tests revealed that both joy and relief 
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are more likely given positive outcomes. We additionally observed small effects for a 
positive evaluation of morally positive behavior for both emotions.  
Table 3.3 Analyses of Variance: Actor Emotions (N = 237) 
 Ought (O) Goal-
Attainment 
(GA) 
Effort 
(E) 
O x GA O x E GA x E O x GA x E 
Emotion F η² F η² F η² F η² F η² F η² F η² 
pride 67.11*** .11 203.21*** .33 17.51*** .03 79.31*** .13 4.68* .0080 14.98*** .02 <1 .00 
self-respect 61.71*** .14 82.76*** .18 26.72*** .06 30.78*** .07 16.84*** .04 7.86** .02 <1 .00 
relief 4.44* .0094 110.50*** .23 1.50n.s. .00 123.60*** .26 1.55n.s. .00 < 1 .00 <1 .00 
joy 37.24*** .05 302.42*** .43 <1 .00 132.40*** .19 <1 .00 1.55n.s. .00 <1 .00 
               
shame 35.42*** .10 18.02*** .05 <1 .00 43.60*** .13 8.46** .02 1.54n.s. .00 3.46
Ɨ(.064) .01 
embarrassment 18.67*** .06 37.77*** .12 <1 .00 16.81*** .05 3.50
Ɨ(.063) .01 5.87** .02 2.30n.s. .0073 
guilt 44.70*** .12 19.36*** .05 5.19* .01 60.07*** .16 7.43** .02 <1 .00 17.58*** .05 
regret 33.83*** .08 30.94*** .08 8.32** .02 60.17*** .15 23.91*** .06 <1 .00 24.72*** .06 
anger <1 .00 132.89*** .30 <1 .00 67.69*** .16 <1 .00 1.27n.s. .00 3.87
Ɨ(.051) .0089 
disappointment <1 .00 163.68*** .35 <1 .00 67.95*** .15 <1 .00 4.16* .0089 <1 .00 
sadness 1.75n.s. .00 66.15*** .18 <1 .00 74.57*** .20 3.21
Ɨ(.074) .0085 1.22n.s. .00 <1 .00 
Note. η
2
= amount of explained variance; Ɨ = p < .10, * p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001, n.s. = not 
significant). 
 
Table 3.4 T-Test Results Obtained for Behavior and Outcome: Actor Emotions 
 Positive 
Behavior 
Negative 
Behavior 
   Positive 
Outcome 
Negative 
Outcome 
   
 M(SD) M(SD) t df d M(SD) M(SD) t df d 
pride 2.74 (2.21) 1.24 (1.52) 4.92*** 80.51 .87 2.29 (2.04) 0.92 (1.26) 6.23*** 203.02 .81 
self-respect 3.07 (1.67) 1.33 (1.30) 7.38*** 86.40 1.24 2.20 (1.74) 1.33 (1.28) 4.38*** 222.16 .57 
joy 2.59 (2.34) 1.85 (1.84) 2.24* 87.07 .38 2.91 (2.01) 1.12 (1.53) 7.73*** 224.98 1.00 
relief 2.72 (2.12) 2.11 (1.77) 2.01* 90.58 .33 3.22 (1.66) 1.26 (1.55) 9.38*** 235 1.22 
           
shame 1.33 (1.60) 2.54 (1.63) -5.03*** 235 -.75 1.63 (1.66) 2.86 (1.51) -5.97*** 234.68 -.78 
guilt 1.10 (1.39) 2.51 (1.74) -6.38*** 129.82 -.85 1.46 (1.64) 2.87 (1.60) -6.71*** 235 -.87 
regret 0.93 (1.33) 2.50 (1.69) -7.38*** 131.80 -.98 1.44 (1.64) 2.79 (1.58) -6.46*** 235 -.84 
embarrassment 1.34 (1.61) 2.18 (1.66) -3.40** 235 -.51 1.57 (1.68) 2.37 (1.60) -3.75*** 235 -.49 
anger 1.98 (2.01) 2.05 (1.74) -0.21n.s. 92.98 -.04 1.32 (1.64) 2.78 (1.68) -6.79*** 235 -.88 
disappointment 2.08 (2.16) 2.09 (1.70) -0.03n.s. 86.91 -.01 1.39 (1.66) 2.83 (1.70) -6.60*** 235 -.86 
sadness 1.92 (1.97) 1.85 (1.61) 0.26n.s. 89.34 .04 1.11 (1.48) 2.66 (1.56) -7.82*** 235 -1.02 
Note. * = p < .05, **=p < .01, *** = p < .001, n.s. = not significant. 
 
3.4.2.3 Negative Moral Actor Emotions 
For shame, guilt and regret, the largest amount of variance is explained by O x GA 
(shame: 13 %; guilt: 16 %; regret: 15 %), whereas for embarrassment, the largest 
proportion of variance is explained by GA (12 %). For guilt, regret and embarrassment, 
the second highest proportion of variance is explained by O (guilt: 12 %; regret: 8 %; 
  
Figure 3.3 Mean Values for Actor Emotions (Study 2) 
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Figure 3.3 Mean Values for Actor Emotions (Study 2) (continued) 
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Note. O = Ought, GA = Goal Attainment, E = Effort 
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embarrassment: 6 %), followed by GA (guilt: 5 %; regret: 8 %) or O x GA (embarrassment: 
5 %). Furthermore, guilt (1 %) and regret (2 %) are influenced by E, whereas 
embarrassment is not (0 %). Additionally, the interactions of O x E and O x GA x E 
contribute to the genesis of guilt and regret (guilt: 2 % for O x E and 5 % for O x GA x E; 
regret: 6 % for O x E and 6 % for O x GA x E). For embarrassment, 1 % of variance is 
explained by O x E and 2 % by GA x E. In addition to O x GA shame is influenced by GA 
(5 %), followed by O (1 %), O x E (2 %) and O x GA x E (1 %). 
All of the negative moral actor emotions are more likely given negative behavior. 
Similar effects were obtained for negative outcomes (see Table 3.4, Figure 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.4 The Morally Evaluative Function of Moral Observer Emotions 
 
Actor Emotions (Study 2) - Effect sizes d obtained for positive vs.negative behavior 
 
 
Anger, disappointment and sadness are excluded from being regarded as a moral emotion as 
signals for negative behavior were not obtained. Joy and relief are excluded as for those emotions 
(in contrast to all moral actor emotions) the effect obtained for outcome is larger than the effect 
obtained for behavior (joyoutcome: dMean = 1.00, reliefoutcome: dMean= 1.22). 
Note. The strength of the morally evaluative signal is represented by effect sizes d obtained for t-
tests referring to behavior. Positive values represent signals for morally positive behavior, whereas 
negative values represent signals for morally negative behavior.  
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3.4.2.4 Negative Non-Moral Actor Emotions 
All three (presumably) non-moral emotions are exclusively characterized by GA (sadness: 
18 %; disappointment: 35 %; anger: 3 %) and the interaction of O x GA (sadness: 2 %; 
disappointment: 15 %; anger: 16 %). As expected, according to the results of the t-tests, 
sadness, anger and disappointment are more likely given negative outcomes. We did not 
find any effects for a negative evaluation of negative behavior for these emotions. 
 
3.4.3 Discussion of Study 2 
In line with our expectations, (1) moral actor emotions are influenced by all three cognitive 
antecedents O, GA and E and their interactions. In contrast, non-moral emotions are 
influence by O, GA and the interactions of these two antecedents only. Generally, we 
observed that GA has a comparatively stronger influence on actor than observer 
emotions, thus confirming previous results (Rudolph et al., 2013). Hence, we conclude 
that for an actor emotion to be classified as moral or non-moral, effort seems to be the 
decisive element: For positive moral emotions, 12 to 15 % of explained variance is 
attributed to E and its interactions. For negative moral emotions 3 to 14 % of variance is 
explained by effort and its interactions. In contrast, we have 0 % of explained variance 
that is attributed to effort for any of the non-moral emotions. 
Furthermore, as expected, (2) higher degrees of positive moral actor emotions are 
obtained for morally positive behavior and higher degrees of negative moral actor 
emotions were obtained for morally negative behavior. Joy and relief were found given 
both positive behaviors as well as positive outcomes. Furthermore, with regard to pride, 
both effects are almost equal in size. For self-respect the effect for positive behavior is 
considerably stronger than the effect for positive outcomes. Especially with regard to 
pride, subject’s emotion ratings may have been influenced by social desirability: 
Communicating to be proud of one’s own achievements is often perceived as a sign of 
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arrogance (see e.g., Hareli & Weiner, 2000, 2002; Weiner, 2006; Zammuner, 1996). 
Consequently, participants may have chosen to report only self-respect as a similar but 
socially more accepted emotion when they actually (also) felt pride (see also Zammuner, 
1996 for a similar point of view with regard to joy).  
(3) Negative moral emotions are more likely for negative behavior, thus signaling 
that one’s own behavior was bad. Furthermore, they are also more likely given negative 
as compared to positive outcomes. However, as the considered cells of the design partly 
overlap when evaluating behavior and outcome, this result does not mean that these 
emotions cannot be considered as moral emotions. Instead, this finding underlines that in 
addition to judgments of O and E, moral actor emotions rely more strongly on judgments 
of GA than moral observer emotions. 
As expected, (4) positive non-moral actor emotions, are more likely given positive 
outcomes and (5) negative non-moral emotions are more likely given negative outcomes. 
To a smaller extent, positive non-moral emotions also communicate that a behavior was 
positive (i.e., they are also more likely given positive as compared to negative behavior). 
However, this positive evaluation of invested effort to attain a positive goal is restricted to 
attained goals only. As for their observer-counterparts, this result excludes both joy and 
relief from being regarded as a moral actor emotion. More importantly, whereas moral 
actor emotions contain an evaluative function with regard to both behavior and outcome, 
non-moral actor emotions show no (negative non-moral actor emotions) or hardly any 
(positive non-moral actor emotions) evaluation of behavior, that is zero to very small 
effects were obtained (see Table 3.4). 
In sum, in line with previous research, we classify self-respect and pride as moral 
actor emotions (see e.g., Li & Fischer, 2007; Mauri, 2011; Tangney et al., 2007; Rudolph 
et al., 2013). We include pride into this category, despite the fact that the average effect of 
the evaluative function is comparatively small, which, as already mentioned, may have 
been caused by reasons of social desirability. As their observer counterparts, we classify 
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both joy and relief as positive non-moral emotions (see also e.g., Ekman, 1992; Tracy & 
Robins, 2004).  
Regret, guilt, shame and embarrassment are classified as moral actor emotions, 
as all these emotions show a negative morally evaluative function. Again, these results 
reflect an empirical corroboration and extension of existing approaches (e.g., Haidt, 2003; 
Tangney et al., 2007; Weiner, 2006). Rudolph et al.’s (2013) finding that all moral actor 
emotions are influenced by judgments of effort was confirmed. However, with regard to 
shame and embarrassment, these results also contradict previous approaches regarding 
these emotions as predominantly occurring after negative events related to lack of ability 
or other forms of incompetence or deficiencies referring to a person’s self (e.g., Hareli & 
Weiner, 2002; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Tangney, 2002; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; 
Weiner, 2006). Nevertheless, we think that these findings can also be regarded as 
complementary: Both shame and embarrassment may not only be related to ability (as 
suggested by previous approaches), but also to effort (as suggested by our results). As 
pursuing morally negative intentions (O-) can be regarded as moral transgressions, 
previous findings are corroborated in this regard (Baumeister et al. 1994; Tangney et al., 
2007). Furthermore, shame may be related to both moral (i.e., moral transgressions, e.g., 
pursuing negative goals or the violation of the norm of effort) and non-moral (e.g., lack of 
ability) antecedents and has thus been referred to moral versus non-moral shame (see 
e.g., Smith, Webster, Eyre, & Parrott, 2002). 
In line with our expectations, in contrast to observer-disappointment, its actor 
counterpart does not contain a morally evaluative function: this emotion seems to be only 
outcome-related (see van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002). The same is true for anger as an 
actor emotion. Furthermore, as its observer-counterpart, sadness as an actor emotion 
also does not contain a morally evaluative function. Consequently, all three emotions 
disappointment (ORD), anger and sadness are classified as non-moral emotions, which 
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again corroborates previous findings (e.g., Ekman, 1994; Tracy & Robins, 2004; van Dijk 
& Zeelenberg, 2002). 
 
3.5 General Discussion 
Two studies analyzed the influence of three cognitive antecedents, namely ought, goal 
attainment and effort on the genesis of moral and non-moral actor and observer emotions. 
To the best of our knowledge, this has been the first empirical approach identifying criteria 
(i.e., evaluating behaviors vs. outcomes) that offer the possibility to distinguish moral from 
non-moral emotions. Specific evaluative patterns of the respective groups of emotions 
have been identified: A summary of our classification is presented in Table 3.5. 
(1) Positive moral emotions (actor: self-respect, pride; observer: respect, sympathy, pride, 
admiration) are elicited as positive evaluations of positive behavior, that is, they 
communicate that a one’s own (actor emotions) or another person’s (observer 
emotions) behavior was good and right (i.e., that a morally positive goal was pursued 
and that effort was invested to attain this goal) – even if the goal was not attained. (For 
minor restrictions with regard to pride as an actor emotion please see Chapter 3.4). 
(2) In contrast, positive non-moral emotions (actor: joy, relief; observer: joy, relief, envy) 
are elicited as positive evaluations of positive outcomes. They communicate that an 
outcome was good (i.e., that a morally positive goal was attained or that a morally 
negative goal was not attained). (Please note that envy occurs for positive attained 
goals only.) 
(3) Negative moral emotions (actor: regret, guilt, shame, embarrassment; observer: 
schadenfreude, contempt, indignation, anger, person-related disappointment) arise as 
negative evaluations of morally negative behavior (i.e., pursuing morally negative 
goals or not investing effort to attain morally positive goals). Thus, they communicate 
that the respective behavior was bad and wrong. 
3 On Distinguishing Moral from Non-Moral Emotions. 52 
 
 
(4) Negative non-moral emotions (actor: anger, sadness, disappointment; observer: 
sadness, outcome-related disappointment) are elicited after negative outcomes (i.e., 
attained positive as well as non-attained negative goals) and communicate that the 
outcome of a situation was negative. 
Table 3.5 A Classification of Moral vs. Non-Moral Emotions 
 Moral Emotions Non-moral Emotions 
Observer positive 
 
 
 
 
  negative 
 
admiration 
pride 
respect 
sympathy 
 
anger 
indignation 
schadenfreude 
contempt 
disappointment (PRD) 
joy 
relief 
 
 
 
sadness 
disappointment (ORD) 
 
 
Actor  positive 
 
 
  negative 
 
pride 
self-respect 
 
regret 
guilt 
shame 
embarrassment 
joy 
relief 
 
sadness 
disappointment 
anger 
 
Note. ORD = object-related disappointment, PRD = person-related disappointment 
 
When comparing moral actor vs. observer emotions, we observe a comparatively 
stronger influence of effort for moral observer emotions and a comparatively stronger 
influence of goal attainment for moral actor emotions. How can we explain this finding? As 
proposed by Weiner (1995, 2006), a person’s responsibility for a negative outcome can be 
reduced if this negative result is attributed to uncontrollable causes that may act as 
mitigating circumstances. Consequently, when the observed other is not responsible for 
the failure, negative moral emotions are reduced – instead, the person’s positive behavior 
is positively evaluated by positive moral emotions. However, with regard to actor 
emotions, participants were asked to put themselves into the perspective of the acting 
person. Thus, they may possess or infer additional information, beyond the information 
provided with regard to effort and ought. This additional information may be related to the 
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participant’s own qualities or ability which may also become a target of emotional 
evaluation (see e.g., M. Lewis, 2008; Tangney et al, 2007; Weiner, 2006), thus reducing 
the influence of effort for moral actor emotions.  
Consequently, when evaluating oneself, especially in case of non-attained morally 
positive goals, people may feel ashamed or embarrassed (and even guilty) despite the 
fact that they expended effort. These negative moral emotions (see Figure 3.3) may occur 
as negative evaluations of inferred low ability (as effort and ability are regarded as 
compensatory, especially with regard to achievement situations, see Binser & Försterling, 
2004). In contrast, for negative moral observer emotions, comparatively lower values were 
obtained here – as information referring to low ability was not provided in our scenarios 
(see Figure 3.1). Thus, as for negative moral actor emotions, high values are obtained for 
both high effort as well as lack of effort (in case of non-attained positive goals). 
Consequently, the influence of effort is comparatively smaller.  
A similar (but reverse) mechanism applies to positive moral actor vs. observer 
emotions: In case of non-attained positive goals, we obtained comparatively higher values 
for observer- as compared to actor emotions (given that effort was invested). Again, the 
positive evaluation of this positive behavior may be reduced due to inference to low ability 
(eliciting negative rather than positive moral emotions), and thus reduces the general 
influence of effort for moral actor emotions as well. Hence, when evaluating actions or 
behavior, people assess themselves more rigorously than they assess others. These 
results imply a certain „other-serving moral emotional bias“ with regard to the evaluation of 
behavior: In case of non-attained positive goals, people feel more positive and less 
negative moral emotions for others than for themselves, given that effort was invested (for 
a further discussion on ‘actor-observer-asymmetries’ see e.g., Malle, 2006; Malle, Knobe, 
& Nelson, 2007).  
Thus, you may be proud of your partner and admire him/her for investing effort and 
taking part in the New-York marathon, whereas she/he may feel ashamed (rather than 
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proud) for not attaining the goal of receiving the gold or silver medal. However – and this 
is the most important difference to non-moral emotions. None of you will feel joy, as the 
goal of winning the marathon was not attained. 
 
3.5.1 The Signal-Function of Moral Emotions 
In general, our findings underline and supplement Weiner’s (2006) argument that “moral 
emotions primarily communicate that the person is doing or has done something wrong or 
bad, and this is not acceptable. Moral emotions are regulators of moral actions directed 
towards vice-ridden persons” (p. 96). However, we corroborate and extend this view to 
morally positive emotions and their communicative function with regard to evaluating 
morally positive behavior: Thus, our results indicate that in addition to communicating that 
a behavior was wrong (which applies to negative moral emotions), moral emotions also 
communicate that a behavior was good and right (which applies to positive moral 
emotions). In this regard, we could say that positive moral emotions seem to provide 
emotional reward for morally positive behavior. In contrast, negative moral emotions seem 
to punish people for morally negative behavior.  
Providing emotional reward versus punishment has also been related to the 
“functional value” of moral emotions (see Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014): In this 
regard, positive moral emotions send ‘go-signal’s for morally positive behaviors. That is, 
positive moral emotions signal that a person’s behavior is good and right and that this 
behavior should be continued. In contrast, negative moral emotions send ‘stop-signals’ for 
morally negative behaviors. Thus, negative moral emotions signal that a person’s 
behavior was bad and wrong and should be stopped or changed. As being the target of 
morally positive emotions (e.g., pride or admiration) feels good, these emotions provide 
emotional reward. Furthermore, as being the target of morally negative emotions (e.g., 
guilt or indignation) feels bad, these emotions provide emotional punishment.  
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Thus, from an evolutionary perspective (see also Darwin, 1872), moral emotions 
may have developed to (1) inform the actor (which can be self or other) about the moral 
quality (right versus wrong) of her/his actions as well as to (2) motivate the actor to either 
continue with or change her/his positive vs. negative behavior, respectively: This also 
shows that emotions have a social function: They help us to cope with the challenges of 
our social environment (see Fischer & Manstead, 2008) and thus guide people’s behavior 
(see Cushman, 2011).  
To summarize, moral emotions are elicited by evaluations of behaviors as right 
versus wrong. This evaluation is referred to as the morally evaluative function of moral 
emotions. Moral emotions communicate the respective evaluation to the person at which 
the emotion is directed. That is, from a functional perspective, moral emotions provide 
signals informing the person receiving the respective emotion on whether her/his behavior 
is morally right – and should thus be continued (go-signal) – versus wrong – and should 
thus be stopped or changed (stop-signal). Go-signals contain positive or pleasant feelings, 
thus providing emotional reward for morally positive behaviors, whereas stop-signals 
contain negative or unpleasant feelings, thus providing emotional punishment for morally 
negative behaviors. These signals have been related to the functional value of moral 
emotions. For a more detailed discussion of stop- vs. go signals, please refer to Rudolph 
and Tscharaktschiew (2014). We will return to considerations of reward and punishment 
related to moral emotions in Chapter 5.  
 
3.5.2 Limitations and Implications for Future Research 
In the present studies, we analyzed calculations of ought, goal attainment and effort as 
cognitive antecedents of the respective emotions. However, previous research has 
identified other cognitive appraisals that also influence the emergence of moral emotions. 
For example, the functions of responsibility, (e.g., Graham, Weiner, & Zucker, 1997; 
Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004; van Dijk, Goslinga, & Ouverkerk, 2008; 
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Weiner, 1995; 2006) and deservingness (Feather, 1999; 2006; 2012; Feather & McKee, 
2009; Feather et al., 2011) are especially well documented in this regard. Furthermore, 
within the field of appraisal theory a diverse range of further antecedents (see Chapter 
5.2) and behavioral consequences or action tendencies have been proposed (for a 
summary see Scherer et al., 2001). However, so far, none of these approaches has 
provided an empirical tool for distinguishing moral and non-moral emotions. 
Furthermore, as can be seen in Figures 3.1 and 3.3, for each of the combinations 
of ought, goal attainment and effort, several moral emotions are elicited at the same time 
(including both positive and negative emotions for one and the same situation). It could be 
interesting to investigate whether certain personality characteristics, such as self-esteem, 
empathy or perfectionism; see e.g., Feather, 2012; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney, 
2002) contribute to eliciting specific moral and non-moral emotions. (For an analysis of the 
influence of perfectionism on shame and guilt, please the manuscript in preparation which 
is provided on the enclosed CD (Tscharaktschiew, Freymann, Brüggemann, Arnold, 
Ullmann, & Rudolph, 2014). 
The vast majority of studies in the field of moral emotion has been conducted by 
using some sort of questionnaire or interview. However, other methods can make 
important contributions to the investigation of moral and non-moral emotions as well. As 
the experience of (moral) emotions is inseparably linked to brain activity as well as to 
bodily perceptions and responses, studying the neural correlates underlying the 
experience of moral and non-moral emotions constitutes an important complement to 
traditional approaches. Recently, a fast growing body of research has been divided to the 
study of neuro-physiological correlates of moral emotions and moral cognition (Greene & 
Haidt, 2002; Moll, Oliveira-Souza, Zahn, & Grafman, 2008; Ostrosky, 2010). However, 
evidence with regard to comparisons of brain activation when experiencing moral vs. non-
moral emotions is sparse (see Takahashi et al., 2008 for an analysis of brain activation 
when experiencing pride vs. joy). In this regard, comparing the neural networks involved in 
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the processing of other moral vs. non-moral emotions may further enhance the 
understanding of the biological basis of moral emotions. In a similar vein, it may also be 
interesting to study the involvement of the autonomic nervous system, for example with 
regard to skin conductance level or heart rate (see e.g., Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 
1990; Witvliet, Ludwig, & Bauer, 2002).  
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4 The Who and Whom of Help-Giving: 
An Attributional Model Integrating the Help-Giver and the 
Help-Recipient. 
 
4.1. Abstract 
In this article, we investigate the influence of responsibility, moral emotions and empathy 
on help-giving for stigmatized persons in need. Both characteristics of the recipient of help 
and the help-giver are analyzed within a general theoretical framework. Based on an 
online study (N = 332), structural equation models confirm and extend an attributional 
cognition  emotion  action model of help-giving (Rudolph et al., 2004). Conditions 
promoting help-giving are identified: (1) A potential help-giver who regards himself as 
responsible for the recipient’s misfortune is likely to experience guilt, regret, and shame, 
thus increasing the likelihood of help. (2) A potential recipient of help who is regarded as 
being not responsible for his/her plight elicits sympathy, and is thus more likely to receive 
help. In contrast, when the person in need is regarded as being responsible for his/her 
plight, anger and even schadenfreude are elicited, and likelihood of help-giving 
decreases. (3) Different aspects of empathy as a stable personal characteristic exert 
direct and indirect (i.e., emotionally mediated) effects on help-giving. Using structural 
equation modeling, we outline an attributional model of helping conceptualizing helping 
behavior within an actor-observer-system integrating a variety of moral emotions involved 
in help-giving. 
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4.2 Introduction and Theoretical Background 
The notion that moral emotions guide our social interactions has a long tradition in 
philosophy (e.g., Hume, 1740; Smith, 1759/2005). However, it was not until recently that 
moral emotions became an important research topic in psychology (e.g., Carlo, Mestre, 
Samper, Tur, & Armenta, 2010; Cimbora & McIntosh, 2005; de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & 
Breugelmans, 2007; Frank, 1988, 2011; Haidt, 2003; Ketelaar, 2004; Malti, Gummerum, 
Keller, & Buchmann, 2009). Moral emotions are essential elements of social interactions 
(e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Haidt, 2003; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; 
Weiner, 2006), as moral emotions are based on judgments concerning the rightness or 
wrongness of one’s own as well as other persons’ behavior (e.g., Kroll & Egan, 2004; 
Weiner, 2006; see also Chapters 2 and 3) and are regarded as a key link between thought 
and action (Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). 
 The notion that thoughts give rise to emotions, and emotions in turn direct and 
energize action has been especially well documented in attributional analyses of helping 
behavior (Weiner, 2006): That is, when a person in need is regarded as being responsible 
for his/her plight, anger is likely and help tends to be withheld. In contrast, ascriptions of 
low responsibility promote feelings of sympathy, which in turn increase the likelihood that 
help is provided (for a meta-analysis, see Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 
2004). To illustrate, imagine a homeless but nevertheless healthy-looking young man 
asking you for money. We might conclude that he is responsible for his plight (as he might 
have good chances to earn money). As a consequence, we may feel angry and decide 
against helping him. In contrast, imagine a blind and homeless man in his seventies. We 
might conclude that he is not responsible for his plight. Hence, we feel sympathy and 
decide to help him. 
The strong impact of perceived responsibility on sympathy, anger, and help-giving 
has been studied in the context of social stigmas: Social stigmas are defined as “any mark 
or sign for perceived or inferred conditions of deviation from a prototype or norm” (Weiner, 
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Perry, & Magnusson, 1988, p. 738; see also Jones, Farina, Hastorf, Markus, Miller et al., 
1984). These refer to a wide range of conditions such as ethnicity, homelessness, 
disease, handicaps, disabilities, poverty or unemployment. Social stigmas vary with 
regard to their perceived responsibility and controllability. Uncontrollable stigmas, such as 
Alzheimer’s disease or blindness, elicit more sympathy and help-giving than controllable 
stigmas such as drug abuse or obesity, which are more likely to elicit anger and to reduce 
the willingness for help-giving (e.g., Menec & Perry, 1998; Weiner et al., 1988). Poverty is 
a stigma that can be characterized by different degrees of responsibility, depending on the 
actual causes of poverty. Hence, when poverty is attributed to lack of effort or laziness, a 
person will be perceived as responsible for her plight. Hence, anger (rather than 
sympathy) is experienced, and help is withheld. In contrast, when poverty is attributed to 
sickness or physical handicaps, perceptions of low responsibility are elicited, sympathy 
(rather than anger) is experienced, and help is provided (Weiner, Osborne, & Rudolph, 
2011). 
Thus far, attributional explanations of help-giving have focused mainly on 
characteristics of the recipient of help, and examined the responsibility of the help-giver 
only to a lesser extent. To illustrate, let us return to our thought experiment about the 
young man who asks you to give him some money. Imagine you had been his employer 
until recently, and you dismissed him because you wanted to give the job to a friend of 
yours. You might realize that he suffers because you dismissed him, as you wanted to 
give the job to a friend of yours, not because of his bad work results or laziness. Hence, 
this cause is uncontrollable to your employee. There is evidence that perceptions of one’s 
own responsibility lead to feelings of regret and guilt, which consequently motivate help-
giving (see e.g., Basil, Ridgway, & Basil, 2008; de Hooge et al., 2007; Tangney & Dearing, 
2002). Moreover, such perceptions of one’s own responsibility might elicit feelings of 
shame as well, promoting a motivation to withdraw and decreasing the likelihood of help 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). However, there is also some 
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evidence that under specific circumstances, shame does promote pro-social behavior as 
well (de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010, 2011). 
The aim of the present studies is to analyze both the influence of characteristics of 
the potential help-recipient and the help-giver (i.e., perceived responsibility of both actor 
and recipient) on help-giving within a common theoretical framework. Thus, two kinds of 
responsibility will be considered – the responsibility of the potential help-giver, and the 
responsibility of the potential recipient of help. We assume that each kind of responsibility 
is connected to different sets of moral emotions: Responsibility of the potential help-giver 
is likely to influence moral actor emotions (e.g., guilt, regret, and shame), while 
responsibility of the recipient is likely to influence moral observer emotions (e.g., anger 
and sympathy). According to our hypotheses, both moral actor and moral observer 
emotions influence the likelihood of help-giving. Note that high responsibility of the 
potential help-giver is a facilitating condition of help, while high responsibility of the 
potential recipient of help represents a condition that is detrimental to help. Two causal 
chains arise from this analysis: 
(1a) Potential Help-Giver  High Self-Ascribed Responsibility  Feelings of Guilt, 
Regret, Shame  High Likelihood of Help 
(1b) Potential Help-Giver  Low Self-Ascribed Responsibility No Feelings of 
Guilt, Regret, Shame  Low Likelihood of Help 
(2a) Potential Help-Recipient  High Perceived Responsibility  Anger rather 
than Sympathy  Low Likelihood of Help 
(2b) Potential Help-Recipient  Low Perceived Responsibility  Sympathy rather 
than Anger  High Likelihood of Help 
We now summarize pertinent research exploring the links between responsibility, 
moral observer and moral actor emotions, and help-giving. In addition, we will also 
consider the dispositional empathy of the help-giver, as existing evidence has linked 
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empathy to help-giving as well. In what follows, for the sake of simplicity, we will refer to 
the potential help-giving person as the (moral) actor or help-giver, and to the potential 
recipient of help as the help-recipient or person in need. In addition, we refer to moral 
observer emotions (sympathy, anger, schadenfreude) as emotions elicited by the help 
recipient and experienced by the moral actor, while we refer to moral actor emotions (guilt, 
shame, and regret) as those emotions which the moral actor experiences toward 
him/herself (Rudolph, Schulz, & Tscharaktschiew, 2013; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 
2014; Weiner, 2006; see also Chapters 2 and 3). 
 
4.2.1 Responsibility, Moral Observer Emotions and Help-Giving 
Both sympathy and anger have been described as moral emotions mainly directed at the 
actions of other persons (e.g., Frank, 2011; Gray & Wegner, 2011; Haidt, 2003; Menec & 
Perry, 1998; Rudolph et al., 2013; Skoe, Eisenberg, & Cumberland, 2002; Weiner, 2006, 
2007; see also Chapter 3). Anger is elicited when a person is regarded as responsible for 
a transgression or failure, for example, when the failure is attributed to lack of effort (a 
cause typically regarded as controllable by the person). In contrast, when another 
person’s failure is ascribed to uncontrollable causes (e.g., a physical or mental handicap), 
this person will not be regarded as responsible for the failure and sympathy is elicited 
(e.g., Weiner, 2006). 
A meta-analysis (Rudolph et al., 2004) revealed that the relationship between 
responsibility and help-giving is mediated by moral observer emotions, that is, anger and 
sympathy. The following cognition-emotion-action sequences have been identified: (1) 
High responsibility of person in need  anger rather than sympathy  low likelihood of 
help; (2) low responsibility of person in need  sympathy rather than anger  high 
likelihood of help (see also Menec & Perry, 1998; Reisenzein, 1986; Weiner, 1980, 1985; 
Weiner et al., 1988). This model has been successfully replicated in different cultures (e.g. 
Aiqing, Fanglian, & Huashan, 2004; Badahdah & Alkhder, 2006; Zhang, Xia, & Li, 2007), 
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and applied to help-giving in many different contexts such as AIDS (Badahdah, & Alkhder, 
2006), cancer (Lobchuk, McClement, McPherson, & Cheang, 2008), natural disasters 
(Marjanovic, Greenglass, Struthers, & Faye, 2009), and donations to humanitarian 
organizations (Kayser, Farwell, & Greitemeyer, 2008), to mention a few. Finally, note that 
Schadenfreude is a moral observer emotion that is also influenced by judgments of 
responsibility (e.g., van Dijk, Goslinga, & Ouwerkerk, 2008) and influences help-giving as 
well (Aiqing et al., 2004). We will return to this point. 
 
4.2.2 Responsibility, Moral Actor Emotions and Help-Giving 
We assume additional emotional effects of responsibility on the likelihood of help, that is, 
by moral actor emotions such as guilt, regret, and shame experienced by the potential 
help-giver. However, in comparison to the large body of evidence involving the recipient’s 
responsibility and moral observer emotions, evidence for the influence of moral actor 
emotions on the likelihood of help is comparatively sparse. 
Guilt, regret, and shame require a person’s self-evaluation and thus have been 
labeled as “self-conscious” emotions (Davidson, 2006; Haidt, 2003; Kedia & Hilton, 2011; 
M. Lewis, 2008; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; 
Tangney et al., 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2004). These emotions are reactions to self-caused 
outcomes (e.g., Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996), and typically 
arise after a person’s transgression of moral standards, for example, failing to live up to a 
society’s norms and values, or lying, stealing, causing interpersonal harm, cheating and 
the like (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1994; de Hooge et al., 2007; Kedia & Hilton, 2011, Keltner 
& Buswell, 1996; Tangney, 2002; Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2008). Furthermore, shame 
can represent a negative evaluation of the person’s global self or character (e.g., lack of 
ability), whereas guilt seems to arise as a negative evaluation of a person’s behavior or 
action (e.g., lack of effort; see e.g., Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; H. B. 
Lewis, 1971; Roseman et al., 1996; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 1996; 
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Tangney et al., 2007; Tracy and Robins, 2006). Thus, shame can be caused by both 
moral as well as non-moral causes (moral transgressions on one hand, feelings of 
incompetence or inferiority on the other hand), and has been referred to as moral vs. non-
moral shame (Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002). In contrast, guilt is conceptualized 
as being based on moral causes only (Sabini & Silver, 1997; Smith et al., 2002). In our 
experimental manipulation, we refer to moral shame only, as we intend to measure moral 
emotions elicited by improper behavior (as for example not fulfilling the requirements 
usually expected in a certain profession, which thus can be regarded as a moral 
transgression). 
While guilt has been regarded as eliciting approach motivation (e.g., the tendency 
to make up for one’s wrongdoing), shame has been conceptualized as strengthening 
avoidance motivation (e.g., tendencies to hide or withdraw; e.g., H. B. Lewis, 1971; 
Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney 
et al., 2007). Consequently, feelings of guilt are assumed to promote help-giving (Basil, 
Ridgway, & Basil, 2008; Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, Cermak, & Rosza, 2001; de 
Hooge et al., 2007; Haidt, 2003; Hibbert, Smith, Davies, & Ireland, 2007; Ketelaar & Au, 
2003; Lindsey, 2005; Leffel, Fritz, & Stephens, 2008). However, there are contradictory 
findings concerning the approach versus avoidance character of shame (see de Hooge, 
Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; de Hooge, et al., 2007; de Hooge et al., 2010; Frijda, 
Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Ketelaar & Au, 2003). 
Regret as a moral actor emotion may play a role for help-giving as well, as it 
shares several similarities with shame and guilt: Regret is also regarded as a self-
conscious emotion (Kedia & Hilton, 2011), is also determined by judgments of 
responsibility (van Dijk, van der Pligt, & Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & 
Manstead, 1998, 2000; for a summary see Giorgetta, Zeelenberg, Ferlazzo, & d’Olimpio, 
2012), and increases the likelihood of pro-social behavior (Martinez, Zeelenberg, & 
Rijsman, 2011). 
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4.2.3 Responsibility and Deservingness 
The concept of deservingness is based on Heider’s (1958) balance-theory. According to 
Feather (1999, 2006) (see also Feather & McKee, 2009; Feather, McKee & Bekker, 2011; 
van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, & Goslinga, 2009, deservingness is conceptualized as a relationship 
between the actions of a person and the outcome produced by these actions: Positive 
outcomes are regarded as deserved if caused by positive actions (e.g., success after 
investing effort), and as undeserved if caused by negative actions (e.g., success after 
cheating in an exam). Negative outcomes are regarded as deserved if they are caused by 
negative actions (e.g., failing an exam after cheating), and as undeserved if they are 
preceded by positive actions (e.g., failing an exam after trying hard). Judgments of 
deservingness are closely related to judgments of responsibility, as both concepts require 
personal causation (for a summary see Feather et al., 2011). Furthermore, judgments of 
deservingness also elicit moral emotions (e.g., Feather, 2006; van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, 
Goslinga, & Nieweg, 2005). Deservingness has also been related to help-giving: That is, 
help-giving is more likely when the respective misfortune is regarded as undeserved 
(Appelbaum, 2002; Olson, Cheung, Conway, & Hafer, 2010). 
 
4.2.4 Personal Characteristics of the Help-Giver 
It is well documented that empathy as a stable characteristic of the help-giver promotes 
help-giving (e.g., Batson, 1991; Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland 2002; Eisenberg & 
Fabes, 1990; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Gerdes, 2011; Preston & de Waal, 2002). In line 
with Betancourt, 1990, see also Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; 
Gerdes, 2011) we regard empathy as a person’s concern for another person’s situation 
(for a more detailed discussion on empathy, please see Preston & Hofelich, 2012). 
Empathy is a prerequisite for moral judgments and for moral behavior (e.g., Harris, 2007; 
Hollan, 2012; Roskies, 2011). It is related to moral emotions; for example, empathic 
persons experience stronger feelings of guilt, regret, shame and sympathy ( e.g., Basil et 
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al., 2008; Davis & Gold, 2011; Imhoff, Bilewicz, & Erb, 2012; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; 
Schmitt & Clark, 2006; Tangney, 1991), and experience lower degrees of anger and 
schadenfreude (e.g., Jensen, 2012; Strayer & Roberts, 2004). 
Davis (1983; see also Paulus, 2009) identified four components of empathy, 
namely Perspective Taking (PT), Empathic Concern (EC), Personal Distress (PD), and 
Fantasy (FS). PT is considered as a cognitive component of empathy, whereas EC, FS 
and PD are regarded as emotional components (Paulus, 2009). According to Davis 
(1983), (1) PT is “the tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of 
others”,(2) EC is related to “other-orientated feelings of sympathy and concern for 
unfortunate others”, (3) PD represents the tendency to experience “self-oriented feelings 
of personal anxiety and unease on tense interpersonal settings”, and (4) FS measures the 
“respondents’ tendencies to transpose themselves imaginatively into the feelings of 
fictitious characters in books, movies, and plays” (pp. 113 f.).  
 
4.2.5 Aims and Expectations 
We investigate the influence of the (1) help-givers’ and the help-recipients’ responsibility, 
(2) corresponding actor- and observer emotions, and (3) the help-giver’s dispositional 
empathy on help-giving. Thus, we vary the help-giver’s responsibility for the plight of the 
potential recipient as well as the responsibility of the person in need for help. We analyze 
relations between cognitive ascriptions (responsibility, deservingness), moral emotions 
(actor: guilt, regret, shame; observer: sympathy, anger, schadenfreude), empathy as a 
stable characteristic of the moral actor, and help-giving. With regard to the relationship 
between cognitions, moral emotions and help-giving, we further analyze whether the 
mediation processes discovered for anger and sympathy (acting as mediators between 
the receiver’s responsibility and help-giving) (Rudolph et al., 2004) are also applicable to a 
more comprehensive set of moral emotions. Specifically, our predictions are as follows: 
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(1) Guilt, regret, and shame increase when responsibility of the moral actor is high. 
(2) Help is more likely when the potential help-giver experiences guilt, regret, shame. (3) 
Help-giving decreases when the help-recipient’s responsibility and deservingness is high; 
it increases when the moral actor’s responsibility is high. (4) Sympathy decreases when 
responsibility and deservingness of the person in need is high, while anger and schaden-
freude increase. (5) Help-giving is more likely when sympathy is elicited, and less likely 
when the help-giver experiences anger and schadenfreude. (6) Self-directed emotions of 
the actor (i.e., guilt, regret and shame) and other-directed emotions (elicited by the person 
in need (i.e., sympathy, anger and schadenfreude) serve as mediators between thought 
and action. (7) We expect that (a) the emotion-related components of empathy (i.e., EC, 
PD and FS, summarized as ‘emotional empathy’) increase all moral emotions (guilt, 
regret, and shame, sympathy, anger and schadenfreude) as well as help-giving. (b) The 
cognitive component of empathy (PT) increases help-giving (see also Paulus, 2009).  
 
4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Participants 
The sample included 332 participants (220 female, 112 male). Age ranged from 16 to 70 
years (M = 26.59, SD = 10.26). 112 participants were students of psychology, 104 
participants were students of other subjects, 21 were school students or trainees, 92 were 
adults from different professions, two persons were retired. One participant did not 
indicate his age and area of studies or profession. Psychology students received course 
credit for participation; all other persons participated voluntary. 
 
4.3.2 Experimental Design 
A 2 (responsibility of help-giver: low vs. high) x 3 (responsibility of help-recipient: low vs. 
medium vs. high) between-subjects design was used. For the resulting six conditions, 
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items were presented in two different randomized orders. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the 12 resulting versions of the questionnaire. Dependent variables 
were guilt, regret, and shame as moral actor emotions, sympathy, anger and 
schadenfreude as moral observer emotions, the deservingness of the outcome and 
judgments of help-giving. Furthermore, participants’ dispositional empathy was assessed. 
 
4.3.3 Materials and Procedure 
To identify stigmata characterized by high vs. low responsibility, we conducted a paper 
and pencil pilot study. N = 60 participants of diverse professional backgrounds (age: M = 
34.39 years, SD = 15.74, ranging from 18 to 77 years; 30 female) provided responsibility 
ratings for 15 stigmata (using a 6-point rating scale ranging from 0 = not at all responsible 
to 5 = highly responsible). These stigmata were: Having a mental disability, being a victim 
of a natural disaster, being a victim of sexual abuse, being an orphan, inability to work, 
suffering from depression, being a single mother, being homeless, being an immigrant, 
having acquired AIDS, being anorectic, being a prostitute, suffering from obesity, smoking, 
and committing sexual abuse. For the main study, the stigmata receiving the lowest, 
intermediate and highest values were selected (low: mental disability; M = 0.15, SD = 
0.36; intermediate: being homeless; M = 2.10, SD = 1.14; highest: committing sexual 
abuse; M = 4.17, SD = 1.23). 
Thus, in our main study, participants read one of six scenarios about a stigmatized 
person in need of help, with varying degrees of responsibility of the potential help-recipient 
(low: mentally disabled child; medium: homeless person; high: sexual offender). 
Furthermore, the potential help-giver (a midwife in case of the mentally disabled child; a 
real estate agent in case of the homeless person; a psychotherapist in case of the sexual 
offender) had high versus low responsibility for the stigma of the potential help-recipient: 
(1) The midwife was either not or highly responsible for the fact that a child was born with 
a mental disability: She had either paid close attention to the condition of the mother 
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during childbirth versus had failed to observe relevant medical parameters. (2) The real 
estate agent had tried hard versus had not tried at all to find an alternative for a house in 
which a homeless person could not find shelter anymore. (3) The psychotherapist was 
either not or highly responsible for a relapse of a sexual offender as he had either tried 
hard to convince the sexual offender to attend therapy sessions versus had not taken care 
of the therapeutic progress at all. A full version of the scenarios is available upon request. 
Perceived responsibility of help-giver (two items, Cronbach’s α = .93) and recipient 
(two items, Cronbach’s α = .96) were assessed as manipulation checks. For moral 
emotions (two items each) the following Cronbach’s alphas (α) were obtained: guilt α = 
.96; regret α = 96, shame α = .96, sympathy α = 95, anger, α = 91, schadenfreude α = 
.62). In addition to responsibility (for Cronbach’s α please see above), for structural 
equation modeling, the following items were treated as components of latent variables: 
negative moral actor emotions (6 items, α = .98), negative moral observer emotions (4 
items, α = .83), the deservingness of recipient’s outcome (2 items, α = 97) and help-giving 
(personal and financial help, 2 items, α = .77). A 6-point rating scale (ranging from 0 = not 
at all to 5 = to a high extent) was used. All items are presented in Appendix B.  
To assess dispositional empathy, participants completed the Saarbrucken 
Personality Questionnaire on Empathy (SPF) (Paulus, 2009), the German version of the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1983; see also Jolliffe & Farrington, 2004), 
consisting of 16 items constituting four subscales for different facets of dispositional 
empathy: (1) Perspective Taking (PT), (2) Empathic Concern (EC), (3) Fantasy (FS), and 
(4) Personal Distress (PD). The different components of empathy were assessed on 5-
point rating scales ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). The SPF 
possesses good psychometrical properties (for a summary, see Paulus, 2009). In the 
present study, satisfactory Cronbach’s alphas were obtained for the respective subscales 
(PT: α = .76, EC; α = .65, FS: α = .67, PD: α = .70). 
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Participants were contacted via mailing lists. After a brief introduction, each 
participant received one randomly selected scenario. Participants were asked to put 
themselves in the position of the moral actor (the midwife, the real estate agent, or the 
psychotherapist), and to imagine the described situation as vividly as possible. They then 
reported cognitive evaluations, emotions, and willingness to help the described person in 
need (the mentally disabled child, the homeless women, or the sexual offender). Finally, 
participants provided demographic data and were given the opportunity to make 
comments and ask questions. Half of the participants received the scenario-questionnaire 
first, the other half the SPF. The completion of the entire questionnaire took approximately 
20 minutes. These two questionnaires were part of a larger research project in which 
further personality variables were assessed and related to variables describing the 
observed person, some of which are also addressed in the present study (see Decker & 
Pöthe, 2012). 
 
4.3.4 Data Analysis 
To analyze the relationship between cognitions and emotions, cognitions and help-giving 
as well as between emotions and help-giving, regression analyses are conducted. To 
analyze interrelations between cognitions, emotions and help-giving, we conduct 
mediation analyses using PROCESS (Hayes, 2012). For each of the mediation models 
reported, 95 % bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals were computed using 10,000 
bootstrap samples. Following Hayes (2009, 2012), indirect effects are regarded as 
significant when zero is not included in the respective bootstrap confidence interval. To 
further analyze these relationships within a comprehensive framework, we test the 
resulting models of help-giving (see Figure 4.1 and 4.2) by means of structural equation 
modeling using AMOS® (Arbuckle, 2010). 
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4.4 Results 
The influence of age, gender, and presentation order was analyzed by means of t-tests 
and correlations. Overall, women as compared to men attributed more responsibility to the 
help-giver, experienced more guilt, regret, shame and sympathy, and indicated greater 
willingness to provide both personal and financial help. All these differences are 
characterized by small effect sizes (with Cohen’s d ranging from .25 to .46). In addition, 
with regard to empathy, we found a decrease in FS with increasing age (r = -.23). 
Furthermore, women scored higher as compared to men in FS (d = .45), EC (d = .92) and 
PD (d = .49). We did not find any other significant effects of gender, age or presentation 
order on any of the other dependent variables or manipulation checks (all p > .05). Thus, 
dispositional empathy was not influenced by order of presentation (scenarios first vs. 
empathy-questionnaire first). As gender and age do not constitute essential aspects of our 
research, we do not consider these variables in the following analyses. Mean values and 
standard deviations for all variables can be seen in Table 4.1; all correlations coefficients 
are shown in Table 4.2. 
 
4.4.1 Manipulation Checks 
As intended, we obtained higher levels of perceived responsibility of the help-giver for the 
high responsibility than for the low responsibility condition (M = 2.92, SD = 1.03, n = 166 
vs. M = 0.87, SD = 1.46, n = 166, F(1,331) = 350.24, p < .001, η² = .40). For the 
recipient’s responsibility, we obtained the lowest ratings for the low responsibility condition 
(M = 0.15, SD = 0.61, n = 113), medium ratings for the medium (M = 2.15, SD = 1.50, n = 
110), and highest ratings for the high responsibility condition (M = 4.16, SD = 0.71, n = 
109), F(2, 330) = 445.16, p < .001, η² = .72. 
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4.4.2 From Thinking to Feeling 
The effects of the help-giver’s responsibility on moral actor emotions (guilt, regret, shame) 
and perceived recipient’s responsibility and deservingness on moral observer emotions 
(sympathy, anger, schadenfreude) were analyzed by means of regression analyses. For 
actor emotions, higher perceived responsibility of the help-giver predicts more guilt ( = 
.80, p < .001, t = 23.95, R² = .63), regret:  = .80, p < .001, t = 24.59, R² = .65) and shame 
( = .77, p < .001, t = 22.19, R² = .60). For observer emotions, higher responsibility of the 
recipient elicits less sympathy ( = -.68, p < .001, t = -16.86, R² = .46), and more anger ( 
= .63, p < .001, t = 14.86, R² = .40) and schadenfreude ( = .50, p < .001, t = 10.18, R² = 
.24). Finally, the recipient’s deservingness is a negative predictor of moral observer 
emotions (sympathy:  = -.77, p < .001, t = -21.59, R² = .59; anger: = .76, p < .001, t = 
22.29, R² = .60; schadenfreude:  = .62, p < .001, t = 14.38, R² = .39). 
 
 
4.4.3 From Thinking to Acting 
Higher perceived responsibility of the help-giver promotes help-giving ( = .16, p = .003, t 
= 3.02, R² = .03). Higher responsibility of the recipient reduces help-giving ( = -.45, p < 
.001, t = -9.25, R² = .20). Help-giving is also reduced by higher perceived deservingness 
on the recipient’s side ( = -.44, p < .001, t = -8.77, R² = .19). When taking a closer look at 
the relationship between the two cognitions concerning the receiver, mediation analyses 
make clear that deservingness functions as a partial mediator for the relationship between 
responsibility and help-giving. The path from responsibility to deservingness is significant 
(path X  M in the mediator model:  = .82, p < .001). The path from deservingness to 
help-giving is significant as well ( = -.19, p = .026) and the direct effect of responsibility 
on help-giving (’ = -.30, p < .001) is smaller than the total effect (see above). 
Furthermore, the indirect effect is significant (b = -.16, SE = .06, CI: [-0.28, -0.06]).  
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Table 4.1 Mean Values and Standard Deviations for Dependent Variables 
  RespHelp-Giverlow RespHelp-Giver high 
 
  M (SD)   M (SD) 
      
Shame  0.99 (1.25)   3.35 (1.66) 
Guilt  1.20 (1.40)   3.52 (1.60) 
Regret  0.94 (1.24)   3.50 (1.67) 
   
DeservRecipient RespRecipient low 0.10 (0.56) 
 RespRecipient medium 0.76 (1.02) 
 RespRecipient high 4.45 (0.75) 
   
Sympathy RespRecipient low 4.36 (1.15) 
 RespRecipient medium 3.56 (1.36) 
 RespRecipient high 1.15 (1.11) 
   
Anger RespRecipient low 0.70 (1.19) 
 RespRecipient medium 0.90 (1.06) 
 RespRecipient high 3.65 (1.23) 
   
Schadenfreude RespRecipient low 0.10 (0.54) 
 RespRecipient medium 0.11 (0.54)  
 RespRecipient high 1.46 (1.20) 
      
Helppersonal RespRecipient low 2.98 (1.62)   3.61 (1.41) 
 RespRecipient medium 2.56 (1.42)   2.80 (1.42) 
 RespRecipient high 2.33 (1.32)   2.04 (1.39) 
      
Helpfinancial RespRecipient low 2.75 (1.77)   3.27 (1.37) 
 RespRecipient medium 2.00 (1.28)   1.93 (1.40) 
 RespRecipient high 1.15 (1.17)   1.02 (1.13) 
      
PT  14.33 (2.99) 
EC  14.58 (2.76) 
FS  13.98 (3.17) 
PD  10.60 (3.01) 
      
Note. Resp = responsibility, Deserv = deservingnesss, _HG = help-giver, _R = recipient, PT = 
perspective taking, EC = empathic concern, FS = fantasy, PD = personal distress 
 
4.4.4 From Feeling to Acting 
For actor emotions, the likelihood of help-giving is increased by guilt ( = .19, p = .001, t = 
3.43, R² = .03), regret ( = .20, p < .001, t = 3.70, R² = .04) and shame ( = .20, p < .001, t 
= 3.71, R² = .04). For observer emotions, help-giving is promoted by higher degrees of 
sympathy ( = .49, p < .001, t = 10.17, R² = .24), whereas both anger ( = -.33, p <= .001, 
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t = -6.28, R² = .10) and schadenfreude ( = -.29, p < .001, t = -5.47, R² = .08) reduce the 
likelihood of help-giving. 
 
4.4.5 Moral Emotions as Mediators between Thinking and Acting 
4.4.5.1 Moral Actor Emotions 
Both regret and shame are mediating between the help-giver’s responsibility and help-
giving: Regret is predicted by the help-giver’s responsibility (path X  M in the mediator 
model:  = .80, p < .001). Regret promotes help-giving (path M  Y in the mediator 
model:  = .19, p = .034) and the direct effect of the help-giver’s responsibility on help-
giving becomes insignificant (path X Y in the mediator model: ’ = .01, p = .913). The 
indirect effect is significant (b = .13, SE = .06, CI: [0.02, 0.25]). Similarly, the help-giver’s 
responsibility promotes shame (path X M in the mediator model:  = .77, p < .001). 
Consequently, shame increases the likelihood of help-giving, as the path from shame to 
help-giving is significant (M  Y:  = .18, p = .032), and the direct path from the help-
givers’ responsibility to help-giving becomes insignificant (X  Y: ’ = .02, p = .784.). 
Again, the indirect effect is significant (b = .12, SE = .05, CI: [0.02, 0.23]). 
Higher responsibility of the help-giver also increases feelings of guilt ( = .80, p < 
.001). However, despite the fact that the effect of the help-giver’s responsibility on help-
giving becomes insignificant when guilt is entered into the mediation model (’ = .05, p = 
.612), the path from guilt to help-giving is not significant either (M  Y:  = .15, p = .095). 
Moreover, the indirect effect is insignificant (b = .10, SE = .06, CI: [-0.01, 0.21]).  
However, upon closer inspection, as suggested by the respective correlations (see 
Table 4.2) it becomes clear that guilt has a slightly different function in predicting help-
giving as compared to regret and shame: Guilt is a (partial) mediator of the relationship 
between the help-giver’s responsibility and both regret and shame: The help-giver’s 
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responsibility predicts guilt (path X  M:  = .80, p < .001). Guilt promotes regret, as the 
path from guilt to regret is significant (path M  Y:  = .81, p < .001). The direct effect of 
the help-giver’s responsibility on regret is smaller than the total effect (’ = .16, p < .001) 
and the indirect effect is significant (b = .77, SE = .05, CI: [0.69, 0.87]). We observed a 
similar mechanism with regard to shame, which is also promoted by guilt (path M  Y:  = 
.86, p < .001). The direct effect of the help-giver’s responsibility on regret is smaller than 
the total effect (’ = .09, p = .007) and the indirect effect is significant (b = .79, SE = .04, 
CI: [0.72, 0.88]).  
 
Table 4.2 Correlations of Cognitions, Moral Emotions, Empathy and Help-Giving (N = 332) 
 Resp
_HG 
Guilt Shame Regret Resp
_R 
Deser
v_R 
Sym-
pathy 
Anger Schaden
-freude 
Help_
F 
Help_
P 
PT FS EC 
Guilt .80***              
Shame .77*** .93***             
Regret .80*** .94*** .93***            
Resp_R -.07 -.07. -.12* -.09.           
Deserv_R .00 -.01 -.06 -.00 .82***          
Sympathy .07 .12* .15** .11 -.68*** -.77***         
Anger .15** .13* .10. .14** .63*** .78*** -.60***        
Schadenf. .08 .04 .03 .04 .50*** .62*** -.59*** .64***       
Help_F .13* .14** .17** .15** -.51*** -.47*** .47*** -.36*** -.28***      
Help_P .17** .19*** .20*** .21*** -.31*** -.31*** .41*** -.23*** -.24*** .63***     
PT -.04 .04 .05 .04 .04 .04 .03 -.03 -.04 .12* .23***    
FS .05 .08 .06 .07 .00 -.01 .06 .02 .04 .06 .09 .24**
* 
  
EC .07 .18** .16** 15** .00 .06 .18*** .03 -.01 .12* .25*** .24** .41**
* 
 
PD .09 .15** .16** 15** -.05 -.03 .07 .06 .70 .02 .04 -.10 .15** .22**
* 
Note. *= p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001, _HG = Help-Giver, _R = Recipient, _F = financial, _P = personal, PT = 
perspective taking, EC = empathic concern, PD = personal distress; Schadenf. = Schadenfreude.  
 
Moreover, when both emotions (guilt & regret or guilt & shame, respectively) are 
entered into the mediation model as serial mediators, the path from the help-giver’s 
responsibility to guilt is significant (X  M1:  = .80, p < .001), as is the path from guilt to 
shame (M1 M2:  = .94, p < .001) as well as the path from regret to help-giving (M2 Y: 
 = .19, p = .018). The direct effect of the help-giver’s responsibility on help-giving 
becomes insignificant (X  M: ’ = .01, p = .903) and the indirect effect is significant (b = 
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.12, SE = .06, CI: [0.03, 0.22]). The same mechanism also applies to shame (X  M1:  = 
.80, p < .001; M1 M2:  = .93, p < .001; M2 Y:  = .18, p = .023; X Y (direct effect): ’ 
= .02, p = .772; X Y (indirect effect): b = .12, SE = .05, CI: [0.03, 0.20]). Thus, we find a 
serial mediation from the help-giver’s responsibility to guilt (first mediator) to shame and 
regret (second mediators, respectively), which consequently increase the likelihood of 
help-giving.  
4.4.5.2 Moral Observer Emotions 
Sympathy is as a mediator between the help-giver’s responsibility and help-giving (X  
M:  = -.68, p < .001; M Y:  = .33, p < .001). The direct effect of the receiver’s 
responsibility on help-giving is smaller than the total effect (Y  Y: ’ = -.23, p < .001) and 
the indirect effect is significant (b = -.16, SE = .04, CI: [-0.24, -0.09]). Unexpectedly, both 
anger and schadenfreude do not act as mediators between the receiver’s responsibility 
and help-giving: The receiver’s responsibility predicts anger (path X  M:  = .63, p < 
.001). Despite the fact that the direct effect of the receiver’s responsibility on help-giving is 
slightly smaller than the total effect (path X  Y: ’ = -.41, p < .001) when anger is 
included as a potential mediator, the path from anger to help-giving is not significant (path 
M  Y:  = -.07, p = .301) and the indirect effect is insignificant (b = -.03, SE = .03, CI: [-
0.09, 0.02]. The same pattern was found for schadenfreude (path X  M:  = .49, p < 
.001; path M  Y:  = -.09, p = .119; X  Y (direct effect): ’ = -.41, p < .001; X  Y 
(indirect effect): b = -.03, SE = .02, CI: [-0.07, 0.00]).  
As expected, sympathy is also a mediator between the deservingness of the 
outcome and help-giving: Deservingness promotes sympathy (X  M:  = -.77,p < .001), 
the path from sympathy to help-giving is significant (M  Y:  = .38, p < .001), the direct 
effect of deservingness on help-giving is smaller than the total effect (path X  Y: ’ = -
.15, p = .047) and the indirect effect is significant (b = -.19, SE = .05, CI: [-0.30, -0.10]). As 
for responsibility, neither anger (path X  M:  = .78, p < .001.; path M  Y:  = .03, p = 
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.734; X  Y (direct effect): ’ = -.47, p < .001; X  Y (indirect effect): (b = .01, SE = .04, 
CI: [-0.07, 0.09]) nor schadenfreude (path X  M:  = .62, p < .001.; path M  Y:  = .03, 
p = .636.; X  Y (direct effect): ’ = -.42, p < .001; X  Y (indirect effect): (b = -.01, SE = 
.02, CI: [-0.06, 0.03]) mediate the relationship between deservingness and help-giving.  
However, we found that the deservingness of the outcome is a mediator for the 
relationship of both emotions anger/schadenfreude and help-giving (for a comparison with 
the total effects obtained for the relationships between emotions and help-giving please 
see Chapter 4.4.2). Anger predicts perceptions of deservingness (path X  M:  = .78, p 
< .001), the path from deservingness to help-giving is significant (M  Y:  = -.46, p < 
.001), the path from anger to help-giving becomes insignificant (X  Y: ’ = .03, p = .734) 
and the indirect effect is significant b = .29, SE = .04, CI: [0.21, 0.38]). We observed a 
similar mechanism for schadenfreude: path X  M:  = .62, p < .001; path M  Y:  = -
.42, p < .001; X  Y (direct effect): ’ = -.03, p = .636; X  Y (indirect effect): (b = .15, SE 
= .03, CI: [0.05, 0.10]). 
Moreover, we observed a similar pattern also for sympathy, that is, deservingness 
is also a (partial) mediator between sympathy and help-giving.  
4.4.6 Empathy and Help-Giving 
We will consider the different facets of empathy separately. First, perspective taking (PT) 
does not predict any of the cognitions and emotions ( always ≤ .05, p always > .10, R² 
always .00). However, PT promotes the likelihood of help-giving ( = .19, p < .001, t = 
3.55, R² = .03). Second, personal distress (PD) does not influence any of the cognitions ( 
always ≤ .09, p always > .05, R² always .00). However, higher PD promotes moral actor 
emotions (guilt:  = .15, p = 007, t = 2.71, R² = .02; regret:  = .16, p = .005, t = 2.83, R² = 
.02; shame:  = .16, p = 003, t = 2.94, R² = .02). PD does neither influence moral observer 
emotions ( always ≤ .07, p always > .05, R² always .00) nor help-giving (= .03, p = .585, 
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R² =.00). Third, empathic concern (EC) does not predict cognitions ( always ≤ .06, p 
always > .05, R² always .00). In contrast, EC promotes moral actor emotions (guilt:  = 
.18, p = 001, t = 3.31, R² = .03; regret:  = .15, p = .006, t = 2.77, R² = .02; shame:  = .16, 
p = 003, t = 2.95, R² = .02) and sympathy ( = .18, p = 001, t = 3.33, R² = .03). However, it 
does not influence negative moral observer emotions ( always ≤ .03, p always > .05, R² 
always .00). EC promotes help-giving ( = .21, p < .001, t = 3.84, R² = .04). Finally, 
fantasy (FS) does not predict any of the dependent variables ( always ≤ .09, p always > 
.05, R² always .00).  
As EC influences both emotions and behavior, we conducted additional mediation 
analyzes to test whether moral emotions act as mediators for the relationship between EC 
and help-giving. We found that all four emotions guilt (path X  M:  = .18, p < .001; path 
M  Y:  = .15, p = .005.; X  Y (direct effect): ’ = .18, p < .001; X  Y (indirect effect): 
(b = .01, SE = .01, CI: [0.003, 0.03]), regret (path X  M:  = .15, p = .005; path M  Y:  
= .17, p = .001.; X  Y (direct effect): ’ = .18, p < .001; X  Y (indirect effect): (b = .01, 
SE = .01, CI: [0.003, 0.03]), shame (path X  M:  = .16, p = .003; path M  Y:  = .17, p 
= .001.; X  Y (direct effect): ’ = .18, p < .001; X  Y (indirect effect): (b = .01, SE = 
.001, CI: [0.003, 0.03]).) and sympathy (path X  M:  = .18, p < .001; path M  Y:  = 
.47, p < .001.; X  Y (direct effect): ’ = .12, p = .011; X  Y (indirect effect): (b = .04, SE 
= .01, CI: [0.02, 0.07] act as partial mediators for the relationship between EC and help-
giving.  
 
4.4.7 A Comprehensive Model 
We now present a comprehensive model of help-giving, including stable dispositions 
(empathy), cognitive evaluations (responsibility, deservingness) and moral actor and 
observer emotions. For structural equation modeling, we created the following latent 
4 The Who and Whom of Help-Giving: 79 
 
 
variables: (1) negative moral actor emotions: guilt, regret, shame; (2) negative moral 
observer emotions: anger and schadenfreude; (3) cognitions about responsibility, i.e., 
perceived responsibility and deservingness of the potential recipient of help; (4) emotional 
empathy: EC, PD and FS (5) help: personal and financial help-giving. Perceived 
responsibility of the help-giver, sympathy and PT were entered as observed variables. 
First, we tested a theoretical model (see Figure 4.1) suggested by summarizing 
previous findings: Higher responsibility of the help-giver predicts higher extents of self-
conscious emotions (guilt, regret, shame), which in turn promote help-giving. Furthermore, 
higher extents of the receiver’s responsibility (responsibility and deservingness) promote 
anger and schadenfreude, which subsequently reduce help-giving. Lower degrees of the 
recipient’s responsibility predict higher extents of sympathy, which subsequently increases 
help-giving. Emotional empathy should further increase self-conscious emotions, 
sympathy, negative moral observer emotions and help-giving. In contrast, PT is expected 
to influence help-giving only. This model possesses an almost acceptable fit, (N = 332, 
chi² = 563.15, df = 126, p < .001, chi²/df = 4.469, NFI = .90 CFI = .92, RMSEA = .10). 
However, the paths from emotional empathy to negative moral observer emotions ( = 
.04, p = .412) as well as from emotional empathy to help-giving ( = .10, p = .140) were 
not significant. Furthermore, for two components of the latent variable emotional empathy, 
comparatively weak factor loadings (FS: .27, PD: .48) were observed. Furthermore, 
according to the results of the regression analyses, FS does not predict any of the 
dependent variables. Thus, we (1) decided to exclude this latent variable from further 
analyzes as well as to exclude FS and PD, and (2) treated the remaining components of 
emotional empathy as observed variables.  
 
  
Figure 4.1 Theoretical Cognition  Emotion  Help-Giving Model 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Resp. = Responsibility, Deserv. = Deservingness, R 1/2 = Receiver, item 1/2; Numbers near arrows represent standardized β-coefficients; *= p < .05, ** = p 
< .01, *** = p < .001; for better readability, error terms are not represented.
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An alternative model (see Figure 4.2) is based on the results of the regression analyses 
and mediation analyses just reported. Furthermore, with regard to empathy, we 
considered EC as the component of emotional empathy with the highest factor loadings 
for emotional empathy, and PT as a cognitive element of empathy. The empirical relations 
specified by this model can be summarized as follows: (1) Higher degrees of responsibility 
of the help-giver elicit feelings of guilt. (2) Subsequently, guilt promotes regret and shame 
(summarized as the latent variable ‘secondary self-conscious emotions’). (3) These 
emotions subsequently increase help-giving. (4) Lower degrees of the recipient’s 
responsibility increase sympathy. (5) Sympathy promotes help-giving. This relationship is 
partly mediated by deservingness (with higher sympathy and lower deservingness 
increasing help). (6) Deservingness is a mediator between the recipient’s responsibility 
and help-giving. (7) High responsibility of the recipient elicits anger and schadenfreude, 
which in turn decrease the likelihood of help-giving. This relationship is completely 
mediated by deservingness of the result for the recipient (with higher deservingness 
decreasing help). (8) EC exerts an indirect effect on help-giving by further increasing guilt 
and sympathy. (9) PT directly promotes help-giving. This empirically based model (see 
Figure 4.2) shows a better fit than the theoretical model with N = 332, chi² = 280.37, df = 
95, p < .001, chi²/df = 2.95, NFI = .95, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .08; Δchi²  = 282.78, Δdf,= 31, p 
< .001.4 
 
 
 
                                               
4
We also tested a similar model containing additional paths from EC to secondary self-conscious emotions and help-giving 
as well as PD as further component of emotional empathy with a path to guilt and secondary self-conscious emotions. 
However, theses paths were not significant (EC  secondary self-conscious emotions:  = -.02, p = .312; EC  help-giving: 
( = .10, p = .059; PD  guilt: ( = .05, p = .120; PD  secondary self-conscious emotions:  = .02, p = .189) and the fit of 
the model is not improved as compared to the model as depicted in Figure 4.2 and even shows slightly weaker values for 
NFI and chi²/df (N= 332, chi² = 316.13, df = 107, p < .001, chi²/df = 2.95, NFI = .94, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .08; Δchi²  = 35.76, 
Δdf,= 12, p <.001). Thus, we regard the second model (see Figure 4.2.) as the best fitting model. 
 
  
Figure 4.2 Empirically Confirmed  Emotion  Help-Giving Model 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Resp. = Responsibility, Deserv. = Deservingness, R 1/2 = Receiver, item 1/2; Numbers near arrows represent standardized β-coefficients; *= p < .05, ** = p 
< .01, *** = p < .001; for better readability, error terms are not represented.
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4.5 Discussion 
We conducted a study investigating the relationships between responsibility, moral 
emotions (actor: guilt, regret, shame; observer: sympathy, anger, schadenfreude), stable 
characteristics of the help-giver (dispositional empathy) and help-giving. The findings 
strongly support the notion that both the responsibility of the moral actor (i.e., a potential 
help-giver) and the responsibility of the person in need exert an influence on help-giving. 
Let us consider the interrelations between the respective cognitions, emotions and help-
giving as well as the potential help-giver’s dispositional empathy in more detail: 
 
4.5.1 Responsibility and Feelings of the Moral Actor 
In line with our expectations, responsibility of the help-giver is a strong predictor for all 
three moral actor emotions guilt, regret, and shame. Our results corroborate previous 
findings that responsibility increases feelings of guilt and regret (e.g., Ferguson, Olthof, & 
Stegge, 1997; Giorgetta et al., 2012; Weiner, 2006; Zeelenberg et al., 2000). Moreover, 
our findings further suggest that shame – similar to guilt and regret – is also increased by 
feelings of responsibility. As we measured moral shame (based on improper actions for 
which a person is held responsible), our results are in line with previous findings (see 
Sabini & Silver, 1997; Smith et al., 2002). Consequently, self-ascribed responsibility gives 
not only rise to feelings of guilt and regret, but shame as well. 
 
4.5.2 Moral Actor Emotions and Help-Giving 
As expected, guilt, regret, and shame promote help-giving. Our data challenge the 
traditional view that shame does not promote pro-social behavior (de Hooge et al., 2007), 
providing evidence that both guilt and shame promote pro-social behavior (see also de 
Hooge et al., 2010, 2011). This also sheds further light on the role of regret, which has 
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been discussed only rarely in the context of help-giving so far (see Martinez et al., 2011). 
With respect to shame, our results further strengthen the notion that under specific 
circumstances, shame does promote pro-social behavior, given that this behavior is 
intended to restore one’s threatened self (de Hooge et al., 2010, 2011). As Gausel and 
Leach (2011) suggested, if moral failures are attributed to specific (and thus alterable) 
aspects of the self – as is the case in our experimental manipulation – shame is elicited 
and strengthens the motivation to restore a more positive self-image and self-evaluation 
as well as to repair the social relationships to those people affected by the failure. The 
inappropriate behaviors of an actor can be regarded as moral failures attributed to specific 
aspects of the self. Consequently, shame elicited by these failures may promote help-
giving as a means to repair both one’s damaged self-image as well as the affected social 
relationships with the respective recipients of help.  
 
4.5.3 Responsibility and Help-Giving 
In line with previous research, our results confirm that help-giving is promoted by both 
high responsibility of the help-giver and low responsibility of the recipient (see e.g., Basil, 
Ridgway, & Basil, 2006; Rudolph et al., 2004). Our results also confirm previous findings 
that help-giving is more likely given low deservingness of a negative outcome or 
misfortune (Appelbaum, 2002; Olson et al., 2010). Furthermore, we found that 
deservingness mediates the relationship between the receiver’s responsibility and help-
giving, which is in line with previous findings that responsibility is regarded to be “further 
back in the causal chain than deservingness, because responsibility is a perceived 
attribute of the causal agent, whereas judgments of deservingness require a comparison 
between causes and consequences” (Appelbaum, 2002, p. 970). Thus, responsibility is 
related to the personal causes of an outcome, whereas deservingness requires a 
comparison between personal causation and outcome.  
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4.5.4 Responsibility of the Person in Need and Moral Observer Emotions 
As expected, the perceived responsibility of the recipient as well as the deservingness of 
the outcome decrease sympathy and increase anger as well as schadenfreude (see also 
Feather et al., 2011; Rudolph et al, 2004; van Dijk et al., 2008; Weiner, 2006). 
 
4.5.5 Moral Observer Emotions and Help-Giving 
It is well established that feelings of sympathy promote help-giving, while feelings of anger 
reduce pro-social action (for a summary see Rudolph et al, 2004). In line with our 
expectations, these findings are clearly confirmed by our data. Furthermore, in line with 
previous research, schadenfreude reduces both kinds of help-giving (see also Aiqing et 
al., 2004). 
 
4.5.6 Moral Emotions as Mediators between Cognitions and Help-Giving 
We observed that shame and regret are (direct) mediators between the help-giver’s 
responsibility and help-giving, whereas guilt is not. However, guilt functions as a (partial) 
mediator between the help-giver’s responsibility and regret and shame. These findings 
can best be described as a process of serial mediation including two steps of emotional 
processing. First, higher responsibility of the help-giver provokes feelings of guilt as a 
more immediate emotional response to high responsibility (as compared to shame and 
regret). Guilt triggers feelings of (moral) shame and regret, which consequently promote 
help-giving. The finding that guilt is more closely related to responsibility (as compared to 
shame and regret) emphasizes Weiner’s (1985, 2006) argument that in everyday 
language and usage, guilt is a blended concept, containing cognitive and emotional 
elements. Thus, guilt also contains a cognitive ascription to some extent. In the context of 
responsibility and help-giving, we might therefore consider guilt as a primary self-
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conscious emotion, and (moral) shame and regret as secondary self-conscious emotions. 
Secondary self-conscious emotions seem to require a previous occurrence of guilt 
ascriptions and feelings. 
With regard to moral observer emotions, our results confirm that sympathy is a 
mediator between the receiver’s responsibility and help-giving (see e.g., Rudolph et al., 
2004). In addition, sympathy is also a mediator between the deservingness of the 
outcome and help-giving.  
Negative observer emotions are also elicited by feelings of responsibility, but their 
effects on help-giving are mediated by the deservingness of the outcome. We also found 
a similar pattern for sympathy, that is, deservingness also mediates the relationship 
between sympathy and help-giving; however, in contrast to anger and schadenfreude, we 
only find a partial mediation here and the influence of sympathy on help-giving remains 
significant.  
In short, the idea that moral emotions act as mediators between cognitions 
(responsibility) and behavior (help-giving) (Rudolph et al., 2004) is well confirmed by our 
results. We extended this cognition  emotion  action model to moral actor emotions 
(guilt, regret, shame) as well as to schadenfreude as another moral observer emotion. 
Moreover, we specified the role of deservingness as a further cognition in addition to 
responsibility: Our results emphasize that help-giving strongly relies on judgments of 
responsibility, whereas deservingness plays an important role as an additional cognition 
eliciting sympathy and negative moral observer emotions. More importantly, 
deservingness is a mediator between both responsibility and help-giving as well as moral 
observer emotions and help giving. These results underline previous suggestions 
concerning the causal direction of the relationship between deservingness and emotion. 
According to Feather (2006) these effects are “likely to be reciprocal, with cognition 
influencing affect and affect influencing cognition” (p. 64). Furthermore, it seems that 
deservingness is more closely related to considerations concerning the effect or outcome 
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of cognitive antecedents (here: responsibility), whereas responsibility more strongly 
depends on judgments on causal antecedents alone.  
 
4.5.7 Stable Characteristics of the Moral Actor 
The majority of our hypotheses with regard to empathy is confirmed by the present 
results: (a) Higher degrees of PT predict higher extends of help (but not emotions). (b) 
Higher PD increases feelings of guilt, regret, and shame. (c) Higher EC promotes the 
help-giver’s feelings of guilt, shame and regret. Furthermore, EC promotes sympathy and 
help-giving. These findings are well in line with previous research (Basil et al., 2008; 
Davis, 1983; Imhoff et al., 2012; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney, 1991). However, (d) 
we did not find any effects for FS. Moreover, according to our results, none of the facets of 
dispositional empathy has an impact on anger and schadenfreude, contradicting findings 
related to induced empathy (e.g., e.g., Jensen, 2012; Strayer & Roberts, 2004). Finally, 
we did not find a relationship between empathy and any of the cognitive antecedents of 
emotions and actions considered here. 
Interestingly, we found that the influence of EC on help-giving is partially mediated 
by moral actor emotions (guilt, regret shame) and sympathy, which – to the best of our 
knowledge – has not been investigated thus far.  
 
4.5.8 A Comprehensive Model of Help-Giving 
The specific links between empathy and cognitive, emotional and behavioral elements of 
helping have not been addressed within a common theoretical framework thus far. Hence, 
the present data provide a first step towards a better understanding of the interplay 
between different facets of empathy on one hand and cognitive, emotional and behavioral 
components of helping on the other hand. 
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To describe these complex interrelations between cognitions (responsibility, 
deservingness), emotions (actor: guilt, regret, shame; observer: sympathy, anger, 
schadenfreude), personality of the help-giver (empathy) and behavior (personal and 
financial help-giving), a structural equation model (see Figure 4.2) has been suggested, 
which is well supported by our data. The model confirms and extends the basic cognition 
 emotion  actions sequence already postulated previously (e.g., see Rudolph et al., 
2004; Weiner, 2006; Weiner et al., 2011). 
Two causal chains from cognitions to emotions to action arise, which are 
complemented by further influences based on the help-giver’s dispositional empathy. 
These can be summarized as follows: 
(1) (Self-ascribed) Responsibility of moral actor (high vs. low)  feelings of guilt as a 
primary self-conscious emotion (high vs. low)  feelings of regret and shame as 
secondary self-conscious emotions (high vs. low) help-giving (high vs. low) 
(2) (Perceived) Responsibility of person in need (low vs. high)  
a)  deservingness of outcome (low vs. high)  help-giving (high vs. low)  
b)  feelings of sympathy (high vs. low) ( deservingness low vs. high)  
help-giving (high vs. low) 
c)  feelings of anger and schadenfreude (low vs. high)  deservingness 
(low vs. high) help-giving (high vs. low) 
(3) Empathic concern (high vs. low)  
d)  guilt (high vs. low)  … 
e)  sympathy (high vs. low) … 
(4) Perspective taking (high vs. low)  help-giving (high vs. low) 
Generally, according to our data, cognitions and emotions that refer to the recipient 
of help seem to have a stronger impact on help-giving than cognitions and emotions 
referring to the help-giver. Nevertheless, it seems clear that there are many situations in 
life involving complex interrelations between potential help-givers and -recipients. We may 
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think of situations involving joint team work, as for example at work places, or when 
cooperation among members of sports teams is needed. Similarly, our findings are of 
practical relevance in medical contexts (e.g., the physician’s medical care and the 
patient’s compliance with regard to the treatment of a specific disease) or school contexts 
(e.g., a teacher observing a student’s poor result in an exam that may have partly been 
caused by the teacher’s insufficient effort). In sum, we think that models involving (1) the 
help-giver’s and (2) the recipient’s responsibility, (3) corresponding actor- and observer 
emotions and (4) the help-givers dispositional empathy represent a complex system that 
is characteristic of many situations in everyday life in which help-giving or cooperation is 
needed. 
 
4.5.9 Recommendations for Future Research 
With regard to the concept of self-conscious emotions (see e.g., Davidson, 2006; Kedia & 
Hilton, 2011; M. Lewis, 2008; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney, 2002), we suggested a 
more fine-grained distinction between primary (guilt) and secondary (moral shame, regret) 
self-conscious emotions. Future research could show whether these findings may be 
applied to other contexts as well. To test the occurrence of these emotions, studies 
involving reaction times or investigations of real life-events may be promising tools. With 
regard to help-giving, we addressed the impact of cognitions, moral emotions and 
empathy on personal and financial help-giving. Future research might as well address 
other kinds of help-giving and other kinds of pro-social behaviors containing varying 
degrees of personal involvement (e.g., repairing for one’s wrongdoings, making amends, 
donations, etc.). Furthermore, an equivalent actor-observer system should be applied to 
antisocial behaviors such as punishment or social exclusion as well. 
 Despite the fact that our help-giving model is more complex than previous 
approaches, this is not to say that we addressed all potential factors that may influence 
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help-giving. Other aspects related to the help-giver, for example, subjective competence 
(Bierhoff, Klein, & Kramp, 1990), perceived similarity (Dovidio, 1984) and quality of 
relationship between the help-giver and the recipient (Anderson & Williams, 1996; 
Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994), considerations of cost and reward (Dovidio, 
Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, & Clark, 1991), and the quality of the respective interactions 
(see e.g., Burnstein et al., 1994; Greitemeyer, Rudolph, & Weiner, 2003) also contribute to 
the likelihood of help-giving. Thus, in future research, in addition to responsibility, 
deservingness, moral emotions and empathy, these aspects might be included as further 
predictors of help-giving and other pro- or antisocial behaviors (for a more detailed 
discussion of potential factors influencing helping-behavior see e.g., Bierhoff, 2002 and 
Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006). 
 Finally, the present study is a first exploratory investigation of the inter-connections 
between the potential moral actor and a person in need. We relied on thought 
experiments as an empirical tool. Future studies should include measures of real 
behaviors as well. However, based on meta-analytic evidence (Rudolph et al., 2004), it 
has been well established that within the present domain, data from thought experiments 
and data relying on actual observations of help-giving are characterized by exceptionally 
high conformance. We are thus confident that the present data provide a secure and 
reliable basis for future investigations in the domain of help-giving. 
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5 Moral Emotions: Cognitive Basis and Behavioral 
Consequences. 
5.1 Abstract 
Two studies are reported analyzing the influence of cognitive antecedents on moral 
cognitions, moral actor emotions (Study 1, N = 293) and moral observer emotions (Study 
2, N = 254) as well as reward and punishment (Study 2). Results reveal that both 
responsibility for the attainment or non-attainment of a goal as well as the perceived 
morality of a person’s own and other person’s behavior depend more strongly on effort as 
compared to ability. Effort expenditure increases the likelihood of positive moral emotions 
(pride, self-respect, admiration, respect and sympathy) and decreases the likelihood of 
negative moral emotions (guilt, shame, regret, embarrassment, anger, indignation, 
contempt, disappointment and schadenfreude). Additionally, pride, self-respect, 
admiration and respect are more likely given high ability, whereas, guilt, shame, regret, 
embarrassment and sympathy are more likely given low ability. Furthermore, we provide 
empirical evidence that moral emotions are determined by both responsibility for the 
attainment or non-attainment of a goal as well as by the perceived morality of the 
underlying behavior. Sanctioning behavior is influenced by both moral cognitions and 
moral emotions: Reward is more likely given high responsibility for attained goals and high 
morality of behavior, whereas punishment is more likely given high responsibility for non-
attained goals and low morality of behavior. Furthermore, feelings of admiration, pride, 
respect and sympathy increase the likelihood of reward, whereas anger, contempt, 
indignation, disappointment and schadenfreude increase the likelihood of punishment. 
Mediation analyses reveal that (1) perceived morality of the behavior mediates the 
relationship between responsibility and moral emotions, (2) between responsibility and 
sanctioning behavior, (3) and that moral observer emotions mediate between cognitions 
and sanctioning behavior. Interrelations between cognitions, emotions and sanctioning 
behavior are analyzed in structural equation models.  
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5.2 Introduction and Theoretical Background 
Moral emotions are elicited by judgments of people’s behaviors, such as adhering to social 
norms and values, doing right or wrong, good or bad, acting pro-socially or causing harm 
(e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Bidjerano, 2012; Gray & Wegner, 2011; 
Haidt, 2003; Hutcherson& Gross, 2011; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Tangney, 2002; Weiner, 
2006). Moral emotions affect subsequent behaviors (e.g., Cimbora & McIntosh, 2005; de 
Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007; Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004; 
Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988). In this regard, as Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek (2007) 
have stated, “moral emotions represent a key element of our human moral apparatus, 
influencing the link between moral standards and moral behavior.” (p. 345). Thus, moral 
emotions are related to both cognitive evaluations of the specific eliciting conditions as well 
as to subsequent actions. 
Although there is some disagreement as to which emotions should actually be regarded 
as ‘moral emotions’ (e.g., Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Gray & Wegner, 2011; Haidt, 2003; Kroll & 
Egan, 2004; Rudolph, Schulz, & Tscharaktschiew, 2013; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; 
Weiner, 2006; see also Chapters 2 and 3), there is general agreement that moral emotions 
are characterized by (1) agency and target (i.e., a person eliciting an emotion and a person 
at which the specific emotion is directed) and (2) valence (i.e., whether a specific emotion is 
regarded as positive vs. negative). With regard to agency and target, moral emotions elicited 
by and directed at the same person experiencing the emotion have been described as ‘inner-
directed’, ‘self-conscious’, ‘self-directed’ or ‘actor’ emotions (e.g., Haidt, 2003; Rudolph et al., 
2013; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney, 2002; Tangney et al. 2007, Weiner, 2006), 
whereas emotions elicited by and directed at observed persons (other than the experiencing 
person her/himself) have been described as ‘outer directed’, ‘other directed’ or ‘observer’ 
emotions (e.g., Rudolph et al., 2013; Weiner, 2006). The positive versus negative valence of 
an emotion has previously been related to its hedonic quality, that is, whether an emotion 
feels good versus bad (e.g., Ben Ze’ev, 2000). However, there are cases, in which the 
5 Moral Emotions: Cognitive Basis and Behavioral Consequences.  93 
 
 
hedonic quality of an emotion differs depending on the experience of the observed versus the 
observing person. For example, from the perspective of the observing person, experiencing 
schadenfreude feels good, whereas being the target of schadenfreude feels bad (see 
Chapter 3.2.2.3 ‘Discordant Emotions’; see also Chapter 2). In this regard, a straightforward 
classification seems difficult. Thus, in the following, we take a functional approach, relating 
the positive versus negative valence of the respective emotion to its ‘evaluative function’, that 
is, evaluating whether a preceding behavior of a person (self or other) was right (positive 
moral emotions) versus wrong (negative moral emotions) (see also Rudolph et al., 2013; 
Weiner, 2006; see also Chapters 2 and 3). We will refer to emotions elicited by and directed 
at observed persons but experienced by the observing person as ‘moral observer emotions’ 
and emotions elicited and experienced by as well as directed at the experiencing (or acting) 
person as ‘moral actor emotions’.  
For the present studies, we have chosen 15 moral emotions (in alphabetical order: 
admiration, anger, contempt, disappointment, embarrassment, guilt, indignation, pride (self-
directed), pride (other-directed), regret, respect, schadenfreude, self-respect, shame, 
sympathy) that have previously been described as moral emotions by different authors 
(Davidson, 2006; Drummond, 2006; Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Gray & Wegner, 2011; Haidt, 2003; 
Kroll & Egan, 2004; Massey, 1983a,b; Mauri, 2011; Rudolph et al., 2013; Rudolph & 
Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Tangney et al., 2007; see also Chapter 3). Considering target (actor 
her/himself vs. observed person) and morally evaluative function (positive vs. negative), four 
groups of moral emotions can be identified: (1) positive moral actor emotions (pride, self-
respect), (2) negative moral actor emotions (guilt, regret, shame, embarrassment), (3) 
positive moral observer emotions (admiration, pride, respect, sympathy) and (4) negative 
moral observer emotions (anger, indignation, contempt, disappointment, schadenfreude) 
(see also Chapters 2 and 3). Please note that disappointment can be directed at both 
persons as well as outcomes of situations (see also van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002) and is only 
regarded as a moral emotion when it is directed at a person’s behavior (see Chapter 3). 
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5.2.1 Cognitive Antecedents of Moral Emotions 
As already mentioned, moral emotions are related to moral norms and values. In his naïve 
action analysis, Heider (1958) described the moral standard of a situation or goal as ‘ought’: 
Ought is an impersonal concept that refers to universal norms and standards. It is 
independent from a person’s individual wishes or concerns, prescribing what should be 
experienced or done in a specific situation – from a moral point of view (see also Rudolph et 
al., 2013). That is, ought represents the moral valence (positive vs. negative) of a specific 
goal. For example, the intention to help a person in need is regarded as morally good and 
right. In contrast, causing harm to another person is regarded as morally bad and wrong.  
Typically, positive moral emotions (observer: admiration, pride, respect; actor: pride, self-
respect) emerge when moral standards are met or exceeded, for example with regard to 
especially praiseworthy behaviors or successes in achievement situations (Algoe & Haidt, 
2009; Chipperfield, Perry, Weiner, & Newell, 2009; Drummond, 2006; Feather, McKee, & 
Bekker, 2011; Haidt, 2003; Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Li & Fischer, 2007; Massey, 1983a, Mauri, 
2011; Tangney, 2002; Tangney et al.. 2007; Weiner, 2006). In contrast, negative moral 
emotions (observer: anger, contempt, disgust, disappointment, schadenfreude; actor: guilt, 
regret, shame, embarrassment) arise after a transgression of moral standards or norm-
incompatibility, as is the case for morally negative behaviors such as lying, cheating, not 
helping persons in need, not investing required effort in achievement situations, causing 
harm to another person etc. (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Bidgerano, 2010; 
Davidson, 2006; Haidt, 2003; Gray & Wegner, 2011; Hareli, Moran-Amir, David, & Hess, 
2013; Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Miller, 
1992; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney et al. 2007; 
van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; Weiner, 2006). 
With regard to eliciting moral emotions, other aspects of Heider’s (1958) naïve action 
analysis are important as well: In addition to having a positive or negative intention (the 
‘ought’ of a behavior or goal), the expended effort to attain one’s goals and the respective 
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person’s ability constitute the internal forces contributing to the attainment or non-attainment 
of a goal. Additionally, external forces (i.e., luck and task difficulty) also influence the process 
of goal attainment.  
Previous research suggests that among these concepts, the “norm of effort” (Matteucci, 
2007; Matteucci & Gosling, 2004) is of special importance: For example, in school settings, 
pupils are expected to work hard and try as hard as they can. If school failures are attributed 
to lack of effort, teachers (both actual teachers and student participants imagining to be 
teachers) are likely to regard the failing students as responsible for the respective failure and 
a more willing to implement punishments as when failures are attributed to lack of ability, 
which is characterized by lower responsibility (e.g., Matteucci, 2007; Reyna & Weiner, 2001; 
Weiner, 2003; see also Graham, 1991).  
Among the moral emotions mentioned above, guilt and regret (actor emotions) as well as 
anger, indignation and schadenfreude (observer emotions) have been related to lack of 
effort, whereas admiration has been related to high effort (for a summary, see Weiner, 2006). 
However, there is also evidence that all negative moral emotions are more likely given lack of 
effort, whereas all positive moral emotions are more likely given high effort (Rudolph et al, 
2013; see also Chapter 3).  
In contrast, shame, embarrassment, contempt and sympathy have also been 
related to lack of ability or inferences of incompetence (e.g., Hareli & Weiner, 2002; 
Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Tangney et al., 2007; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; 
Weiner, 2006). Interestingly, pride has been further distinguished into ‘alpha’- vs. ‘beta-
pride’: Alpha-pride refers to pride in a person’s self (e.g., with regard to one’s abilities), 
whereas beta-pride refers to pride in a person’s behavior (e.g., expended effort to attain 
one’s goals) (Tangney, 1990; see also Tangney, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007). A similar 
distinction between ‘authentic pride’ (elicited by positive events attributed to internal and 
unstable cause, e.g., high effort) and ‘hubristic pride’ (elicited by positive events attributed 
to internal and stable causes, e.g., ability) has been provided by Tracy and Robins (2004; 
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see also Tracy & Robins, 2007, 2014). In a similar vein, sympathy also occurs after both 
expending high effort given that a morally positive goal was not attained (Rudolph et al., 
2013; see also Chapters 2 and 3) as well as after failures or misfortunes ascribed to low 
ability (e.g., Weiner, 2006). 
In short, there is evidence that moral emotions are strongly influenced by judgments 
of ought, goal-attainment, and effort. Furthermore, some moral emotions (admiration, 
sympathy, contempt, pride, shame, embarrassment) have previously also been related to 
judgments of ability. Thus, we suggest that (1) positive moral emotions arise as positive 
evaluations of person's (self-or other) behavior. Furthermore, they represent positive signals 
towards the receiving person. We argue that these signals function as ‘go-signals’, 
encouraging the acting person to continue the positive behavior. In contrast, (2) negative 
moral emotions arise as negative evaluations of person's (self-or other) behavior. They 
represent negative signals towards the receiving person. We argue that these signals 
function as stop-signals, encouraging the acting person to stop or change the negative 
behavior (see Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; see also Chapters 2 and 3). For example, 
pride is likely when an action was good and right. It signals that this behavior should be 
continued (go-signal). In contrast, anger or guilt are likely when an action was bad and 
wrong. They signal that this behavior should be changed (stop-signal). Furthermore, in the 
present studies, we analyze which of the positive and negative actor and observer emotions 
also arise as positive versus negative evaluations of ability. (For a more detailed discussion 
of social and communicative functions of emotions in general see also Hareli et al., 2013). 
We will now briefly consider some other cognitive antecedents of moral emotions: 
Moral emotions are influenced by judgements of a person’s responsibility for an outcome of a 
specific situation (e.g., success or failure) or a specific plight (e.g., an illness or 
unemployment) (e.g., Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Weiner, 1985, 1995, 2006). For example, a 
student is highly responsible for successfully passing an exam if she/he has worked very 
hard to attain this goal in advance. Consequently, the student will be proud of his 
5 Moral Emotions: Cognitive Basis and Behavioral Consequences.  97 
 
 
achievement (actor emotion). Furthermore, the student’s teacher and parents will feel pride 
(observer emotion) as well. In contrast, if a student is higly responsible for failing an 
important exam (as is the case if the failure is ascribed to lack of effort), the student will 
experience feelings of guilt and regret and his teacher and parents may feel anger or even 
schadenfreude (see e.g., Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Feather et al., 2011). 
Generally, moral emotions are related to considerations of good versus bad and right 
versus wrong (Weiner, 2006). For the present studies, we will refer to considerations whether 
a person’s action is evaluated as good or bad, right or wrong as the perceived ‘moralitiy of 
the behavior). The morality of a person’s own behavior is addressed in Study 1. The morality 
of other person’s behavior is addressed in Study 2. 
 
5.2.2 Behavioral Consequences of Moral Emotions 
As previously mentioned, moral emotions are linked to subsequent behaviors. The greatest 
amount of empirical research related to moral emotions and subsequent behaviors has 
probably been conducted in the field of help-giving and similar pro-social activities. 
Sympathy, guilt, shame and regret have been found to promote help-giving or similar pro-
social behaviors (Basil, Ridgway, & Basil, 2008; Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, Cermak, & 
Rosza, 2001; Carlo, McGinley, Davis, & Streit, 2013; Carlo, Mestre, Samper, Tur, & Armenta, 
2010; de Hooge, Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2007, 2010, 2011; Martinez, Zeelenberg, & 
Rijsman, 2011; see also Chapter 4), whereas anger and schadenfreude reduce help-giving 
(Aiqing, Fanglian, & Huashan, 2004; Rudolph et al., 2004; Schulz, Rudolph, 
Tscharaktschiew, & Rudolph, 2013; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988; Weiner, 2006; see 
also Chapter 4).  
In contrast, anger, disappointment and contempt have been related to aggressive 
behaviors or punishment (Carlo et al., 2013, Clement, 2011; Melwani, & Barsade, 2011; 
Rudolph et al., 2004; Weiner et al., 1988; Weiner, 2006). Similarly, some of the negative 
observer emotions (i.e., anger, indignation and contempt) have been described as ‘other 
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condemning’ emotions (Haidt, 2003). 
It is interesting, however, that positive moral emotions have mainly been neglected in the 
empirical study of behavioral consequences of emotions (the only exception being 
sympathy). We think that in addition to the relationship between moral emotions and 
punishment (as a negative behavioral consequence), the relationship between moral 
emotions and reward (as a positive behavioral consequent) should also be investigated with 
regard to preceding moral judgments. Both reward and punishment have been described as 
‘sanctioning behavior’ following judgments of responsibility: A person can only be sanctioned 
(i.e., rewarded or punished) for an outcome if she/he is regarded as responsible for this 
outcome (Graham, 1991; Reyna & Weiner, 2001; Shaw & Reitan, 1969; see also Heider, 
1958). As moral emotions are related to judgments of responsibility, we suggest that moral 
emotions are – in addition to help-giving and punishment – also related to reward. In this 
regard, admiration has already been described as “other praising” (Algoe & Haidt, 2009) or 
‘approval’ (Giner-Sorolla, 2012) emotion. Furthermore, other positive moral emotions have 
also been related to morally relevant behaviors. For example, respect has been defined as 
“the only emotion that serves as an incentive for morally praiseworthy actions” (Drummond, 
2006, p. 2). Furthermore, self-respect has also been related to morality, especially with 
regard to acting in accordance with one’s standards of worthy behavior as well as with 
regarding oneself as a virtuous, person (Massey, 1983b; Mauri, 2011; see also Massey, 
1983a). Moreover, pride also encourages morally positive behavior that conforms to social 
standards (e.g., Tangney et al., 2007). 
In addition to responsibility, we analyze the influence of the perceived morality of a 
person’s behavior as another preceding cognitive judgment eliciting moral emotions and 
sanctioning behavior. 
 
5.2.3 Combining Cognitive Antecedents and Behavioral Consequences 
To summarize our considerations so far, positive moral emotions are likely given positive 
5 Moral Emotions: Cognitive Basis and Behavioral Consequences.  99 
 
 
evaluations of a person’s (self or other) actions, whereas negative moral emotions are likely 
given negative evaluations of the respective person’s behavior. Furthermore, positive moral 
emotions encourage positive behaviors (e.g., help-giving or related pro-social behaviors, 
reward and praise), whereas negative moral emotions encourage negative or behaviors (e.g., 
aggression, punishment or ‘condemning’ others).  
Additionally, according to previous research (see Chapter 5.2.1) some moral emotions 
(pride, admiration, shame, sympathy and contempt) also emerge as evaluations of a 
person’s stable traits (i.e., ability). However, we regard these evaluations as an additional 
condition for the elicitation of moral emotions and subsequent behaviors, whereas we regard 
effort as a necessary condition. Thus, in line with Weiner (2006), we suppose that the 
relationship between antecedent conditions, moral emotions and subsequent behavioral 
responses can be best described as a cognition  emotion  action sequence. In this 
regard, the relationship between responsibility, moral emotions and help-giving is an 
especially well documented example: If another person is not responsible (cognition) for a 
plight or failure, an observing person will experience sympathy (emotion), which 
subsequently promotes help-giving (action). In contrast, when the other person’s 
responsibility for a plight or failure is high, anger is elicited. This emotion reduces the 
willingness for help-giving (see also Rudolph et al., 2004).  
We assume a similar cognition  emotion  action sequence for the perceived morality 
of a person’s behavior: For example, when another person’s behavior was right, that is, for 
example given that this person expended considerable effort to attain a morally positive goal, 
in case goal attainment, admiration is elicited. This emotion subsequently encourages 
reward. In contrast, when the person’s behavior was wrong (i.e., effort was not expended) 
anger is likely to arise. This emotion, as already mentioned, subsequently increases the 
likelihood for punishment. 
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5.2.4 Aims and Expectations 
With regard to sanctioning behavior, a theoretical framework including both cognitive 
antecedents (e.g. goal attainment, effort and ability) and associated cognitive judgments 
(responsibility for the attainment vs. non-attainment of a goal, perceived morality of a 
person’s behavior) as well as eliciting positive as well as negative moral emotions related to 
positive (reward) and negative (punishment) sanctions is still missing. Thus, our aim is to 
analyze the influence of goal attainment, effort and ability on (1) the likelihood of cognitive 
evaluations (responsibility, morality of behavior) and (2) the likelihood of moral actor (Study 
1) as well as moral observer (Study 2) emotions. Furthermore, (3) relationships between 
responsibility, morality of behavior, moral emotions and sanctioning behavior (reward, 
punishment, Study 2) are analyzed. Hypotheses are outlined separately for Studies 1 and 2. 
 
5.3 Study 1 
We expect that goal attainment, effort and ability influence judgments of responsibility and 
the perceived morality of the underlying behavior (i.e., judgments of whether an action is 
regarded as good and right versus bad and wrong) as well as the emergence of moral actor 
emotions.  
More precisely, (1) we expect that persons perceive themselves as most responsible 
for the attainment of a goal when effort was high as well as most responsible for the non-
attainment of a goal when effort was low. Likewise, the attainment of a goal is regarded as 
most controllable when effort was expended, whereas the non-attainment of a goal is 
regarded as most controllable when effort was not expended.  
 (2) We expect that a behavior is perceived as good and right (i.e., high morality of the 
behavior) when effort was invested. 
 (3) We expect that the influence of ability on responsibility (controllability, 
responsibility) and the perceived morality of the behavior (good behavior, right behavior) is 
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comparatively smaller than the influence of effort. 
(4) We expect that positive moral actor emotions (pride, self-respect) are most likely 
given both high effort and high ability in case of attained goals; we further suppose that either 
condition (low effort or low ability) alone is sufficient for eliciting these emotions.  
(5) We expect that negative moral actor emotions (guilt, shame, regret, 
embarrassment) are most likely given low effort and low ability in case of non-attained goals; 
we further expect that either condition (high effort or high ability) alone is sufficient for eliciting 
these emotions. 
(6) We expect that for attained goals, positive moral actor emotions are predicted by 
higher responsibility and higher perceived morality of the behavior, whereas negative moral 
actor emotions are predicted by lower responsibility and lower morality of the behavior. 
(7) We expect that for non-attained goals, positive moral emotions are predicted by 
lower responsibility and higher perceived morality of the behavior, whereas negative moral 
emotions are predicted by higher responsibility and lower morality of the behavior. 
(8) We explore if (and) how responsibility and morality are related in predicting moral 
actor emotions and suppose that the morality of the behavior mediates the relationship 
between responsibility and moral actor emotions. 
 
5.3.1 Method 
5.3.1.1 Participants 
The sample included 293 participants (187 female, 105 male). Their age ranged from 17 to 
62 years (M = 25.74, SD = 9.12). 116 participants were psychology students, 87 were 
students of other subjects, 79 participants were adults with diverse professions, five were 
school students, two participants were in an apprenticeship and two persons were 
unemployed. One person did not indicate her/his sex and two persons did not indicate their 
area of studies or profession.  
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5.3.1.2 Experimental Design 
A 2 (goal attainment: attained vs. not attained) x 2 (effort: high vs. low) x 2 (ability) between-
subjects design was used. The controllability of the attainment or non-attainment of the goal, 
the responsibility for the attainment or non-attainment of the goal, the morality of the 
underlying behavior (investing effort vs. not investing effort given high vs. low ability), 
represented by the extent to which the underlying behavior was regarded as positive and 
right (positive behavior, right behavior) as well as ratings of positive (pride, self-respect) and 
negative (guilt, shame, regret, embarrassment) moral actor emotions were assessed as 
dependent variables. For regression analyses and mediation analyses, cognitions 
(responsibility: controllability, responsibility; morality of behavior: positive behavior, right 
behavior) served as predictors for moral emotions. 
5.3.1.3 Materials and Procedure 
The study was conducted using an online questionnaire, constructed with the internet-based 
software Unipark®. In a short introduction, participants were asked to put themselves in the 
position of the acting person in a realistic scenario: This person’s aim was to successfully 
complete a scientific expedition to the Himalaya. Depending on the experimental condition, it 
was described that this person expended high versus low effort to attain this goal, had high 
versus low ability and either attained or did not attain this goal. An example of the vignettes is 
presented in the upper part of Appendix C. (A description of all scenarios is available upon 
request.)  
Participants were asked to imagine the respective situation as vividly as possible as well 
as to indicate the extents to which they would experience each of the cognitions and moral 
actor emotions. A 6-point rating scale (labeled with 0 = not at all and 5 = to a high extent) 
was provided. At the end of the questionnaire, participants were asked to provide 
demographic data and were given the opportunity to ask questions and make comments. 
The questionnaire was part of a larger research project. The completion took approximately 
10 minutes. Cognitions and emotions were presented in automatically randomized orders. 
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions. 
5.3.1.4 Data Analysis 
First, to analyze the influence of goal attainment, effort and ability on moral cognitions and 
emotions, analysis of variance (between-subjects ANOVAs) were conducted separately for 
each of the cognitions and emotions. To analyze the influence of cognitions on moral 
emotions as well as the relationships between the respective cognitions, regression analyses 
and mediation analyses were conducted. For regression analyses and mediation analyses, 
item scores were z-standardized and averaged: For each of the respective group of 
cognitions and emotions (responsibility, morality of behavior, positive moral actor emotions, 
negative moral actor emotions) item scores were summed and averaged. Mediation analyzes 
were conducted using PROCESS® (see Hayes, 2012). For each of the mediation models, 95 
% bias-corrected confidence intervals were constructed using 10,000 bootstrap samples. 
Indirect effects are regarded as significant when zero is not included in the respective 
bootstrap confidence interval (see e.g., Hayes, 2009, 2012). 
 
5.3.2 Results 
Potential influences of age and gender were analyzed by means of correlations and one-way 
between-subjects ANOVAs. With increasing age, participants indicated slightly lower values 
for guilt (r = -.13, p = .021) and embarrassment (r = -.14, p = .014). There were no effects of 
gender on any of the depended variables. Obtained effects for age are rather small. As age 
and gender do not constitute major aspects of our research, they are excluded from further 
analyses. 
5.3.2.1 Manipulation Checks 
For both attained and non-attained goals, higher values for effort were obtained in the high-
effort as compared to the low-effort condition (attained goals: Mhigh effort = 4.71, SD = 0.51, n = 
.75, Mlow effort = 2.16, SD = 1.39, n = .75, F = 222.70, p < .001, η
2= .60; non-attained goals: 
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Mhigh effort = 4.38, SD = 1.09, n = .71; Mlow effort = 1.97, SD = 1.68, n = 72; F = 103.40, p < .001 , 
η2 = .42). Similarly, we obtained higher values for ability in the high-ability than in the low-
ability conditions (attained goals: Mhigh ability= 3.86, SD = 1.25, n = .74; Mlow ability= 1.46, SD = 
1.26, n = 76; F = 137.36, p < .001, η2 =.48; non-attained goals: Mhigh ability = 3.51, SD = 1.08, n 
= .72; Mlow ability= 1.06, SD = 0.95, n = .71; F = 208,85, p < .001, η
2 = .59). Furthermore, we 
analyzed weather an expedition to the Himalaya is perceived as a generally positive goal. 
Across all conditions, the mean value was highly above the midpoint of the scale M = 4.25, 
SD = 1.15, t = 26.18, p < .001, d = 2.16). We therefore assume that the described goal is 
generally regarded as positive. 
5.3.2.2 Eliciting Moral Cognitions and Moral Actor Emotions 
Due to space limitations, we only address the most important findings of our analyses. 
Complete results of ANOVAS can be seen in Table 5.1. Mean values are depicted in Figure 
5.1 (moral cognitions) and Figure 5.2 (moral emotions). 
5.3.2.2.1 Responsibility 
In line with expectations, both controllability and responsibility are mainly characterized by 
large interaction effects of GA x E (controllability: η2 = .21; responsibility η2 = .35), small 
effects of GA x A (controllability: η2 = .03; responsibility η2 = .04) and medium effects of E x A 
(controllability: η2 = .06; responsibility η2 = .08). Thus, as can be seen in Figure 5.1, the 
highest values for both cognitions are obtained when effort was invested (given that the goal 
was attained) or not invested (given that the goal was not attained). Furthermore, when the 
goal was attained in spite of low effort, higher values are obtained in case of high ability. 
Moreover, with regard to non-attained goals, higher values were obtained when the non-
attainment was ascribed to low ability (given that effort was high).  
5.3.2.2.2 Morality of behavior 
Whether an actor regards his actions or behavior as positive and right is mainly dependent 
on effort expenditure: For both positive behavior and right behavior higher values are 
  
 
Table 5.1 Analyses of Variance for Cognitions and Moral Actor Emotions (N=293) 
  
Source ofVariance 
 
 
 
Dependent  
Variable 
 
Goal attainment (GA) 
 
 
Effort (E) 
 
Ability (A) 
 
GA x E 
 
GA x A 
 
E x A 
 
GA x E x A 
 F η2 F η2 F η2 F η2 F η2 F η2 F η2 
Controllability 3.18(.076) .01 8.65(.004) .02 < 1(.617) .001 91.09(<.001) .21 11.89(.001) .03 27.30(<.001) .06 2.14(.144) .005 
Responsibility 6.14(.014) .01 2.22(.138) .004 < 1(.686) .00 190.44(<.001) .35 19.88(<.001) .04 41.95(<.001) .08 2.21(.138) .004 
Positive behavior 61.45(<.001) .11 169.94(<.001) .31 14.08(<.001) .03 < 1(.660) .00 1.34(.248) .002 < 1(.571) .001 21.98(<.001) .04 
Right behavior 34.76(<.001) .06 268.23(<.001) .43 6.49(.011) .01 1.57(.211) .003 4.01(.046) .01 1.34(.247) .002 21.78(<.001) .03 
               
Pride 342.01(<.001) .44 82.57(<.001) .11 21.98(<.001) .03 7.12(.008) .01 1.13(.288) .001 < 1(.496) .001 30.85(<.001) .04 
Self-respect 97.89(<.001) .17 123.24(<.001) .22 18.88(<.001) .03 3.44(.065) .01 1.47(.226) .003 9.91(.002) .02 33.34(<.001) .06 
Guilt 261.456(<.001) .37 79.81(<.001) .11 19.81(<.001) .03 10.03(.002) .01 3.05(.082) .004 7.72(.006) .01 34.15(<.001) .05 
Shame 224.98(<.001) .34 83.45(<.001) .12 15.74(<.001) .02 4.46(.036) .01 2.73(.099) .004 10.85(.001) .02 42.21(<.001) .06 
Regret 221.92(<.001) .32 130.15(<.001) .19 17.18(<.001) .02 14.14(<.001) .02 < 1(.603) .00 4.25(.040) .01 29.25(<.001) .04 
Embarrassment 262.04(<.001) .38 60.64(<.001) .09 15.83(<.001) .02 7.39(.007) .01 3.65(.057) .01 9.68(.002) .01 42.06(<.001) .06 
Note. F-values and η
2
 for goal attainment, effort, and ability.η
2
 = explained variance for each individual factor in the experimental design; p-values are indicated 
in brackets. 
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obtained when effort was expended, which is reflected by large main effects of effort 
(behavior regarded as positive: η2 = .31; behavior regarded as right: η2 = .43). This applies to 
both attained as well as non-attained goals being reflected by only small to medium effect 
sizes for goal attainment for main effects and interactions. There is hardly any effect of 
ability: There is no effect with regard to whether the behavior was regarded as positive. With 
regard to whether the behavior was regarded as right, very small effect sizes were obtained 
for the main effect of ability as well as for the interaction of GA, E and A. As can be seen in 
Figure 5.1, interestingly, the influence of ability is mainly restricted to attained goals, given 
that effort was not expended. Here, higher values are obtained in case of high ability. To a 
smaller extent, this also applies to the judgment of whether a behavior was good, however 
this effect is too small to be detected by a 3-way ANOVA. 
 
Figure 5.1 Mean Values and Standard Errors for Cognitions (Study 1) 
controllability responsibility 
  
positive behavior right behavior 
  
Note. GA = goal attainment, E = effort, A = ability (+ = attained/ high, - = not attained / low) 
 
5.3.2.2.3 Positive moral actor emotions 
As expected, pride and self-respect are predominantly influenced by large main effects of 
goal attainment (pride: η2 = .44; self-respect: η2 = .17) and effort (pride: η2 = .11; self-respect: 
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η2 = .22) and small main effects of ability (pride: η2 = .03; self-respect: η2 = .03). Furthermore, 
small to medium effects were also obtained for the interaction of GA x E (pride: η2 = .01; self-
respect: η2 = .01), E x A (self-respect: η2 = .02) and GA x E x A (pride: η2 = .04; self- respect: 
η2 = .06). These two moral actor emotions are most likely in case of attained goals, given that 
effort was expended (in case of both high and low ability). To moderate degrees, both 
emotions also emerge in case of non-attained goals, given both high effort as well as high 
ability as well as for attained goals in case of low effort, given that ability was high. 
Interestingly, with regard to non-attained goals, the values obtained for self-respect are 
higher than the values obtained for pride. 
5.3.2.2.4 Negative moral actor emotions 
Guilt, shame, regret and embarrassment are predominantly influenced by large effects of 
goal attainment (guilt: η2= .37; shame: η2 = .34; regret: η2 = .32; embarrassment: η2 = .38) 
and effort (guilt: η2= .11; shame: η2 = .12; regret: η2 = .19; embarrassment: η2 = .09) and by 
small effects for ability (guilt: η2= .03; shame: η2 = .02; regret: η2 = .02; embarrassment: η2 = 
.02). Additionally, small to medium effects were observed for interactions: GA x E (guilt: η2= 
.01; shame: η2 = .01; regret: η2 = .02; embarrassment: η2 = . 01), GA x A (embarrassment: η2 
= . 01), E x A (guilt: η2= . 01; shame: η2 = .02; regret: η2 = . 01; embarrassment: η2 = . 01) 
and GA x E x A (guilt: η2= .05; shame: η2 = .06; regret: η2 = .04; embarrassment: η2 = .06). All 
negative moral observer emotions are most likely for non-attained goals, given that effort had 
not been expended (in case of both high and low ability).  
Furthermore, guilt, shame, regret and embarrassment are experienced if a goal was not 
attained despite the fact that effort had been expended but ability was low. Moreover, to a 
lower extent, these emotions are also likely for attained goals, given that both effort and 
ability were low. Interestingly, mean values for all negative actor emotions are very similar, 
the only exception being a comparatively lower value obtained for regret in case of non-
attained goals, given that ability was low and effort was expended. 
  
Figure 5.2 Mean Values and Standard Errors for Moral Actor Emotions (Study 1) 
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5.3.2.3 Predicting Moral Actor Emotions from Cognitions: Attained Goals 
As ANOVAs revealed large main effects of goal-attainment or the interaction of goal-
attainment and effort for all dependent variables, regression analyses and mediation 
analyses were computed separately for attained versus not non-attained goals. As high 
correlations were found for items representing responsibility (controllability, responsibility: r = 
.56, p < .001) and morality of behavior (good behavior, right behavior: r = .86, p < .001) we 
now use the averaged values representing the respective cognitions. Correlations of all 
variables are presented in the upper part of Table 5.2. 
5.3.2.3.1 Positive moral actor emotions 
Linear regressions revealed that – when considered individually – higher extents of both 
cognitive antecedents responsibility and morality of behavior increase the likelihood for pride 
(responsibility: β = .55, t = 7.93, p < .001, R² = .29; morality of behavior: β = .78, t = 15.35, p 
< .001, R² = .61). However, as can be seen in Table 5.2, there are high correlations between 
these two cognitive antecedents. Thus, stepwise hierarchical linear regressions show that 
when the two cognitions are entered into the regression equation, morality of behavior is the 
only predictor of pride (β = .78, t = 15.35, p < .001, R² = .61) and responsibility is excluded 
from the regression model (β = .07, t = 1.05, p = .297). 
When regarded as single predictors, higher extents of both cognitions also predict self-
respect (responsibility: β = .57, t = 8.45, p < .001, R² = .32; morality of behavior: β = .77, t = 
14.62, p < .001, R² = .59). When both cognitions are entered into the regression equation 
together, morality of behavior is also the only predictor for self-respect (β = .77, t = 14.62, p < 
.001, R² = .59) and responsibility is excluded from the regression model (β = .13, t = 1.89, p = 
.061). 
5.3.2.3.2 Negative moral actor emotions 
Higher extents of guilt are predicted by lower extents of both cognitions, when being 
regarded as individual predictors (responsibility: β = -.43, t = -5.86, p < .001, R² = .18; 
morality of behavior: β = -.57, t = -8.39, p < .001, R² = .32). Furthermore, as for positive moral  
  
Table 5.2 Correlations (Study 1) 
Attained Goals 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Effort  -          
2. Ability .29*** -         
3. Responsibility .59*** .45*** -        
4. Morality .79*** .43*** .64*** -       
5. Pride .60*** .44*** .55*** .78*** -      
6. Self-respect .62*** .42*** .57*** .77*** .83*** -     
7. Guilt -.44*** -.31*** -.43*** -.57*** -.57*** -.51*** -    
8. Shame -.52*** -.28*** -.44*** -.64*** -.62*** -.56*** .74*** -   
9. Regret -.54*** -.38*** -.46*** -.67*** -.67*** -.56*** .80*** .78*** -  
10. Embarrassment -.43*** -.29*** -.38*** -.55*** -.55*** -.49*** .71*** .84*** .73*** - 
 
Non-attained Goals 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Effort  -          
2. Ability .15 -         
3. Responsibility -.57*** -.30*** -        
4. Morality .73*** .29*** -.74*** -       
5. Pride .38*** .27** -.52*** .56*** -      
6. Self-respect .46*** .26** -.62*** .63*** .61*** -     
7. Guilt -.41*** -.26** .70*** -.60*** -.51*** -.58*** -    
8. Shame -.30*** -.27** .67*** -.59*** -.49*** -.57*** .85*** -   
9. Regret -.48*** -.25** .68*** -.68*** -.45*** -.51*** .76*** .78*** -  
10. Embarrassment -.29*** -.24** .59*** -.52*** -.44*** -.46*** .78*** .84*** .77*** - 
.*p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
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actor emotions, hierarchical linear regressions reveal that when both cognitive antecedents 
are included in the regression model, morality of behavior is the only predictor (β = -.57, t = -
8.39, p < .001, R² = .32), whereas responsibility is excluded from the regression model again 
(β = -.12, t = -1.32, p = .190).  
Similar to guilt, as single predictors, lower extents of both responsibility and morality of 
behavior also predict shame (responsibility: β = -.44, t = -5.93, p < .001, R² = .19; morality of 
behavior: β = -.64, t = -10.23, p < .001, R² = .41). Again, the hierarchical linear regression 
revealed that shame is only predicted by the morality of the behavior (β = -.64, t = -10.23, p < 
.001, R² = .41) and responsibility is excluded from the regression model again (β = -.04, t = -
0.49, p = .627). 
As single predictors, lower responsibility and morality of behavior also increase the 
likelihood for regret (responsibility: β = -.46, t = -6.37, p < .001, R² = .21; morality of behavior: 
β = -.67, t = -11.02, p < .001, R² = .45). However, once again, according to the hierarchical 
linear regression, morality of behavior is the only predictor (β = -.67, t = -11.02, p < .001, R² = 
.45) and responsibility is excluded from the model (β = -.05, t = -0.67, p = .504). 
Embarrassment is also predicted by lower extents of both cognitive antecedents 
(responsibility: β = -.38, t = -5.04, p < .001, R² = .14; morality of behavior: β = -.55, t = -7.94, 
p < .001, R² = .29) when regarded as single predictors. When both cognitions are entered 
into a hierarchical regression, embarrassment is only predicted by the morality of the 
behavior (β = -.55, t = -7.94, p < .001, R² = .29) and responsibility is excluded from the 
regression model again (β = .05, t = -0.58, p = .561).  
5.3.2.4 Predicting Moral Actor Emotions from Cognitions: Non-Attained Goals 
Again, high correlations were found for items representing responsibility (controllability, 
responsibility: r = .69, p < .001) and morality of behavior (positive behavior, right behavior: r = 
.77, p < .001). Thus, as was the case for attained goals, averaged values representing the 
respective cognitions are used subsequently. Correlations of all variables are presented in 
the lower part of Table 5.2. 
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5.3.2.4.1 Positive moral actor emotions 
When goals are not attained, lower extents of responsibility for the non-attainment as well as 
higher extents of the perceived morality of the behavior increase the likelihood for pride 
(responsibility: β = -.52, t = -7.31, p < .001, R² = .27; morality of behavior: β = .56, t = 8.11, p 
< .001, R² = .31). When both variables are entered in a stepwise hierarchical regression, 
morality of behavior is the strongest predictor (β = .39, t = 3.81, p < .001), followed by 
responsibility, which explains additional 2 % of variance (β = -.24, t = -2.30, p = .023, R² total= 
.33). 
As single predictors, both lower responsibility and higher morality of the behavior also 
predict self-respect (responsibility: β = -.62, t = -9.42, p < .001, R² = .38; morality of behavior: 
β = .63, t = 9.61, p < .001, R² = .39). Stepwise hierarchical regression revealed that morality 
of behavior is the strongest predictor of self-respect (β = .37, t = 3.99, p < .001) and that 
additional 5 % of variance is explained by responsibility (β = -.34, t = -3.68, p < .001, R² total = 
.44).  
5.3.2.4.2 Negative moral actor emotions 
Guilt is also predicted by both higher responsibility and lower morality of the behavior, when 
they are regarded as single predictors (responsibility: β = .70, t = 11.52, p < .001, R² = .48; 
morality of behavior: β = -.60, t = -8.90, p < .001, R² = .36). According to the results of the 
stepwise hierarchical regression, guilt is most strongly dependent on responsibility (β = .56, t 
= 6.27, p < .001). Morality of behavior explains 1 % of additional variance (β = -.18, t = -2.06, 
p = .041).  
 As single predictors, both higher extents of responsibility and lower extents of the 
morality of the behavior also predict shame (responsibility: β = .67, t = 10.63, p < .001, R² = 
.44; morality of behavior: β = -.59, t = -8.64, p < .001, R² = .34). When both cognitions are 
entered into the regression equation, responsibility is the strongest predictor for shame (β = 
.51, t = 5.56, p < .001) and additional 2 % of variance are explained by morality of behavior 
(β = -.21, t = -2.25, p = .026, R²total = .46).  
 Similarly, both higher responsibility and lower morality of behavior also increase the 
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likelihood for regret (responsibility: β = .68, t = 11.03, p < .001, R² = .46; morality of behavior: 
β = -.68, t = -10.97, p < .001, R² = .46). Stepwise hierarchical regression emphasizes that 
responsibility is the strongest predictor for regret (β = .39, t = 4.55, p < .001). Morality of 
behavior explains additional 6 % of additional variance (β = -.39, t = -4.48, p < .001, R²total = 
.52). 
 Finally, when treated as individual predictors, higher responsibility and lower morality 
of the behavior also predict embarrassment (responsibility: β = .59, t = 8.56, p < .001, R²= 
.34; morality of behavior: β = -.52, t = -7.18, p < .001, R² = .26). However, when considered in 
stepwise hierarchical regression, embarrassment is only predicted by responsibility β = .59, t 
= 8.56, p < .001, R²total = .34). Morality of behavior (β = -.19, t = -1.83, p = .070) is excluded 
from the regression model. 
5.3.2.5 Predicting Moral Actor Emotions from Cognitions: Mediation Analyses. 
As structurally different results were obtained for attained versus non-attained goals, 
mediation analyses were conducted separately for attained and non-attained goals. 
5.3.2.5.1 Attained goals 
As hierarchical regressions revealed that (except for embarrassment given non-attained 
goals) the influence of responsibility on moral actor emotions partly or completely disappears, 
when the morality of the behavior is added to the regression model, we tested whether 
morality of behavior is a mediator between responsibility and positive as well as negative 
moral actor emotions. As very similar results were obtained for the respective emotions, the 
values obtained for pride and self-respect were averaged and summarized as ‘positive moral 
actor emotions’. Furthermore, the values obtained for guilt, shame, regret and 
embarrassment were averaged and are now summarized as ‘negative moral actor emotions’. 
For correlations please see Table 5.2. 
Results are depicted in the upper parts of Figure 5.3. As far as positive moral actor emotions 
are concerned, the path from responsibility to morality of behavior (now regarded as a 
potential mediator) is significant (path X  M in the mediator model). The path from morality 
of behavior to positive moral actor emotions is significant as well (path M  Y in the mediator 
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model). Furthermore, the direct effect of responsibility on positive moral actor emotions is 
insignificant (path X  Y in the mediator model), whereas the total effect was significant. The 
indirect effect is significant (b = .51, SE = .07, CI: [0.39, 0.66]). Thus, relationships can be 
described as follows: Judgments of higher responsibility for the attainment of the goal 
facilitate judgments of higher perceived morality of the behavior, which subsequently 
increase the likelihood for pride and self-respect. Judgments of morality completely mediate 
the relationship between responsibility and positive moral actor emotions.  
With regard to negative moral actor emotions, again, higher perceived responsibility 
allows for higher perceived morality of the behavior (path X  M). The path from morality of 
behavior to negative moral actor emotions is also significant (path M  Y). Thus, negative 
moral actor emotions are more likely in case of lower perceived morality of the behavior. 
Furthermore, the direct effect of responsibility on help-giving is insignificant (path X  Y), 
whereas the total effect was significant. Similar to positive moral actor emotions, the indirect 
effect is significant (b = -.43, SE = .08, CI: [-0.63, -0.28]). Hence, morality of behavior also 
completely mediates the relationship between responsibility and negative moral observer 
emotions 5 
5.3.2.5.2 Non-Attained goals 
As for guilt, shame, and regret the effect of responsibility on negative moral actor emotions 
was reduced when both cognitions were included as predictors in the hierarchical regression 
models, we tested whether morality of behavior is a partial mediator between responsibility 
and moral actor emotions. With regard to negative moral actor emotions, we now only 
included guilt, shame and regret, as for embarrassment morality of behavior does not explain 
any variance when responsibility is also included in the regression model. The respective 
mediation models are depicted in the lower parts of Figure 5.3 and can be described as 
follows: 
                                               
5
To analyze these relationships in more detail, we also conducted separate mediation analyzes for each of the 
moral actor emotions. Due to space reasons, we do not report these analyses here. Results confirmed the 
results of the mediation analyses containing averaged values and are available upon request. This applies 
to the analysis of both attained and non-attained goals. 
  
Figure 5.3 Cognitions Predicting Moral Actor Emotions: Mediation Analyses (Study 1)
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Note. PMAE = positive moral actor emotions: averaged values for pride, self-respect; NMAE = negative moral actor emotions: averaged  
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Lower responsibility for the non-attainment of the goal allows for higher perceived 
morality of the underlying behavior (path X  M). Subsequently, higher morality of the 
behavior increases the likelihood for positive moral actor emotions (path M  Y). The direct 
effect of responsibility on moral actor emotions (path X  Y) is smaller than the total effect 
and the indirect effect is significant (b = -.30, SE = .06, CI: [-0.43, -0.18]). Thus, morality of 
behavior partially mediates the relationship between responsibility and positive moral actor 
emotions. 
As far as negative moral actor emotions are concerned, higher responsibility 
facilitates judgments of lower morality of the behavior (path X  M). Lower morality of 
behavior increases the likelihood for negative moral actor emotions (path M  Y). Again, the 
direct effect of responsibility on negative moral observer emotions (path X  Y) is smaller 
than the total effect and the indirect effect is significant (b = .19, SE = .05, CI: [0.10, -0.31]). 
Hence, morality of behavior is also a partial mediator for the relationship between 
responsibility and negative moral actor emotions. 
 
5.3.3 Discussion of Study 1 
5.3.3.1 Cognitive Antecedents as Elicitors of Moral Cognitions and Moral Actor 
   Emotions 
In line with our expectations, eliciting moral cognitions (controllability, responsibility, good 
behavior, right behavior) and moral actor emotions (positive: pride, self-respect; negative: 
guilt, shame, regret, embarrassment) is influenced by all three factors goal-attainment, effort 
and ability: 
5.3.3.1.1 Moral cognitions 
(As the ANOVA-results for controllability were very similar, in the following, we refer to the 
results for both items as ‘responsibility’). (1) As expected, whether people regard themselves 
as responsible for the attainment or non-attainment of a goal is predominantly determined by 
effort: Generally, people regard themselves as most responsible for the attainment of a goal, 
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when effort was expected beforehand. Furthermore, given non-attained goals, they regard 
themselves as most responsible when they did not expend effort.  
Generally, the influence of ability on responsibility is much smaller than the influence of 
effort. However, to a moderate degree, people also feel responsible for the attainment of the 
goal because of high ability, given that effort was low. Similarly, they also regard themselves 
as somewhat responsible for the non-attainment of a goal, given that effort was high. In sum, 
these results suggest that people are regarded as more responsible for expending high 
versus low effort than for having high versus low ability and also that effort is rather 
controllable, whereas ability is rather uncontrollable, which is well in line with previous 
research (see e.g., Weiner, 1995, 2006). However, given that the attainment or non-
attainment of a goal cannot be ascribed to high versus low effort (i.e., when these conditions 
are not met), to a lower extent, ability also elicits judgments of controllability and 
responsibility. This underlines previous findings that especially with regard to achievements 
(i.e., the attainment vs. non-attainment of goals), effort and ability are regarded as 
compensatory (see Binser & Försterling, 2004). Thus, more importantly, our results suggest 
that ability is less controllable than effort, but not completely uncontrollable. 
(2) Referring to both the degree to which a behavior is regarded as positive and right, the 
morality of this behavior is also mainly determined by effort expenditure. Generally, for both 
attained and non-attained goals, the respective behavior is regarded as morally positive and 
right, when effort was invested. This result underlines the importance of the norm of effort 
(Matteucci, 2007; Matteucci & Gosling, 2004) for judgments on the morality of people’s 
behavior. Interestingly, not investing effort can – to a certain degree – also be accepted as 
right, given that the respective goal was attained because of high ability, which again 
corroborates Binser and Försterling’s argument (2004, see above). It almost appears as 
having high ability functions as an excuse for not investing effort in this case. 
(3) Generally, as expected, the influence of ability on judgments of responsibility and the 
morality of the behavior is considerably lower than the influence of effort. As these judgments 
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have been described as being related to eliciting moral emotions (see e.g., Weiner, 1995, 
2006), and given that moral emotions are also strongly influenced by effort expenditure (as 
we will also see later on) it seems plausible that moral emotions are also more strongly 
determined by effort than by ability. 
5.3.3.1.2 Positive moral actor emotions 
(4) As expected, both pride and self-respect are most likely given high effort and high ability 
in case of attained goals. Furthermore, almost equally high values were obtained for attained 
goals when effort was expended and ability was low. Despite the fact that the influence of 
effort is stronger than the influence of ability, as long as one of these conditions (i.e., high 
effort or high ability) is present, these positive moral emotions are likely (most strongly when 
both conditions are given and the goal is attained). Thus, our results corroborate Tangney’s 
(1990, see also 2002; Tangney et al., 2007) concept of alpha’- vs. ‘beta-pride’: Alpha-pride is 
elicited by high ability, whereas beta-pride is elicited by high effort. Moreover, our results 
suggest an extension of this concept to self-respect: We conclude that, similar to pride, 
alpha-self-respect is elicited by high ability and beta-self-respect is elicited by high effort 
expenditure. Interestingly, in case of non-attained goals given high effort, even higher values 
were obtained for self-respect as compared to pride. This may have been caused by reasons 
of social desirability: Communicating to be proud of one’s own achievements is often 
perceived as a sign of arrogance (see e.g., Hareli & Weiner, 2000, 2002; Weiner, 2006). 
Consequently, in experiments and questionnaires participants often chose to report socially 
more accepted emotions instead of reporting their truly felt emotions (Zammuner, 1996). 
Thus, our participants may as well have chosen to report feeling self-respect as a similar but 
socially more accepted emotion when they actually experienced pride as well. 
5.3.3.1.3 Negative moral actor emotions 
According to our results, as expected, (5) all negative moral actor emotions guilt, shame, 
regret and embarrassment are most likely given not attained goals, accompanied by lack of 
effort. The influence of low ability becomes most apparent in case of non-attained goals 
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given high effort. Thus, as their positive counterparts, negative moral actor emotions are also 
influenced by both effort and ability, as they occur for both lack of effort expenditure as well 
as lack of ability given both non-attained and – to a lower extent – also attained goals. Thus, 
we argue that – similar to positive moral actor emotions – negative moral actor emotions can 
also be regarded as alpha- and beta-variants (see e.g., Tangney, 1990). All negative actor 
emotions emerge in case of both low effort (beta-moral emotions) and/or low ability (alpha-
moral emotions). Interestingly, in case of non-attained goals, comparatively lower values are 
experienced for regret when effort was invested but ability was low. As low ability is less 
controllable than low effort, probably, having low ability can hardly be regretted – as it is also 
less changeable than expending low versus high effort. This is also reflected by 
comparatively lower values for ability and its interactions for this emotion obtained in the 
ANOVA. Thus, we think that regret is the moral actor emotion containing the lowest (but still 
present, see the condition of non-attained goals given high effort and low ability) alpha-
component. 
5.3.3.2 Moral Cognitions Eliciting Moral Actor Emotions. 
When regarded as individual predictors, (6) as expected, both higher responsibility and 
higher morality of the behavior increase the experience of both positive moral actor emotions 
pride and self-respect. However, hierarchical linear regressions show that for both emotions 
morality of behavior is the stronger predictor among the two. Responsibility is excluded from 
the regression models. Thus, the reason why positive moral emotions are also elicited in 
case of non-attained goals, is probably caused by underlying judgments of the high morality 
of the behavior – which, consequently, elicits positive moral emotions – even despite the fact 
that the outcome of the situation was negative (i.e., that the goal was not attained).  
Furthermore, the likelihood of guilt, shame, regret and embarrassment is increased by 
lower extents of both responsibility for the attainment of the goal as well as by a lower 
perceived morality of the behavior. These results corroborate previous research suggesting 
that these negative moral actor emotions occur after judgments of responsibility as well as by 
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the transgression of norms (i.e., the norm off effort, see Matteucci, 2007), which is 
represented by higher versus lower perceived morality of the behavior in the present studies 
(see also Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Bidgerano, 2010; Davidson, 2006; Haidt, 
2003; Gray & Wegner, 2011, Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Hareli et al., 2013; Hutcherson & Gross, 
2011; Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Miller, 1992; Rozin, et al., 1999; Tangney et al. 2007; van Dijk 
& Zeelenberg, 2002; Weiner, 2006). As for positive moral actor emotions, stepwise 
hierarchical linear regressions showed that all negative moral actor emotions are only 
predicted by the morality of the behavior, whereas responsibility is excluded from the 
regression model. 
Similarly, (7) when regarded as individual predictors, as expected, lower extents of 
responsibility for the non-attainment of a goal as well as higher perceived morality of the 
behavior increase the experience of positive moral actor emotions, whereas higher 
responsibility for the non-attainment of a goal as well as lower perceived morality increase 
the experience of negative moral actor emotions. Hierarchical linear regressions revealed 
that except for embarrassment (which is predicted by responsibility only), all moral actor 
emotions are predicted by both cognitions responsibility and morality of behavior. 
Consequently, (8) in case of attained goals, the impact of responsibility on both positive 
as well as negative moral actor emotions is completely mediated by the morality of the 
behavior: High responsibility for the attainment of the goal elicits higher judgments of the 
morality of the behavior, which in turn increases the likelihood for experiencing pride and self-
respect and decreases the likelihood for experiencing guilt, shame, regret and 
embarrassment. In case on non-attained goals, we observed a partial mediation for guilt, 
shame and regret. For embarrassment, the influence of both morality of behavior and 
responsibility seems to be independent from each other, showing a comparatively stronger 
influence of responsibility in this regard. 
Generally, so far, our results corroborate previous findings that moral emotions are 
influenced by judgments of responsibility (e.g., Rudolph et al, 2004; Weiner, 1995, 2006) and 
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are also related to the moral value of behaviors (i.e., judgments regarding good vs. bad, right 
vs. wrong, see Weiner, 2006). However, for the first time, we now present a more detailed 
picture with regard to how judgments of responsibility and morality are related in predicting 
moral emotions: Responsibility seems to be a necessary prerequisite, as, obviously, only 
when a person is responsible for her/his actions, the morality of these actions can be 
assessed, which than carries the greatest proportion of predictive value in eliciting moral 
actor emotions, especially in case of attained goals. However, please note that we are aware 
of the fact that, especially in case of low responsibility, there are more potential factors to 
which the attainment or non-attainment of a goal can be ascribed; for example, external 
factors such as good versus bad luck or task difficulty (see e.g., Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1995, 
2006). Our arguments are based on the assumptions that people are informed about internal 
causes for success or failure (i.e., effort, ability) and thus rely on this information in their 
judgments on responsibility. 
 
5.4 Study 2 
As for study 1, we expect that goal attainment, effort and ability influence the perceived 
responsibility of another person for the attainment or non-attainment of the goal as well as 
the perceived morality of the observed person’s behavior. Furthermore, these three factors 
should contribute to the elicitation of moral observer emotions as well as sanctioning 
behavior. Furthermore, we want to analyze the relationships between cognitions, moral 
observer emotions and sanctioning behavior (reward and punishment). 
More precisely, (1) we expect that other persons are regarded as most responsible 
given high effort in case of attained goals as well as given low effort in case of non-attained 
goals. Similarly, the attainment of a goal is regarded as most controllable when effort was 
expended, whereas the non-attainment of a goal is regarded as most controllable when effort 
was not expended.  
 (2) For both attained and non-attained goals, we expect higher extents of the 
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perceived morality of the behavior given that effort was high. 
 (3) We expect that – as was the case for evaluating one’s own effort and ability (Study 
1) – the influence of ability on responsibility (controllability, responsibility) and the perceived 
morality of the behavior (positive behavior, right behavior) is comparatively smaller than the 
influence of effort. 
(4) We expect that positive moral observer emotions (admiration, pride, respect) – as 
their actor counterparts – are most likely given both high effort and high ability in case of 
attained goals. We further expect moderate degrees of these emotions given either condition 
(high effort or high ability). (For sympathy, these expectations refer to non-attained goals 
only.) 
(5) We expect that negative moral observer emotions (anger, indignation, contempt, 
schadenfreude, disappointment) are most likely given low effort. For contempt, we further 
expect that this emotion is experienced more strongly in case of low ability (given non-
attained goals). 
(6) We expect that reward (i.e., praise, reward) is most likely given high effort, 
whereas punishment (i.e., punishment, criticism) is most likely given low effort. 
(7) We expect that for attained goals, positive moral actor emotions are predicted by 
higher responsibility and higher perceived morality of the behavior, whereas negative moral 
actor emotions are predicted by lower responsibility and lower morality of the behavior. 
(8) We expect that for non-attained goals, positive moral emotions are predicted by 
lower responsibility and higher perceived morality of the behavior, whereas negative moral 
emotions are predicted by higher responsibility and lower morality of the behavior. 
(9) We expect that – as was the case for moral actor emotions (Study 1) – the 
morality of the behavior mediates the relationship between responsibility and moral observer 
emotions. 
(10) We expect that higher degrees of responsibility for the attainment of a goal 
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predict higher degrees of reward, whereas higher degrees of responsibility for the non-
attainment of a goal predict higher degrees of punishment. Furthermore, reward should be 
increased by higher extents of the perceived morality of the behavior, whereas punishment 
should be increased by lower perceived morality of the behavior.  
(11) We expect that higher degrees of positive moral observer emotions increase the 
likelihood for reward, whereas higher degrees of negative moral emotions increase the 
likelihood for punishment. We further suppose that moral observer emotions mediate the 
relationship between cognitions (i.e., morality of behavior) and sanctioning behavior.  
(12) We explore how both cognitions and moral observer emotions are interrelated in 
predicting reward and punishment. We suppose that cognitions (responsibility, morality of 
behavior) predict positive as well as negative moral observer emotions, which subsequently 
increase reward versus punishment.  
 
5.4.1. Method 
5.4.1.1 Participants 
The sample included 254 participants (189 female, 65 male). Their age ranged from 12 to 67 
years (M = 25.13, SD = 8.09). 105 participants were psychology students, 97 were students 
of other subjects, 31 participants were adults with diverse professions, 3 were school 
students, 6 participants were in an apprenticeship and 8 persons were unemployed. 4 
persons did not indicate their area of studies or profession.  
5.4.1.2 Experimental Design 
As in Study 1, a 2 (goal attainment: attained vs. not attained) x 2 (effort: high vs. low) x 2 
(ability) between-subjects design was used. The controllability of the attainment or non-
attainment of the goal, perceived responsibility for the attainment or non-attainment of the 
goal, the morality of the underlying behavior (investing effort vs. not investing effort given 
high vs. low ability), represented by the extent to which the underlying behavior was regarded 
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as good and right (positive behavior, right behavior), ratings of positive (admiration, pride, 
respect, sympathy) and negative (anger, indignation, contempt, disappointment, 
schadenfreude) moral observer emotions as well as judgments on sanctioning behavior 
(reward: praise, reward; punishment: punish, criticize) were assessed as dependent 
variables. For regression analyses and mediation analyses, cognitions (responsibility, 
controllability, responsibility; morality of behavior: positive behavior, right behavior) served as 
predictors for both moral emotions and sanctioning behavior. Furthermore, moral observer 
emotions were also analyzed as predictors of sanctioning behavior. 
5.4.1.3 Materials and Procedure 
As in study 1, an online questionnaire was used. Due to a general change of computer 
software at the department, the questionnaire was constructed and administered by means 
of another internet-based software called TestMaker® (see Hartweg, Milbrandt, Zimmerhofer, 
& Hornke, 2011). Now, participants were asked to put themselves in the position of an 
observing person evaluating another person’s action. The scenarios where identical to the 
scenarios used in Study 1, apart from the fact that they were now written in third-person 
perspective. The observed person was called Lena. Now, it was Lena’s aim to successfully 
complete a scientific expedition to the Himalaya. As in Study 1, depending on the 
experimental condition, Lena expended high versus low effort to attain her goal, had high 
versus low ability and either attained or did not attain her goal. An example of the vignettes is 
presented in the lower part of Appendix C. (A description of all scenarios is available upon 
request.) 
As in study 1 Participants were asked to imagine the respective situation as vividly as 
possible. They were then asked to indicate the extents to which they would experience each 
of the cognitions, moral observer emotions and behavior. A 6-point rating scale (labeled with 
0 = not at all and 5 = to a high extent) was provided. At the end of the questionnaire, 
participants were asked to provide demographic data. Furthermore, they were given the 
opportunity to make comments and ask questions. As was the case for Study 1, the 
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questionnaire was part of a larger research project. The completion took approximately 10 
minutes. Cognitions, emotions and behaviors were presented in 2 randomized orders. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions. (Within the scope 
of the larger research project, together with additional variables, a small proportion of 
variables considered in the present study was also addressed in Prignitz, 2012) 
5.4.1.4 Data Analysis 
The same statistical methods and procedures as in Study 1 were applied. Additionally, to 
analyze and describe the complex relationship between cognitions, moral observer emotions 
and sanctioning behavior, structural equation models were developed using AMOS® 
(Arbuckle, 2010). 
 
5.4.2 Results 
Potential influences of age, gender and presentation order were analyzed by means of 
correlations and one-way between-subjects ANOVAs. With increasing age, slightly higher 
values for positive behavior (r = .18, p = .005), and praise (r = .14, p = .031) were obtained. 
Men indicated slightly more willingness to punish (Mmale= 0.86, SD = 1.42, Mfemale = 0.50, SD 
= 0.97, F = 5.30, p = .022, η2 = .02) and criticize (Mmale= 1.98, SD = 1.71, Mfemale = 1.45, SD = 
1.42, F = 6.16, p = .014, η2 = .02) the acting person. Furthermore, we obtained slightly higher 
values for pride for participants in version 1 of the questionnaire as compared to participants 
in version 2 (MVersion 1 = 2.30, SD = 1.69, MVersion 2 = 1.84, SD = 1.67, F = 4.75, p = .030, η
2 = 
.02). There were no other effects of age, gender or presentation order on any of the 
depended variables. As these variables do not constitute major aspects of our research, they 
are excluded from further analyses.  
5.4.2.1 Manipulation Checks 
For both attained and non-attained goals, higher values for effort were obtained in the high-
effort as compared to the low-effort condition (attained goals: Mhigh effort = 4.59, SD = 0.90, Mlow 
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effort = 1.72, SD = 1.11, F = 254.86, p < .001, η
2= .67; non-attained goals: Mhigh effort = 4.45, SD 
= 0.95, Mlow effort = 0.75; SD = 0.93, F = 489.29, p < .001, η
2 = .80). Similarly, we obtained 
higher values for ability in the high-ability than in the low-ability conditions (attained goals: 
Mhigh ability= 4.19, SD = 0.95, Mlow ability= 2.26, SD = 1.57, F = 70.00, p < .001, η
2 =.36; non-
attained goals: Mhigh ability = 3.13, SD = 1.25, Mlow ability= 1.08, SD = 1.12, F = 92.94, p < .001, η
2 
= .42). 
5.4.2.2 Eliciting Moral Cognitions, Moral Observer Emotions and Sanctioning Behavior 
Due to space limitations, as in Study 1, we only address the most important findings of our 
analyses. Complete results of ANOVAS can be seen in Table 5.3. Mean values are depicted 
in Figure 5.4 (cognitions), Figure 5.5 (moral observer emotions) and Figure 5.6 (sanctioning 
behavior). 
5.4.2.2.1 Responsibility 
In line with expectations, both controllability and responsibility are mainly characterized by 
large interaction effects of GA x E (controllability: η2 = .39; responsibility η2 = .47): As can be 
seen in Figure 5.4, the highest values for both variables are obtained when effort was 
expended (given that the goal was attained) versus not expended (given that the goal was 
not attained). Additionally, there are also minor influences of ability, characterized by small 
effect sizes for the interactions of GA x A and E x A. Thus, with regard to attained goals, 
when effort was low, higher values are obtained in case of high ability. Furthermore, with 
regard to non-attained goals, higher values were obtained when the non-attainment was 
ascribed to low ability (given that effort was low). However, there is hardly any influence of 
ability when effort was high in case of attained goals or low in case of non-attained goals. 
5.4.2.2.2 Morality of Behavior 
As expected, whether an observed person’s behavior is regarded as positive and right is 
mainly dependent on effort expenditure: For both positive behavior and right behavior higher 
values were obtained when effort was invested, which is reflected by large main effects of 
effort (behavior regarded as positive: η2 = .51; behavior regarded as right: η2 = .51). 
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Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 5.3, there is also some influence of goal attainment 
(several small to medium effect sizes for main effects and interactions) but hardly any effect 
of ability (zero to very small effect sizes for main effects and interactions). Interestingly, 
however, in case of attained goals, not investing effort received comparatively high values, 
given that high ability was sufficient for goal attainment. Consider, however, that this effect is 
not observed for non attained goals. 
Figure 5.4 Mean Values and Standard Errors for Cognitions (Study 2) 
 
controllability responsibility 
  
positive behavior right behavior 
  
Note. GA = goal attainment, E = effort, A = ability (+ = attained/ high, - = not attained / low) 
 
5.4.2.2.3 Positive moral observer emotions 
As expected, admiration, pride and respect are predominantly characterized by large main 
effects of effort (admiration: η2 = .31; pride: η2 = .29; respect: η2= .32), accompanied by 
medium to large effects of goal attainment (admiration: η2 = .14; pride: η2 =.10; respect: η2 
=.13). Additionally, small effects were also obtained for the interaction of E x A (admiration: 
η2 = .01; respect: η2 = .01; or at least a tendency, as is the case for pride: η2 = .009, p = 
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.0596). That is, all three positive moral observer emotions are most likely in case of attained 
goals, given that effort was expended. To a considerable degree, they are also likely in case 
of non-attained goals, given that effort was expended as well as for attained goals, given low 
effort expenditure. In the last case, higher values are obtained for high as compared to low 
ability. 
As sympathy generally occurs for non-attained goals only, it is predominantly 
influenced by a large main effect of goal attainment (η2 = .45) accompanied by medium 
effects of effort (η2 = .08) and the interaction of GA and E (η2 = .06). Furthermore, we observe 
a small effect for the interaction of E x A (η2 = .01). Thus, as expected, sympathy is most 
likely given high effort in case of non-attained goals, even more so when ability was low.  
5.4.2.2.4 Negative moral observer emotions 
Anger, indignation, contempt and disappointment are predominantly influenced by medium to 
large effects of goal attainment (anger:η2= .15; indignation:η2 = .10; disappointment: η2 = .30, 
contempt: η2 = .07) and effort (anger: η2 = .21; indignation: η2 = .23; disappointment: η2 = .12, 
contempt: η2 = .10) as well as by small to medium effects for the interaction of these two 
factors (anger:η2 = .07; indignation: η2 = .07; disappointment: η2 = .02, contempt: η2 = .04). 
These negative moral observer emotions are experienced most strongly in case of non-
attained goals, given that effort was not expended. Schadenfreude is characterized by small 
main effects of goal attainment (η2 = .05), effort (η2 = .03) and their interaction (η2 = .02) and 
also appears most strongly in case of lack of effort given non-attained goals. ANOVAs reveal 
hardly any influence of ability on the emergence of any of the negative moral observer 
emotions (all η2< .01 for both main effects and interactions). 
 
                                               
6
With regard to pride, this effect is too weak to be detected by a three-way-ANOVA (in contrast to all other 
positive moral observer emotions η
2 
< .01 for the interaction of E and A). However when comparing both 
conditions (GA+E- given high vs. low ability) in a t-test for independent samples, a medium effect size was 
obtained: t(59) = 2.33, p = .023, d = .58. 
  
 
Table 5.3 Analyses of Variance for Cognitions, Moral Observer Emotions and Sanctioning Behavior (N=254) 
  
Source of Variance 
 
 
 
Dependent  
Variable 
Goal Attainment (GA) Effort (E) Ability (A) GA x E GA x A E x A GA x E x A 
F η2 F η2 F η2 F η2 F η2 F η2 F η2 
Positive behavior 62.45(<.001) .09 344.89(<.001) .51 5.33(.022) .008 13.05(<.001) .02 4.70(.031) .007 < 1(.457) .00 2.53(.113) .00 
Right behavior 50.12(<.001) .08 306.87(<.001) .46 24.67(<.001) .04 13.15(<.001) .02 5.84(.016) .009 4.53(.034) .007 9.60(.002) .02 
Controllability 17.52(<.001) .03 13.75(<.001) .03 3.38(.067) .007 197.03(<.001) .39 16.52(<.001) .03 13.62(<.001) .03 < 1(.548) .00 
Responsibility 33.16(<.001) .05 23.23(<.001) .04 4.36(.038) .007 314.57(<.001) .47 22.17(<.001) .03 24.36(<.001) .04 < 1(.515) .00 
               
Admiration 67.12(<.001) .14 147.58(<.001) .31 1.23(.268) .00 4.80(.029) .01 < 1(.762) .00 6.88(.009) .01 1.47(.226) .00 
Pride 43.94(<.001) .10 123.12(<.001) .29 < 1(.377) .00 3.40(.066) .008 < 1(.357) .00 3.60(.059) .009 < 1(.472) .00 
Respect 59.85(<.001) .13 153.95(<.001) .32 < 1(.420) .00 10.67(.001) .02 < 1(.727) .00 4.96(.027) .01 < 1(.621) .00 
Sympathy 282.70(<.001) .45 47.56(<.001) .08 5.05(.026) .008 36.11(<.001) .06 < 1(.543) .00 8.20(.005) .01 3.31(.070) .005 
               
Anger 64.68(<.001) .15 88.69(<.001) .21 1.84(.176) .00 28.50(<.001) .07 < 1(.381) .00 < 1(.995) .00 1.28(.260) .00 
Indignation 41.86(<.001) .10 96.16(<.001) .23 < 1(.345) .00 29.15(<.001) .07 1.01(.315) .00 < 1(.409) .00 < 1(.592) .00 
Contempt 20.19(<.001) .07 30.11(<.001) .10 < 1(.853) .00 11.57(.001) .04 < 1(.820) .00 < 1(.753) .00 < 1(.643) .00 
Schadenfreude 13.62(<.001) .05 9.35(.002) .03 < 1(.621) .00 6.77(.01) .02 < 1(.477) .00 < 1(.744) .00 < 1(.675) .00 
Disappointment 137.02(<.001) .30 53.86(<.001) .12 < 1(.947) .00 10.92(.001) .02 2.54(.112) .006 2.57(.110) .006 1.02(.312) .00 
               
Praise 62.55(<.001) .12 185.30(<.001) .36 3.61(.059) .007 9.71(.002) .02 < 1(.848) .00 < 1(.583) .00 2.61(.108) .005 
Reward 47.33(<.001) .11 132.58(<.001) .31 1.63(.202) .00 < 1(.811) .00 < 1(.843) .00 < 1(.918) .00 < 1(.323) .00 
Criticism 42.16(<.001) .09 181.48(<.001) .36 11.83(.001) .02 7.31(.007) .02 2.78(.097) .006 < 1(.814) .00 7.27(.007) .02 
Punishment 23.09(<.001) .07 54.46(<.001) .16 1.37(.244) .00 9.38(.002) .03 1.51(.221) .00 1.81(.180) .005 2.10(.149) .006 
Note. F-values and η
2
 for goal attainment, effort, and ability.η
2
 = explained variance for each individual factor in the experimental design; p-values are indicated 
in brackets.*p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001  
  
Figure 5.5 Mean Values and Standard Errors for Moral Observer Emotions (Study 2) 
admiration pride respect 
   
sympathy anger indignation 
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Note. GA = goal attainment, E = effort, A = ability (+ = attained/ high, - = not attained / low)  
0
1
2
3
4
5
GA+E+ GA+E- GA-E+ GA-E-
A+
A-
0
1
2
3
4
5
GA+E+ GA+E- GA-E+ GA-E-
A+
A-
0
1
2
3
4
5
GA+E+ GA+E- GA-E+ GA-E-
A+
A-
0
1
2
3
4
5
GA+E+ GA+E- GA-E+ GA-E-
A+
A-
0
1
2
3
4
5
GA+E+ GA+E- GA-E+ GA-E-
A+
A-
0
1
2
3
4
5
GA+E+ GA+E- GA-E+ GA-E-
A+
A-
0
1
2
3
4
5
GA+E+ GA+E- GA-E+ GA-E-
A+
A-
0
1
2
3
4
5
GA+E+ GA+E- GA-E+ GA-E-
A+
A-
0
1
2
3
4
5
GA+E+ GA+E- GA-E+ GA-E-
A+
A-
5 Moral Emotions: Cognitive Basis and Behavioral Consequences. 131 
 
5.4.2.2.5 Sanctioning behavior: reward and punishment 
Both praise and reward are influenced by large main effects of effort (praise: η2 = .36; 
reward: η2= .31) and medium main effects of goal attainment (praise: η2 = .12; reward: η2 = 
.11). Furthermore, there is a small interaction effect of both variables for praise (η2 = .02). As 
can be seen in Figure 5.6, the highest values for praise and reward where obtained for 
attained goals, given that effort was expended, followed by non-attained, given that effort 
was expended.  
 
Figure 5.6 Mean Values and Standard Errors for Sanctioning Behavior 
praise reward 
  
punishment criticism 
  
 
Note. GA = goal attainment, E = effort, A = ability (+ = attained/ high, - = not attained / low) 
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effects of effort (criticism: η2 = .09; punishment: η2 = .07) and small interaction effects of GA x 
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criticism, we observed a small main effect for ability (η2 = .02) and the interaction of GA, E 
and A (η2 = .02). Thus, there are higher extents of criticism given low as compared to high 
ability for attained goals when effort was low; however, there is no such effect for the single 
measure of punishment (see Figure 5.6). 
5.4.2.3 Predicting Moral Observer Emotions from Cognitions: Attained Goals 
Similar to Study 1, ANOVAs revealed main effects and / or interaction effects for goal 
attainment for all dependent variables. Thus, all subsequent regression analyses, mediation 
analyses and structural equation models were computed separately for attained versus not 
non-attained goals. As sympathy and schadenfreude only occur in case of non-attained 
goals, these emotions were excluded from analyses for attained goals. Correlations of all 
variables are presented in Table 5.4. 
5.4.2.3.1 Positive moral observer emotions 
When regarded as individual predictors, higher extents of both cognitions predict all three 
moral observer emotions admiration (responsibility: β = .46, t = 5.78, p < .001, R² = .20; 
morality of behavior: β = .50, t = 6.39, p < .001, R² = .24), pride (responsibility: β = .41, t = 
4.97, p < .001, R² = .16; morality of behavior: β = .45, t = 5.73, p < .001, R² = .20) and 
respect (responsibility: β = .46, t = 5.76, p < .001, R² = .20; morality of behavior: β = .53, t = 
7.03, p < .001, R² = .28). 
Stepwise hierarchical regressions reveal that when both cognitions are entered into the 
regression equation, morality of behavior is the strongest predictor for admiration (β = .34, t = 
3.45, p = .001, R² = .24) and 3 % of additional variance is explained by responsibility (β = .24, 
t = 2.42, p = .017, R²total = .27). Pride is only predicted by morality of behavior (β = .45, t = 
5.73, p < .001, R²total = .20) and responsibility is excluded from the regression model (β = .19, 
t = 1.88, p = .062). Respect is most strongly dependent on morality of behavior (β = .40, t = 
4.15, p < .001) and 1 % of additional variance is explained by responsibility (β = .20, t = 2.06, 
p = .042, R²total = .29). 
 
  
Table 5.4 Correlations (Study 2) 
Attained Goals 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Effort -               
2 Ability .24** -              
3. Responsibility .68*** .49*** -             
4. Morality of Behavior .66*** .41*** .64*** -            
5. Admiration .57*** .36*** .46*** .50*** -           
6. Pride .49*** .28** .41*** .45*** .67*** -          
7. Respect .63*** .26** .46*** .53*** .74*** .67*** -         
8. Sympathy .00 -.13 -.06 -.02 -.03 .00 -.05 -        
9. Anger -.40*** -.30*** -.26** -.47*** -.26** -.22* -.40*** .32*** -       
10. Indignation -.25** -.13 -.14 -.28** -.18* -.18* -.32*** .30*** .58*** -      
11. Contempt -.36*** -.24** -.33*** -.54*** -.29*** -.25** -.36*** .29*** .69*** .67*** -     
12. Schadenfreude -.05 -.02 -.02 .00 -.05 -.01 -.08 .50*** .26** .36*** .30*** -    
13. Disappointment -.30*** -.32*** -.24** -.47*** -.27** -.23** -.32*** .21* .52*** .37*** .61*** .27** -   
14. Reward .66*** .31*** .56*** .72*** .61*** .63*** .60*** -.15 -.37*** -.26** -.39*** -.09 -.31*** -  
15. Punishment -.47*** -.28** -.41*** -.7*** -.27** -.28** -.38*** .12 .57*** .57*** .63*** .18* .54*** -.45*** - 
Non-attained Goals 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Effort                
2 Ability .53***               
3. Responsibility -.79*** -.48***              
4. Morality of Behavior .86*** .47*** -.87***             
5. Admiration .72*** .47*** -.62*** .73***            
6. Pride .70*** .44*** -.60*** .74*** .84***           
7. Respect .75*** .47*** -.67*** .80*** .86*** .83***          
8. Sympathy .62*** .19* -.53*** .60*** .54*** .60*** .61***         
9. Anger -.64*** -.32*** .62*** -.68*** -.56*** -.51*** -.58*** -.40***        
10. Indignation -.47*** -.28** .51*** -.55*** -.41*** -.4*** -.54*** -.46*** .72***       
11. Contempt -.66*** -.34*** .64*** -.71*** -.54*** -.54*** -.63*** -.51*** .78*** .81***      
12. Schadenfreude -.32*** -.22* .34*** -.33*** -.22* -.22* -.32*** -.35*** .39*** .62*** .52***     
13. Disappointment -.52*** -.24** .49*** -.54*** -.48*** -.42*** -.52*** -.26** .64*** .48*** .55*** .20*    
14. Reward .73*** .50*** -.69*** .78*** .81*** .77*** .80*** .49*** -.63*** -.43*** -.58*** -.21* -.52***   
15. Punishment -.64*** -.32*** .74*** -.74*** -.55*** -.53*** -.63*** -.49*** .65*** .66*** .78*** .41*** .53*** -.62***  
.*p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001 
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5.4.2.3.2 Negative moral observer emotions 
As single predictors, lower degrees of responsibility and morality of behavior predict all 
negative moral observer emotions anger (responsibility: β = -.26, t = -3.08, p = .003, R² = .06; 
morality of behavior: β = -.47, t = -5.94, p < .001, R² = .21), indignation (responsibility: β = -
.33, t = -3.86, p < .001, R² = .10; morality of behavior: β = -.54, t = -7.10, p < .001, R² = .28), 
contempt (responsibility: β = -.14, t = -1.57, p = .118, R² = .01; morality of behavior: β = -.28, t 
= -3.25, p = .001, R² = .07), and disappointment (responsibility: β = -.24, t = -2.72, p = .008, 
R² = .05; morality of behavior: β = -.47, t = -6.01, p < .001, R² = .22).  
When both cognitions are entered into the regression model in a stepwise regression, 
anger is only predicted by morality of behavior (β = -.47, t = -5.94, p < .001, R²total= .21) and 
responsibility is excluded from the regression model (β = .06, t = 0.58, p = .566). Similar 
patterns were observed for indignation (morality of behavior: β = -.54, t = -7.10, p < .001, 
R²total= .28; responsibility: β = .03, t = 0.29, p = .770), contempt (morality of behavior: β = -.28, 
t = -3.25, p = .001, R²total = .07; responsibility: β = .07, t = 0.60, p = .551) and disappointment 
(morality of behavior: β = -.47, t = -6.01, p < .001, R²total = .22; responsibility: β = .11, t = 1.11, 
p = .267). 
5.4.2.4 Predicting Moral Observer Emotions from Cognitions: Non-Attained Goals 
5.4.2.4.1 Positive moral observer emotions 
As individual predictors, higher degrees of responsibility for the non-attainment of the goal 
predict lower degrees of admiration (β = -.62, t = -8.83,p < .001, R² = .38), pride (β = -.60, t = 
-8.42, p < .001, R² = .36), respect (β = .-67, t = -10.15, p < .001, R² = .45) and sympathy (β = 
-.53, t = -6.89, p < .001, R² = .27), whereas higher extents of the perceived morality of the 
behavior predict higher extents of these emotions (admiration:β = .73, t = 11.95, p < .001, R² 
= .53; pride: β = .74, t = 12.09, p < .001, R² = .54; respect: β = .80, t = 14.95, p < .001, R² = 
.64; sympathy: β = .60, t = 8.26, p < .001, R² = .35). 
Stepwise hierarchical regressions revealed that when both responsibility and morality of 
behavior are entered into the respective regression equation, all positive moral observer 
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emotions are only predicted by morality of behavior (admiration: β = .73, t = 11.95, p < .001, 
R²total = .53; pride: β = .74, t = 12.09, p < .001, R²total = .54; respect: β = .80, t = 14.95, p < 
.001, R² = .64; sympathy: β = .60, t = 8.26, p < .001, R² = .35), whereas responsibility is 
excluded from the regression model (admiration: β = .05, t = 0.40, p = .689; pride: β = .14, t = 
1.13, p = .262; respect: β = .09, t = .79, p = .432; sympathy: β = -.04, t = -.28, p = .780).  
5.4.2.4. Negative moral observer emotions 
Furthermore, as single predictors, higher responsibility predicts higher extends of anger (β = 
.62, t = 8.75, p < .001, R² = .38), indignation (β = .64, t = 9.30, p < .001, R² = .41), contempt 
(β = .51, t = 6.63, p < .001, R² = .26), disappointment (β = .49, t = 6.26, p < .001, R² = .23) 
and schadenfreude (β = .34, t = 3.99, p < .001, R² = .11). These emotions are also increased 
by lower degrees of the morality of the behavior (anger: β = -.68, t = -10.20, p < .001, R² = 
.45; indignation: β = -.71, t = -11.32, p < .001, R² = .50; contempt: β = -.55, t = -7.32, p < 
.001, R² = .30; disappointment: β = -.54, t = -7.14, p < .001, R² = .29; schadenfreude: β = -
.33, t = -3.93, p < .001, R² = .10). 
According to the results of the stepwise hierarchical regression, anger, indignation, 
contempt and disappointment are solely predicted by morality of behavior (anger: β = -.68, t 
= -10.20, p < .001, R²total = .45; indignation: β = -.71, t = -11.32, p < .001, R²total = .50; 
contempt: β = -.55, t = -7.32, p < .001, R²total = .30; disappointment: β = -.54, t = -7.14, p < 
.001, R²total = .29), whereas for each of these emotions, responsibility is excluded from the 
regression model (anger: β = .13, t = 0.99, p = .325; indignation: β = .09, t = 0.74, p = .462; 
contempt: β = .14, t = 0.95, p = .345; disappointment: β = .09, t = 0.60, p = .553). In contrast, 
schadenfreude is only predicted by responsibility (β = .34, t = 3.99, p < .001, R²total = .11), 
whereas morality of behavior is excluded from the regression model (β = -.16, t = 0.96, p = 
.338). 
5.4.2.5 Predicting Moral Observer Emotions from Cognitions: Mediation Analyses 
As in Study 1, mediation analyses were conducted separately for attained and non-attained 
goals as slightly different results are suggested by regression analyses. 
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5.4.2.5.1 Attained goals 
As hierarchical regressions revealed that the influence of responsibility on moral actor 
emotions partly (admiration, respect) or completely (pride, anger, indignation, contempt, 
disappointment) disappears, when the morality of the behavior is added to the regression 
model, we tested whether morality of behavior is a mediator between responsibility and 
positive as well as negative moral observer emotions. As similar results were obtained for the 
respective emotions, the values obtained for admiration, pride, and respect were averaged 
and summarized as ‘positive moral observer emotions’. Furthermore, the values obtained for 
anger, indignation, contempt and disappointment) were averaged and are now summarized 
as ‘negative moral observer emotions’.  
Results are depicted in the upper parts of Figure 5.7. Higher extents of responsibility 
facilitate higher extents of the perceived morality of the behavior (path X  M), which 
subsequently increase positive moral observer emotions (path M  Y). The direct effect 
(path X  Y) of responsibility on positive moral observer emotions is smaller than the total 
effect. Furthermore, the indirect effect is significant (b = .36, SE = .14, CI: [0.14, 0.67])). 
Thus, the morality of the behavior partly mediates the relationship between responsibility and 
positive moral observer emotions7. 
As far as negative moral observer emotions are concerned, again, higher extents of 
responsibility for the attainment of a goal allow for higher extents of morality of behavior (path 
X  M), which consequently decreases the extent of negative moral observer emotions (path 
M  Y). The direct effect (path X  Y) of responsibility on negative moral observer becomes 
insignificant. The total effect was significant. Furthermore, the indirect effect is significant (b = 
-.38, SE = .09, CI: [-0.59, -0.23]). Thus, the relationship between responsibility and negative 
moral observer emotions is completely mediated by the perceived morality of the behavior. 
                                               
7As in Study 1, we also conducted individual mediation analyses for each emotion. Results of the mediation 
analysis based on averaged values are generally confirmed. However, to be precise, as was suggested by 
hierarchical regressions, for pride, we observed a complete (instead of a partly) mediation. Detailed results are 
available upon request. 
 
  
Figure 5.7 Cognitions Predicting Moral Observer Emotions: Mediation Analyses
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5.4.2.5.2 Non-attained goals 
We now also included sympathy as a fourth positive moral observer emotion and values 
were averaged across admiration, pride, respect and sympathy. We do not include 
schadenfreude as the stepwise hierarchical regression shows that this emotion is only 
predicted by responsibility when both cognitions are included in the regression model. 
Results are depicted in the lower part of Figure 5.7. Lower extents of perceived responsibility 
for the non-attainment of the goal elicit higher extents of the perceived morality of the 
behavior (X  M), which in turn elicits higher extents of positive moral observer emotions (M 
 Y). The direct effect of responsibility on positive moral observer emotions becomes 
insignificant (X  Y). The total effect was significant. Furthermore, the indirect effect is 
significant (b = -.75, SE = .09, CI: [-0.93, -0.59]). Thus, in case of non-attained goals, the 
relationship between responsibility and positive moral observer emotions is completely 
mediated by the perceived morality of the behavior.  
 Higher degrees of the perceived responsibility for the non-attainment of the goal elicit 
lower degrees of the perceived morality of the behavior (X  Y). Lower morality increases 
the likelihood for experiencing negative moral observer emotions (M  Y). The direct effect 
of responsibility on negative moral observer emotions is insignificant (X  Y). The total effect 
was significant. Furthermore, the indirect effect is significant (b = -.75, SE = .09, CI: [-0.93, -
0.59]). Thus, as for attained goals, the effect of responsibility on negative moral observer 
emotions is completely mediated by the perceived morality of the observed person’s 
behavior. 
5.4.2.6 Predicting Sanctioning Behavior from Cognitions: Attained Goals 
Linear regressions revealed that – when considered individually – higher extents of both 
cognitive antecedents increase the likelihood for reward (responsibility: β = .56, t = 7.56, p < 
.001, R² = .31; morality of behavior: β = .72, t = 11.60, p < .001, R² = .51). However, 
hierarchical linear regressions show that when both responsibility and morality of behavior 
are entered as predictors, the largest amount of variance is explained by morality of behavior 
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(β = .61, t = 7.68, p < .001, R²= .51) and only 2 % of additional variance is explained by 
responsibility (β = .17, t = 2.10, p = .038, R²total= .53).  
In a similar vein, when considered individually, lower extents of both cognitive 
antecedents serve as predictors for punishment (responsibility: β = -.41, t = -4.97, p < .001, 
R² = .16; morality of behavior: β = -.70, t = -11.09, p < .001, R² = .49). When responsibility 
and morality of behavior are entered into the regression equation together, punishment is 
only predicted by morality of behavior (β = -.70, t = -11.09, p < .001, R² = .49) and 
responsibility is excluded from the regression model (β = .08, t = 0.93, p = .354).  
5.4.2.7 Predicting Sanctioning Behavior from Cognitions: Non-Attained Goals 
When considered individually, both lower responsibility for the non-attainment of the goal as 
well as higher extents of the perceived morality of the behavior also serve as predictors for 
reward in case of non-attained goals (responsibility: β = -.69, t = -10.68, p < .001, R² = .48; 
morality of behavior: β = .78, t = 13.78, p < .001, R² = .60). When entered in a stepwise 
regression, reward is only predicted by morality of behavior (β = .78, t = 13.78, p < .001, R² = 
.60) and responsibility is excluded from the regression model (β = -.07, t = -0.65, p = .516).
 With regard to punishment, again, when entered into the regression equation as 
single predictors, both higher extents of responsibility (β = .74, t = 12.29, p < .001, R² = .55) 
as well as lower extents of the morality of the behavior (β = -.74, t = -12.42, p < .001, R² = 
.55) increase the likelihood for punishment. When both responsibility and morality of behavior 
are included, morality of behavior is the strongest predictor (β = -.41, t = -3.56, p = .001, R² = 
.55) and 3 % of additional variance is explained by responsibility (β = .39, t = 3.33, p = .001, 
R²total = .58).  
5.4.2.8. Predicting Sanctioning Behavior from Moral Observer Emotions: Attained 
 Goals 
As expected, higher extents of admiration (β = .61, t = 8.62, p < .001, R² = .37), pride (β = 
.63, t = 9.12, p < .001, R² = .39) and respect (β = .60, t = 8.50, p < .001, R² = .36) increase 
the likelihood for reward. In contrast, higher extends of negative moral observer emotions 
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decrease the likelihood for reward (anger: β = -.37, t = -4.53, p < .001, R² = .13, indignation: 
β = -.39, t = -4.70, p < .001, R² = .14, contempt: β = -.26, t = -3.06, p =.003, R² = .06, 
disappointment: β = -.31, t = -3.69, p < .001, R² = .09). 
Furthermore, in line with expectations, higher extents of anger (β = .60, t = 7.77, p < 
.001, R² = .33), indignation (β = .63, t = 9.04, p < .001, R² = .39), contempt (β = .57, t = 7.80, 
p < .001, R² = .32) and disappointment (β = .54, t = 7.13, p < .001, R² = .28) elicit higher 
degrees of punishment. In contrast, positive moral actor emotions decrease the likelihood for 
punishment (admiration: β = -.27, t = -3.13, p = .001, R² = .07; pride: β = -.28, t = -3.25, p = 
.001, R² = .07; respect: β = -.38, t = -4.62, p < .001, R² = .14). 
5.4.2.9 Predicting Sanctioning Behavior from Moral Observer Emotions: Non-Attained 
 Goals 
As expected, the likelihood for reward is increased given higher degrees of positive moral 
observer emotions (admiration: β = .81, t = 15.48, p < .001, R² = .66; pride: β = .77, t = 13.59, 
p < .001, R² = .60; respect: β = .80, t = 14.63, p < .001, R² = .63; sympathy: β = .50, t = 6.24, 
p < .001, R² = .23). Furthermore, higher extents of negative moral observer emotions 
decrease the likelihood for reward (anger: β = -.63, t = -9.12, p < .001, R²= .40; indignation: β 
= -.58, t = -7.89, p < .001, R² = .33; contempt: β = -.43, t = -5.24, p < .001, R² = .18; 
schadenfreude: β = -.21, t = -2.34, p = .021, R² = .04; disappointment: β = -.52, t = -6.69, p < 
.001, R² = .26). 
In line with expectations, the likelihood for punishment is predicted by higher extents of 
negative moral observer emotions (anger: β = .65, t = 9.61, p < .001, R² = .42; indignation: β 
= .78, t = 13.99, p < .001, R² = .61; contempt: β = .66, t = 9.71, p < .001, R² = .43; 
schadenfreude: β = .41, t = 5.05, p < .001, R² = .16; disappointment: β = .53, t = 6.88, p < 
.001, R² = .27). Moreover, higher extents of positive moral observer emotions decrease the 
likelihood for punishment (admiration: β = -.55, t = -7.25, p < .001, R² = .29; pride: β = -.53, t 
= -6.98, p < .001, R² = .28; respect: β = -.63, t = -9.12, p < .001, R² = .40; sympathy: β = -.49, 
t = -6.17, p < .001, R² = .30). 
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5.4.2.10 Predicting Sanctioning Behavior from Cognitions and Moral Observer  
   Emotions: Mediation Analyses 
As in Study 1, mediation analyses were conducted separately for attained versus non-
attained goals as slightly different results are suggested by regression analyses. As is 
suggested by the results of the regression analyses and previous mediation analyses, we 
used morality of behavior as independent variable predicting reward and punishment. 
Results for responsibility as predictor variable are available upon request. 
5.4.2.9.1 Attained goals 
As can be seen in the upper left part of Figure 5.8, the total effect of morality of behavior on 
reward is partially mediated by positive moral observer emotions: Both the path from morality 
of behavior on positive moral observer emotions (path X  M in the mediator model) as well 
as the path from positive moral observer emotions to reward (path M  Y) are significant. 
Thus, higher perceived morality of the behavior elicits higher extents of positive moral 
observer emotions. Subsequently, these emotions increase the likelihood for reward. The 
path from morality of behavior to reward (path X  Y) remains significant; however, this 
direct effect (β’) is considerably smaller than the total effect. Furthermore, the indirect effect 
of morality of behavior on reward is significant (b = .23, SE = .05, CI: [0.15, 0.34]). 
With regard to punishment, we observe that negative moral observer emotions are 
partial mediators (see upper right part of Figure 5.8). Lower perceived morality of the 
behavior elicits negative moral observer emotions which consequently encourage 
punishment: Both the path from morality of behavior to emotions (i.e., path X  M) as well as 
the path from moral observer emotions to punishment (i.e., path M  Y) are significant. 
Similar to the mediation model for reward, after controlling for the mediator, the path from 
morality of behavior to punishment (path X  Y) remains significant, but the direct effect (β’) 
is smaller than the total effect and the indirect effect is significant (b = -.24, SE = .06, CI: [-
0.36, -0.14]). 
  
Figure 5.8 Cognitions and Moral Observer Emotions Predicting Sanctioning Behavior: Mediation Analyses 
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5.4.2.9.2 Non-attained goals 
Despite the fact that both sympathy and schadenfreude prototypically arise in case on non-
attained goals, we did not include sympathy into the mediation models, as this emotion does 
not act as mediator between the morality of behavior and reward when considered as an 
individual emotion or potential mediator.8 
As for attained goals, mediation analyses reveal that positive moral observer emotions 
partially mediate the relationship between morality of behavior and reward. Again, higher 
extents of the perceived morality of the behavior increase the likelihood for positive moral 
observer emotions, which in turn increase the likelihood for reward. Both the path from 
morality of behavior to positive moral observer emotions (X  M) and the path from moral 
observer emotions to reward (M  Y) are significant. The direct effect of X on Y (β’) is 
smaller than the total effect (see lower left part of Fig. 5.8). As for the previous analyses, the 
indirect effect of morality of behavior on reward (X  Y) is significant (b = .48, SE = .07, CI: 
[0.37, 0.63]). 
Furthermore, negative moral observer emotions partially mediate the relationship 
between the perceived morality of the behavior and punishment. That is, lower perceived 
morality of the behavior increases the likelihood for negative moral observer emotions, which 
in turn increase the likelihood for punishment. As can be seen in the lower right part of Figure 
5.8, both the path from cognition to emotion (X  M) and the path from emotions to behavior 
(M  Y) are significant. The direct effect (β’) of responsibility and deservingness on 
punishment is smaller than the total effect. Again, the indirect effect is significant (b = -.33, 
SE = .07, CI: [-0.48, -0.20]). 
  
                                               
8
We also conducted mediation analyzes testing if individual emotions act as mediators between cognitions 
and emotions. For all subsequent mediation analyzes, only those emotions are included in the respective 
group of positive or negative moral emotions that also mediate the relationship between the respective 
cognition and behavior when considered as an individual emotion. Results of the mediation analyses testing 
single emotions as potential mediators are available on request. 
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5.4.2.11 Predicting Sanctioning Behavior from Cognitions and Emotions:  
                 a Comprehensive Cognition  Emotion  Action Model 
 
We now integrate the above findings of regression analyses and mediation analyses into a 
comprehensive model predicting both reward and punishment within a common theoretical 
framework. Again, separate models were computed for attained and non-attained goals. 
Correlations of the averaged components of latent variables (responsibility, morality of 
behavior, positive moral observer emotions, negative moral observer emotions, reward, 
punishment) are shown in Table 5.4. (Correlations of single items as well as mediation 
analyses conducted for individual emotions are available on request.)  
As can be seen in Figure 5.9, for both attained and non-attained goals, the respective 
model possesses a good fit. In both models, the influence of responsibility on moral observer 
emotion is mediated by the perceived morality of the underlying behavior. In case of attained 
goals – as here only a partial mediation is observed – there are also direct influences of 
responsibility on positive moral observer emotions. Furthermore, the relationship between 
cognitions and sanctioning behavior is mediated by moral observer emotions: reward is more 
likely given higher extents of positive moral observer emotions, whereas punishment is more 
likely given higher extents of negative moral observer emotions. 
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Figure 5.9 Structural Equation Models for the Prediction of Reward and Punishment 
Attained Goals 
 
 
N = 128, df = 82, chi²= 150.817, chi²/df = 1.839, CFI = .944, RMSEA = .081 
 
 
Non-Attained Goals 
 
 
N = 126, df = 97, chi²: 196.621, , chi²/df = 2.027, CFI = .951, RMSEA = .091 
 
Note. Numbers represent standardized regression coefficients (β), *** = p < .001, ** = p < .01, * =p 
< .001 
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5.4.3 Discussion of Study 2 
5.4.3.1 Cognitive Antecedents as Elicitors of Moral Cognitions, Moral Observer  
 Emotions, Reward and Punishment 
5.4.3.1.1 Moral cognitions 
According to our results, in line with expectations, (1) both controllability and responsibility 
are almost exclusively determined by the interaction of goal attainment and effort, that is, 
attained goals are regarded as highly controllable when effort was invested and rather 
uncontrollable when effort was not invested. The non-attainment of goals is regarded as 
more controllable when effort was low and less controllable when effort was high. Thus, 
people are regarded as responsible for the attainment of goals, when effort was expended 
and less responsible, when effort was not expended. Furthermore, in case of non-attained 
goals, people are regarded as more responsible when effort was low and less responsible 
when effort was high.  
As was the case in Study 1, the influence of ability is comparatively low. However, 
interestingly, we also find small interaction effects for goal attainment x ability and effort x 
ability: In case of attained goals and low effort, comparatively more controllability and 
responsibility was perceived when ability was high. In case of non-attained goals and high 
effort, comparatively more controllability and responsibility was perceived in case of low 
ability. This also means that when the attainment of a goal cannot be ascribed to high 
effort, it is (at least in part) ascribed to high ability. Moreover, in the presence of effort the 
non-attainment of a goal is (partly) ascribed to low ability. As a consequence, these 
results suggest that ability is not regarded as completely uncontrollable and something a 
person is not responsible for. Rather, it seems that a certain degree of controllability and 
responsibility is also ascribed to ability, however, to a comparatively smaller extent as is 
the case for effort. Thus, as was the case for assessing one’s own responsibility and the 
controllability of the result, we can say that whereas expending effort or not is highly 
controllable, having high or low ability is rather – but not completely – perceived as 
uncontrollable to the observed person. Similarly, an observed person is seen as highly 
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responsible for expending high vs. low effort but she/he is not completely seen as 
irresponsible for having high versus low ability. We will return to this point in the general 
discussion. 
(2) As expected, the morality of another person’s behavior (i.e., judgments on 
whether a certain behavior is considered as morally positive and right), is predominantly 
determined by effort: With regard to both attained and non-attained goals, expending 
effort it is regarded as morally positive behavior, which underlines previous results with 
regard to the norm of effort (see e.g., Matteucci, 2007; Weiner, 2003). Goal attainment 
has a comparatively weaker influence on the evaluation of a behavior as good or right, 
resulting in only slightly higher values for attained goals. Ability does not affect the extent 
to which another person’s behavior is regarded as positive. Interestingly, a small 
interaction effect of goal attainment, effort and ability for rightness of behavior (together 
with a small main effect for ability) suggests that if a person can attain a goal due to high 
ability, it is more acceptable (i.e., slightly higher values for rightness of behavior) that this 
person does not invest effort as compared to low ability and/or the non-attainment of the 
goal. This finding again supports similar findings from Study 1 and may also be ascribed 
to the fact that ability and effort can be regarded as compensatory (see Binser & 
Försterling, 2004).  
Thus (3), as was expected, the influence of ability on both responsibility and 
morality of behavior is much smaller than the influence of effort. This further underlines 
the comparatively higher importance of effort for moral cognitions. 
5.4.3.1.2 Moral observer emotions 
Among the four positive moral emotions investigated, as expected, (4) admiration, pride 
and respect are most likely given that effort was expended, even more so, when the goal 
was attained. To a certain degree, these emotions are also perceived for attained goals in 
case of low effort, especially when ability was high. These findings suggest that all three 
emotions are related to effort, which underlines previous findings (e.g., Chipperfield et al., 
2009; Feather et al., 2011; Frijda, 1986; Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Rudolph et al., 2013; see 
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also Chapter 3). Furthermore, admiration, pride and respect are also related to ability, 
which also corroborates previous findings with regard to admiration and pride (e.g., Algoe 
& Haidt, 2009; Chipperfield et al., 2009) and extends these findings to respect. With 
regard to the functional value of moral emotions (see Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014), 
this means that these three emotions send a positive signal for both expending high effort 
and having high ability. Thus, we think that Tangney’s (e.g., 1990, 2002) concept of alpha-
vs. beta pride can also be applied to pride as an observer emotion as well as to 
admiration and respect: Alpha-admiration, -pride and -respect provide positive signals for 
another person’s self (i.e., having high ability), whereas beta-admiration, -pride and -
respect signal that another person’s behavior (i.e., expending effort) was good or positive. 
Sympathy only emerges in case of non-attained goals, especially when effort was 
expended. Given these conditions, it is further increased when ability was low. Thus, 
corroborating previous findings (e.g., Rudolph et al., 2013; see also Chapter 3) sympathy 
is more likely given a positive evaluation of expended effort but is also related to low 
ability (see e.g., Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Weiner, 2006). Again, extending Tangney’s (e.g., 
1990, 2002) concept of alpha- versus beta pride, our results unite previous seemingly 
contradictory findings: We suggest that sympathy may emerge as both alpha-sympathy 
(being related to lack of ability) and beta-sympathy (being related to high effort), given that 
a goal was not attained. 
As far as negative moral emotions are concerned, (5) results suggest that anger, 
indignation, contempt, schadenfreude and disappointment predominantly emerge as 
negative evaluations of lack of effort, given that the goal is not attained. Only very small 
extents of anger and indignation are also found when effort is not expended in case of 
attained goals. There is no noteworthy influence of ability for any of the negative moral 
observer emotions. Again, previous results defining anger, indignation and schadenfreude 
as ‘effort-linked moral emotions’ are underlined (e.g., Gray & Wegner, 2011; Hareli & 
Weiner, 2002; Weiner, 2006). However, in contrast to our expectation, our results 
contradict Weiner’s (2006) view that contempt is an ability-linked negative moral observer 
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emotion. According to our results, it rather represents a negative evaluation of lack of 
effort in case of non-attained goals. As disappointment may occur as both related to 
outcomes (outcome-related disappointment or ORD) and persons (person related 
disappointment or PRD, for a discussion of ORD vs. PRD please see van Dijk & 
Zeelenberg, 2002), the interpretation of the observed values appears to be a bit tricky: 
Disappointment is felt most strongly when effort was not expended and the goal was not 
attained. We regard this result as an occurrence of PRD. Furthermore, a considerable 
degree of disappointment is also felt for non-attained goals given that effort was 
expended, especially when ability was high. At first glance, this may suggest a negative 
evaluation of both expending effort as well as having high ability. However, we think that 
in this case we measured ORD expressing a negative evaluation of the negative outcome 
(i.e., the non-attainment of the goal) despite the fact that both effort and ability were high 
(which typically leads to low values for negative moral emotions).  
With regard to the concept of alpha- versus beta-moral emotions, our results 
suggest that all five negative moral observer emotions anger, indignation, contempt, 
schadenfreude and disappointment appear as beta- variants only and thus reflect a 
negative evaluation of negative behavior (i.e., lack of effort). Again, this is in line with 
previous research emphasizing the importance of effort for these emotions (e.g., Rudolph 
et al., 2013, see also Chapter 3). 
5.4.3.1.3 Sanctioning behavior 
As expected, (6) in line with previous research considering reward versus punishment in 
achievement contexts (e.g., Weiner & Kukla, 1970; see also Weiner, 2006), both praise 
and reward predominantly arise as positive evaluations of expended effort, even more so 
when the goal was attained. Furthermore, criticism and punishment are most likely given 
lack of effort, even more so when the goal was not attained. With regard to criticism, 
especially for attained goals given low effort, we find more criticism when ability was low. 
However, in our opinion, this result does not reflect a negative evaluation of ability: it 
rather reflects that given that ability was low, the necessity for expending effort was even 
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higher (see Binser & Försterling, 2004). However, effects obtained for ability are much 
weaker than effects obtained for effort and goal attainment.  
In sum, as expected, praise and reward represent positive evaluations of positive 
behavior (i.e., expending effort), whereas criticism and punishment represent negative 
evaluations of morally negative behavior (i.e., lack of effort). 
5.4.3.2. Moral Cognitions Eliciting Moral Observer Emotions 
Given attained goals, as expected, (7) all three positive moral observer emotions are 
predicted by higher extends of both higher responsibility for the attainment of a goal as well 
as by higher perceived morality of the behavior when regarded as single predictors. 
Hierarchical regressions revealed that admiration and respect are predicted by both 
cognitions, whereas pride is only predicted by the morality of the behavior. Furthermore, 
anger, indignation, contempt and disappointment are predicted by lower extents of 
responsibility and morality of the behavior. However, hierarchical linear regressions revealed 
that all negative observer emotions are predicted by the morality of the behavior, whereas 
responsibility was excluded from the respective regression models. 
Furthermore, with regard to non-attained goals, in line with expectations, (8) all 
four moral observer emotions admiration, pride, respect and sympathy are predicted by 
lower extents of responsibility for the non-attainment as well as by lower perceived 
morality of the behavior. According to the results of the hierarchical regressions, morality 
of behavior is the only predictor of these positive moral observer emotions and 
responsibility was excluded from the regression models.  
All of the negative moral observer emotions are elicited by higher degrees of 
responsibility for the non-attainment of the goal as well as by higher perceived morality of 
the behavior when each of the cognitions is regarded as single predictor. Results of the 
hierarchical regressions revealed that anger, indignation, contempt and disappointment 
are only predicted by the morality of the behavior. In contrast, schadenfreude is only 
predicted by responsibility. Once again, previous findings with regard to responsibility 
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(e.g., Rudolph et al., 2004; Weiner, 1995, 2006) are confirmed and extended to a wider 
range of moral emotions. Furthermore, our empirical results corroborate Weiner’s (2006) 
suggestions with regard to considerations of good and bad, right and wrong as represent 
by the perceived morality of the behavior. 
(9) With regard to the relationships between responsibility and morality of behavior 
in predicting moral emotions, we found that for both attained and non-attained goals, 
morality of behavior serves as a mediator between responsibility and positive as well as 
negative moral observer emotions. More precisely, with regard to positive moral observer 
emotions given attained goals, morality of behavior completely mediates the relationship 
between responsibility and pride, and partly mediates the relationship between 
responsibility and admiration as well as responsibility and respect. Furthermore, the 
morality of the behavior completely mediates the relationship between responsibility and 
negative moral observer emotions given attained goals as well as between responsibility 
and both positive and negative moral observer emotions given non-attained goals. 
Schadenfreude is the only exception, as for this emotion, the relationship between 
responsibility and the emotional experience is not mediated by the perceived morality of 
the behavior, suggesting a relatively greater influence of responsibility as compared to 
morality of behavior. Thus, previous results with regard to responsibility are underlined 
(e.g., Hareli & Weiner, 2002). 
5.4.3.3 Relationships between Moral Cognitions, Moral Observer Emotions, Reward  
 and Punishment 
So far, we only assumed that positive and negative moral emotions send positive versus 
negative signals. We now consider positive (reward) and negative (punishment) 
sanctioning behavior as observable signals related to positive versus negative moral 
emotions. We first investigate the relationship between moral cognitions (responsibility, 
morality of behavior) and sanctioning behavior as well as moral observer emotions and 
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sanctioning behavior. We then discuss the influence of emotions as potential mediators on 
the relationship between cognitions and sanctioning behavior. 
In line with our expectations, (10) we observed that when regarded as individual 
predictors, higher degrees of both responsibility as well as morality of behavior predict 
higher degrees of reward given attained goals. Furthermore, given non-attained goals, 
reward is predicted by lower responsibility and higher morality of behavior. Moreover, 
punishment is increased by lower responsibility for the attainment of the goal as well as by 
higher responsibility for the non-attainment of a goal. According to the results of the 
hierarchical regressions, morality of behavior is the stronger predictor among the two for 
reward given attained goals as well as for punishment given non-attained goals. Morality 
is the only predictor for punishment given attained goals as well as for reward given non-
attained goals. Thus, both reward and punishment are dependent more strongly on the 
morality of the other person’s behavior than on their perceived responsibility. However, as 
was already mentioned, judgments of responsibility constitute necessary prerequisites for 
eliciting judgments of the morality of behavior. These results also underline previous 
findings with regard to responsibility (e.g., Weiner, 1995, 2006; Rudolph et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, morality of behavior has been identified as another important concept 
predicting reward and punishment.  
As expected, (11) higher extents of admiration, pride and respect increase the 
likelihood for reward in case of attained goals. In cases of non-attained goals, in addition 
to these emotions, higher extents of reward are also predicted by higher extents of 
sympathy. However, when compared to other moral emotions, the effect of sympathy on 
reward is smaller. Furthermore, to a lower extent, lower extents of positive moral observer 
emotions predict higher extents of punishment.  
In line with expectations, for both attained and non-attained goals, positive moral 
observer emotions (i.e., admiration, pride, respect) are mediators between moral 
cognitions (here: morality of behavior) and reward. Thus, we think that in addition to 
admiration, which has already been described as ‘other praising’ (Algoe & Haidt, 2009) or 
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‘approval’ (Giner-Sorolla, 2012) respect and pride can also be regarded as other praising 
or rewarding emotions, as strong relationships to praise and reward were found. 
Unexpectedly, sympathy does not mediate the relationships between the moral cognitions 
and reward and punishment. However, as sympathy has previously been labeled as 
‘other-suffering’ (Haidt, 2003) or ‘other caring’ (Giner-Sorolla, 2012) emotion, it seems 
reasonable that this emotion is more closely related to other pro-social behaviors, such as 
help-giving (which is already well documented; for a summary see Rudolph et al., 2004) 
than to behaviors related to praise and reward.  
Furthermore, all negative moral observer emotions (i.e., anger, indignation, 
contempt, disappointment, schadenfreude) increase punishment, when regarded as single 
predictors (for schadenfreude this applies to non-attained goal only). As already 
mentioned, anger and contempt have already been described as ‘other-condemning 
emotions’ (Haidt, 2003). Our data suggest that indignation, disappointment and 
schadenfreude also belong to this group of emotions as criticism and punishment may 
well be used as a means to condemn others.  
Additionally, to a smaller extent, lower degrees of all negative moral observer 
emotions predict higher degrees of reward (again, for schadenfreude we only refer to non-
attained goals). However, these effects were smaller than the effects related to 
punishment. Thus, we think that punishment or condemnation is the dominant function of 
negative moral observer emotions.  
Furthermore, as supposed, negative moral observer emotions (anger, indignation, 
contempt, disappointment, schadenfreude) mediate the relationship between cognitions 
(here: morality of behavior)9 and punishment. This also underlines previous results with 
regard to anger mediating the relationship between responsibility and punishment (for a 
summery see Weiner, 2006) and extends these principles to other moral observer 
emotions, that is indignation, contempt, schadenfreude and disappointment. We will return 
                                               
9
 We also conducted mediation analyses for the relationship between responsibility and reward versus 
punishment with moral observer emotions as potential mediator. Results were similar to the results reported 
for morality of behavior and are available upon request 
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to this point in the general discussion. Please note that with regard to disappointment, we 
only refer to person-related disappointment, i.e., disappointment predominately elicited by 
a person’s morally negative behavior, not by the non-attainment of a goal per se (see van 
Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; see also Chapter 3).  
 (12) Guided by the results of the regression analyses and mediation analyses, 
structural equation models were developed and well supported by our data: In predicting 
reward versus punishment, two serial mediation processes were integrated: Higher 
extents of responsibility for attained goals as well as lower extents of responsibility for 
non-attained goals allow for higher extents of the perceived morality of the behavior. 
Higher perceived morality elicits positive moral observer emotions (i.e., admiration, pride, 
respect), which consequently encourage reward. In case of attained goals, we observed 
additional influences of responsibility on positive moral observer emotions (higher degrees 
of responsibility eliciting higher degrees admiration, pride and respect). Moreover, for both 
attained and non-attained goals, lower extents of responsibility for attained goals as well 
as higher responsibility for non-attained goals allow for lower perception of the perceived 
morality of the other person’s behavior. Lower perceived morality elicits negative moral 
observer emotions (i.e., anger, indignation, contempt, disappointment, (schadenfreude, 
non-attained goals only), which subsequently increase the likelihood for punishment. 
Thus, the relationship between responsibility and sanctioning behavior is mediated by 
both morality of behavior and moral observer emotions. Furthermore, the relationship 
between the perceived morality of behavior and sanctioning behavior is also mediated by 
moral observer emotions. As praise and reward are often applied to influence other 
person’s future behavior (e.g., in educational contexts), these results corroborate Fiske’s 
(2002) argument that moral emotions are "immediate motivational proxies for expected 
long-term benefits of important relationships" (p. 170). 
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5.5 General Discussion 
Two studies have been reported analyzing the influence of cognitive antecedents (goal 
attainment, effort, ability) on moral cognitions (responsibility, morality of behavior) moral actor 
(Study 1) and moral observer (Study 2) emotions and sanctioning behavior (reward, 
punishment, Study 2). Furthermore, relationships between moral cognitions and moral 
emotions as well as moral emotions and sanctioning behavior were investigated. In Study 1, 
participants evaluated their own actions (i.e., expending effort given high or low ability) and 
resulting moral cognitions and moral actor emotions, whereas in Study 2, participants 
evaluated an observed person’s actions as well as resulting moral cognitions, moral observer 
emotions and sanctioning behavior. 
 
5.5.1 Moral Cognitions 
Evaluating both own actions as well as the actions of others, judgments of responsibility (and 
controllability) are mainly determined by effort. People regard themselves and others as more 
responsible for the attainment of a goal, when effort was expended. Furthermore, people 
regard themselves and others as more responsible for the non-attainment of a goal when 
effort was not expended. Moreover, for both attained and non-attained goals both a person’s 
own as well as other person’s behavior is perceived as more morally good and right given 
that effort was invested. These results underline the high importance of the norm of effort 
(e.g., Matteucci, 2007; Matteucci & Gosling, 204) for judgments on responsibility and 
morality.  
 
5.5.2 Moral Emotions 
Results suggest that all moral emotions are strongly influenced by effort expenditure. 
Additionally, most of the moral actor and observer emotions are also determined by ability. 
Thus, Tangney’s (e.g., 1990, 2002) concept of alpha- versus beta-pride is also applicable to 
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other moral observer emotions: In addition to pride (as an actor emotion), pride as an 
observer emotion, self-respect, admiration and respect also arise in case of of high ability, 
whereas guilt, shame, regret, embarrassment and sympathy are likely given low ability. 
Please note that we regard sympathy as a positive moral emotion despite the fact that it also 
arises given that another person’s ability was low. We argue that all moral emotions are 
primarily elicited by positive evaluations of behavior and thus regard sympathy as a positive 
moral emotion as it is most likely given high effort (in case of non-attained goals).  
We did not find a noteworthy influence of low ability on negative moral observer 
emotions. From a functional point of view, signaling others that a rather uncontrollable 
condition (see Weiner, 1995, 2006) is wrong and should be changed (stop-signals) would not 
lead to success. Thus, negative signals for other’s low ability may not have evolved in 
ancestral times (see Darwin, 1872). In contrast, signals elicited by controllable (and thus) 
changeable behaviors are more likely to be successful in encouraging positive (go-signal) 
and inhibiting negative (stop-signal) future behavior. (For a detailed discussion of the 
evolutionary point of view towards emotions, please refer to Darwin, 1872). More generally, 
we observed that ability has a greater influence on moral actor than on moral observer 
emotions. This becomes most obvious when comparing the mean values obtained for 
positive moral actor as compared to positive moral observer emotions given that effort was 
invested in case of non-attained goals: For admiration, pride (as an observer emotion), 
respect and sympathy, relatively high values were obtained for both high and low ability, 
whereas for pride (as an actor emotion) and self-respect values for low ability were rather 
low. This may be caused by the fact that in everyday interactions, we usually possess more 
information about own abilities than about the abilities of others. For further ‘actor-observer 
asymmetries’ please see Malle, 2006; Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007). Furthermore, 
especially pride as a positive moral actor emotion may have been reported to a lower extent 
because of the low social desirability of this emotion (see also Hareli & Weiner, 2000; 
Zammuner, 1996).  
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With regard to moral cognitions, to the best of our knowledge, for the first time, our 
studies give empirical evidence that moral emotions are not only influenced by judgments of 
responsibility (see e.g., Rudolph et al., 2004; Weiner, 2006), but also by judgments of the 
perceived morality of one’s own or other person’s behavior, thus corroborating previous 
theoretical implications (see Weiner, 2006).  
 
5.5.3 Sanctioning Behavior 
Our results underline previous findings that in achievement situations, reward is especially 
likely given high effort, whereas punishment is especially likely given low effort (e.g., Weiner 
& Kukla, 1970, see also Weiner, 2006). Thus, people are rewarded more, if they are 
responsible for successes, and punished less, when they are not responsible for failures (see 
also Shaw & Reitan, 1969). Furthermore, our results suggest that people are more likely to 
be rewarded when the perceived morality of their behavior is high and more likely to be 
punished when the perceived morality of their behavior is low. Thus, as has been mentioned, 
our results provide empirical evidence for Weiner’s (2006) theoretical considerations of 
judgments on good versus bad and right versus wrong.  
We also found that sanctioning behavior is influenced by moral observer emotions: 
Reward is increased by higher extents of positive moral observer emotions (admiration, 
pride, reward, sympathy), whereas punishment is increased by higher extents of negative 
moral observer emotions (anger, indignation, contempt, disappointment, schadenfreude). 
However, please note that for sympathy, comparatively smaller effects were obtained. This is 
not surprising, as this emotion has traditionally been found to be closely related to help-giving 
and related pro-social behaviors (see e.g., Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Haidt, 2003; Rudolph et al., 
2013). This underlines that all three positive moral observer emotions admiration, pride and 
respect can be regarded as other-praising (see Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Haidt, 2003) or approval 
(Giner-Sorolla, 2012) emotions. Based on our results, we suggest referring to these emotions 
as ‘other-rewarding’ emotions. 
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However, for the first time, our results reveal that the relationship between moral 
cognitions and punishment is not only mediated by anger (see e.g., Weiner, 2006), but also 
by indignation, contempt, disappointment and schadenfreude. In the case of schadenfreude, 
comparatively lower effects with regard to punishment were obtained. This may be caused by 
the fact that being the target of schadenfreude already implies a punishment in itself: The 
punishment is the perceived and displayed joy over the misfortune of another person. The 
occurred misfortune is often perceived as a fair punishment (Feather, 1999, 2008; Feather & 
McKee, 2009; Feather et al., 2011; van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, & Nieweg, 2005) based 
on our general need of justice (Lerner & Miller, 1978). We thus think that all negative moral 
emotions can be regarded as ‘other condemning’ emotions (see Haidt, 2003). With regard to 
our results, we suggest referring to these moral emotions as ‘other-punishing’ emotions.  
Trying to analyze the detailed relationship between positive and negative moral observer 
emotions, their preceding cognitions (i.e., morality and perceived morality of the other 
person’s behavior) and associated behavioral responses (i.e., reward and punishment) within 
a common framework, structural equation models were developed and well supported by our 
data: The influence of responsibility on sanctioning behavior is mediated by both, the 
perceived morality of the behavior as well as by positive (increasing reward) and negative 
(increasing punishment) moral observer emotions. As these emotions only partly mediate the 
relationship between the morality of the preceding behavior and subsequent sanctioning 
behavior, we observed further direct influences coming from morality of behavior, that is, high 
perceived morality increasing reward and low perceived morality increasing punishment. 
Additionally, in case of attained goals, we observe further direct influences of responsibility 
on positive morally observer emotion as this relationship is only partly mediated by the 
perceived morality of the behavior. Thus, the general attribution model of cognition  
emotion  action sequences (see Rudolph et al. 2004; Weiner, 1995, 2006) has been 
successfully applied to the context of reward and punishment, including a wide range of 
moral emotions and two preceding moral cognitions. 
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5.5.4 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research. 
As already mentioned, there are also external factors contributing to the attainment or non-
attainment of a goal (e.g., luck, task-difficulty), which are completely beyond the acting 
person’s control. However, for the present studies we only concentrated on internal aspects 
of which ability as regarded as certainly less controllable than effort. Future research could 
for example analyze whether the above findings can be replicated given easy versus difficult 
tasks being attained or not attained. Furthermore, the moral standard or valence of the goal 
(ought) also contributes to the evaluation of actions (Heider, 1958; see also Rudolph et al., 
2013). In our studies, we concentrated on morally positive goals only (i.e., taking part in a 
research expedition was regarded as a morally positive goal). However, future studies could 
specifically address the attainment versus non-attainment of morally negative goals given 
high or low effort and high or low ability. 
 We conducted our studies using an adult sample of participants. As reward and 
punishment are particularly important in school settings or with regard to educational aspects 
in kindergartens or parenting, similar studies could be conducted with teachers, nurses, 
parents or other care persons. Furthermore, children’s awareness of these relationships 
could be investigated in different age groups.  
 With regard to the relationship between moral observer emotions and sanctioning 
behavior, so far, we only assume that it feels good or rewarding to be the target of 
admiration, pride and respect as well as that it feels bad or punishing to be the target of 
anger, indignation, contempt, disappointment and schadenfreude. Future studies could 
explicitly ask participants to indicate how these emotional signals are perceived. 
 Finally, our (quite representative, in our view) sample consist of 15 moral emotions. 
However, so far, it is not clear whether the above findings may be applied to all positive 
versus negative moral emotions. For example, we did not include awe, elevation, gratitude 
and disgust as these emotions only occur in very specific contexts (e.g., physical purity, 
divinity, heroism and religion, see Algoe & Haidt; Gray & Wegner, 2011; 2009; Rozin et al., 
1999). 
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6 Moral vs. Non-moral Emotions: Further Differentiation Based 
on Cognitive Effort 
6.1 Abstract 
In a study analyzing frequency of choice and reaction times (RTs), participants (N = 52) 
decided whether they experienced distinctive moral cognitions (responsibility, 
deservingness), moral emotions (positive: pride, self-respect; negative: guilt, shame) and 
non-moral emotions (positive: joy; negative: anger, sadness, self-pity) following short 
scenarios providing information on goal attainment and effort. A 2 (Goal attainment: yes 
vs. no) x 2 (effort: high vs. low) within-subjects design was used. Results reveal that 
responsibility and deservingness are most likely in case of attained goals given high effort 
or non-attained goals given low effort. Positive moral emotions are likely given high effort, 
especially when the goal was attained. Negative moral emotions are likely given low effort, 
especially when the goal was not attained. Positive non-moral emotions are more likely 
given attained goals. Negative non-moral emotions are more likely given non-attained 
goals. RTs for both moral cognitions and moral emotions are longer for imbalanced as 
compared to balanced situations (see Heider, 1958), i.e., attained goals given low effort 
and non-attained goals given high effort. Furthermore, RTs are longer for moral as 
compared to non-moral emotions, especially in imbalanced situations. Thus, moral 
emotions require more cognitive effort than non-moral emotions. Moreover, moral 
emotions are more closely related to moral cognitions than non-moral emotions. Results 
are discussed within the framework of intuitionist (Haidt, 2001) and attributional (Weiner, 
1995, 2006) models of moral emotions and moral judgment. 
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6.2 Introduction and Theoretical Background 
According to the Social Intuitionist Model (Haidt, 2001), moral emotions are comparable to 
fast and effortless intuitive judgments automatically elicited by situations in the 
environment. For example, when faced with ‘moral dilemmas’, that is, for example, 
siblings having a sexual affair, people immediately say that a sexual relationship among 
siblings is wrong – even if any negative consequences (e.g., inbreeding or emotional 
harm) are excluded. In this regard, moral emotions are regarded as ‘gut feelings of the 
mind’ (Haidt, 2001, p. 825) on which subsequent moral reasoning is based. Thus, the 
Social Intuitionist Model regards moral reasoning as “a post hoc construction, generated 
after a judgment has been reached” (Haidt, 2001, p. 814). That is, people immediately feel 
that it is wrong to engage in a sexual relationship with one’s sibling – however, a 
conscious search for reasons is conducted after the decision that this behavior is morally 
wrong has already been made. Taking up the considerations of metaphors (see Chapter 
2), when making moral judgments, within the Social Intuitionist Model, people are not 
regarded as scientists or judges making decisions about good and bad, right or wrong 
(see also Heider, 1958; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Weiner, 2006), but rather as 
lawyers defending an already pre-established point of view (see also Pizarro & Bloom, 
2003). In short, according to the Social Intuitionist Model, “… moral intuitions (including 
moral emotions) come first and directly cause moral judgments” (Haidt, 2001, p. 814). 
 However, alternative approaches, have shown that cognitive appraisals (e.g., 
Lazarus, 1991) precede and shape our emotional landscape (see also Ellsworth & 
Scherer, 2003; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Lerner & 
Keltner, 2000; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Roseman & 
Evdokas, 2004; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). As we have 
seen in the previous chapters, with regard to moral emotions, the concepts of ought, goal 
attainment, effort and ability (Heider, 1958), controllability and responsibility (e.g., Weiner, 
1995, 2006) and deservingness (e.g., Feather, 1999, 2006) are particularly well 
established examples of appraisals or cognitive antecedents eliciting moral emotions. 
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Furthermore, as we have seen in Chapter 3, with regard to the distinction between moral 
and non-moral emotions, different combinations of goal attainment and effort give rise to 
different extents of moral versus non-moral emotions. That is, generally, moral emotions 
are more strongly determined by judgments of the underlying behavior (i.e., effort 
expenditure), whereas non-moral emotions are more strongly related to judgments of the 
outcome of a certain situation (i.e., goal attainment). Put differently, whereas for non-
moral emotions, information on goal-attainment is sufficient, moral emotions also rely on 
additional information about a person’s behavior (i.e., effort). This Chapter further 
elaborates on the distinction between moral versus non-moral emotions, now studying the 
cognitive effort underlying the elicitation of these types of emotions. 
 
6.2.1 The Cognitive Effort Underlying Moral vs. Non-Moral Emotions 
As a means for measuring cognitive effort, reaction times underlying judgments on both 
moral and non-moral emotions are analyzed, assuming longer reaction times for higher 
cognitive effort, that is, more difficulties in making a decision whether a certain emotions is 
elicited following a description of a real life-scenario. Hence, as moral emotions – in 
addition to judgments on goal attainment (as is also the case for non-moral emotions, see 
above) – additionally strongly rely on judgments of effort, we suggest that moral emotions 
require more cognitive effort (and thus longer reaction times) than non-moral emotions. 
Thus, even if moral emotions are quick intuitive judgments (see Haidt, 2001), we argue 
that non-moral emotions arise even more quickly and thus require less cognitive effort 
than moral emotions. In addition to moral and non-moral emotions, we also analyze 
reaction times for judgments of responsibility and deservingness as moral cognitions 
preceding moral emotions (Feather, 1999, 2006; Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer, & 
Weiner, 2004; Weiner, 1995, 2006; see also Chapters 4 and 5).  
As has been found in Chapter 2, among the elements of Heider’s (1958) Naïve 
Action Analysis, ought (the moral standard of a situation or goal which can be positive or 
negative), goal attainment (the goal of an action which can be attained or not attained), 
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and effort (which can either be expended or not expended to attain the goal) are sufficient 
conditions for eliciting moral and non-moral emotions. To give an example: (1) A person 
wants to attain a positive goal, for example, receiving a university degree (ought = 
positive). He or she fails (goal attainment = negative), because she/he has not expended 
much/any effort (effort = negative). In this case, the person is likely to experience both 
guilt (as a moral emotion) and sadness (as a non-moral emotion). Now, (2) please 
imagine that this person did expend considerable effort to receive the degree, but 
nevertheless fails (maybe due to circumstances that are not controllable to the person, 
e.g., a sudden disease). In this case, guilt should not be elicited (or at least be elicited to a 
lower extent), whereas sadness is very likely to arise. Here we can see the difference in 
the evaluative function of moral versus non-moral emotions: whereas moral emotions 
evaluate a person’s behavior (which was good and right, as effort was invested), non-
moral emotions evaluate the outcome of situation (which is bad, as the goal was not 
attained). Consequently, as the behavior was positive (referring to the second example), 
negative moral emotions (e.g., guilt) are not likely, whereas negative non-moral emotions 
(e.g., sadness) are likely (as the outcome was negative). 
 
6.2.2 Cognitive Effort and Balance Theory 
Staying with Heider, another of his groundbreaking concepts may contribute to the 
distinction between moral and non-moral emotions. In his balance theory, Heider (1958) 
explains interpersonal events in terms of cognitive balance: A positive event or effect is 
typically attributed to a positive cause, whereas a negative event or effect is typically 
attributed to a negative cause. When both cause and event are either negative or positive, 
the overall structure or representation of the situation is perceived as balanced. In 
contrast, when positive causes are followed by a negative outcome or negative causes 
are followed by a positive outcome, the overall situation is perceived as imbalanced. 
According to Heider, imbalanced situations are perceived as unsatisfactory. They are 
6 Moral vs. Non-moral Emotions: Further Differentiation Based on Cognitive Effort 164 
 
unstable and prone to changes towards a balanced structure (see also Klauer, 2006). To 
further analyze these possible changes, we finally introduce another principle, the concept 
of ‘imbalance repair’ (Brown and Van Kleeck, 1989; see also Rudolph & von Hecker, 
1997, 2006), which states that imbalanced cause-effect relationships require 
supplementary statements in terms of additional explanations, which reduce the perceived 
imbalance of the respective situation. With regard to imbalances between person’s actions 
and outcomes of situations, people conduct an ‘attributional search’ that increases the 
positive or negative value of a person’s action towards a more balanced evaluation of the 
overall situation (Crandall, N'Gbala, Tsang, & Dawson, 2007; Duval & Duval, 1983). (For a 
more detailed discussion of balance theory and its applications to actions and outcomes 
see also Crandall et al., 2007; Feather, 1999, 2006; Klauer, 2006; Rudolph & von Hecker, 
2006.) 
The ‘structural model of deservingness’ (Feather, e.g., 1999, 2006) is based on 
balance theory and also considers judgments of actions and outcomes as antecedents 
eliciting moral emotions: According to Feather, the outcome of an action is regarded as 
deserved, if a positively valued outcome follows a positively valued action (i.e., expending 
effort), or if a negatively valued outcome follows a negatively valued action (i.e., not 
expending effort). In contrast, Feather regards an outcome as undeserved if a negatively 
valued outcome follows a positively valued action, or if a positively valued outcome follows 
a negatively valued action. In the resulting structures, a person is seen as a “judge who is 
evaluating actions and outcomes as they relate to some actor who could be self or other” 
(Feather, 1999, p. 109). Using Heider’s (1958) terms, deserved outcomes are seen as 
balanced, whereas undeserved outcomes are seen as unbalanced. A summary of 
balanced (deserved) and imbalanced (undeserved) situations is presented in Table 6.1. 
Judgments of deservingness are closely related to judgments of responsibility (see 
e.g., Feather, 2006). Thus, we can also say that persons are responsible for the 
attainment of a goal, when effort was expended and not (or at least less) responsible 
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given that effort was not expended. Furthermore, people are responsible for the non-
attainment of a goal, when effort was not expended, and not responsible for the non-
attainment of a goal, given that effort was expended (e.g., Weiner, 1995, 2006; see also 
Chapter 5). Again, in Heider’s (1958) terms, outcomes for which a person is responsible 
are regarded as balanced, whereas outcomes for which a person is not responsible are 
regarded as imbalanced. 
 
Table 6.1 Balanced (Deserved) vs. Imbalanced (Undeserved) Situations 
Situation Effort 
(evaluation  
of action) 
Goal Attainment 
(evaluation of 
outcome) 
Balance 
(Deservingness) 
GA+E+ positive positive yes 
GA+E- negative positive no* 
GA-E+ positive negative no 
GA-E- negative negative yes 
Note. GA+ = goal attained, GA- = goal not attained, E+ = high effort, E- = low effort; *note that for 
this situation, a person’s qualities (e.g. ability) may become the target of evaluation and may lead 
to positive evaluations accompanied by positive moral emotions (see Feather, 1999, 2006). 
 
Returning to distinguishing moral from non-moral emotions, we argue that moral 
emotions serve as a means of imbalance repair (see above) in case of unbalanced 
situations. Thus, if an acting person expends effort to attain a positive goal, but 
nevertheless fails, there is an imbalance between the positive behavior (i.e., expending 
effort) and the negative outcome of the situation (i.e., the non-attainment of the goal). 
Positive moral emotions (e.g., self-respect) add a positive feeling to the perceived 
structure and change the perceived imbalance towards a more (positively) balanced 
structure. Similarly, if an acting person does not expend effort to attain a positive goal, but 
still attains her/his goal, there is an imbalance between the negative behavior (i.e., not 
investing effort) and the positive outcome (i.e., the attainment of the goal). Here, negative 
moral emotions (e.g., guilt) are likely, adding a negative feeling to the perceived structure 
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of the situating and changing the perceived imbalance towards a more (negatively) 
balanced structure. As non-moral emotions (e.g., joy or sadness) do not necessarily 
require a consideration of effort, we argue that non-moral emotions do not serve as a 
means of imbalance repair (and thus require less cognitive effort resulting in shorter 
reaction times). 
 
6.2.3 Aims and Expectations 
In the present study, participants were presented with realistic scenarios containing 
descriptions of effort and goal attainment. Reaction times for indicating cognitions 
(responsibility, deservingness) as well as different moral and non-moral actor emotions 
(see previous chapters) elicited by the respective scenarios were assessed as a means 
for measuring cognitive effort. For assessing differences between moral versus non-moral 
emotions, pride and self-respect were chosen as examples of positive moral emotions, 
whereas guilt and shame were chosen as examples of negative moral emotions (e.g., Li & 
Fischer, 2007; Massey, 1983; Tangney, 1990; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; see also Chapter 
3). Furthermore, joy was chosen as a positive non-moral emotion, whereas anger, 
sadness and self-pity were chosen as negative non-moral emotions. To the best of our 
knowledge, none of the emotions classified as non-moral has previously been labeled as 
a moral emotion. We assume that longer reaction times represent a higher extent of 
cognitive effort. Furthermore, in addition to reaction times, we analyze the frequency of 
‘yes or no – answers’ (i.e., indicating whether the respective cognition or emotion is 
experienced in the specific situation or not). 
We argue that the evaluation of imbalanced situations requires more cognitive 
effort than the evaluation of balanced situations, as imbalanced situations require a more 
comprehensive attributional search as well as supplementary statements to reduce the 
perceived imbalance (see Chapter 6.3.2). Moreover, we think that the evaluation of moral 
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emotions requires more cognitive effort than the evaluation of non-moral emotions (as 
moral emotions require the consideration of both goal attainment and effort, whereas for 
non-moral emotions the consideration of goal attainment is sufficient), especially in 
imbalanced situations.  
 More precisely, as far as frequency of choice is concerned, we expect that (1) for 
attained goals, responsibility and deservingness are reported more often in case of high 
effort, whereas for non-attained goals, responsibility and deservingness are reported more 
often in case of low effort. 
With regard to the cognitive effort underlying judgments of moral cognitions, we 
expect that (2) reaction times for responsibility and deservingness are longer for 
imbalanced (i.e., attained goals given lack of effort as well as non-attained goals given 
high effort) as compared to balanced situations (i.e., attained goals given high effort and 
non-attained goals given lack of effort). 
 Furthermore, (3) we expect that both moral and non-moral positive emotions are 
reported most frequently in case of attained goals given high effort. However, positive 
moral emotions should also be reported in case of non-attained goals given high effort 
and positive non-moral emotions should also be reported in case of attained goals given 
low effort. 
 Additionally, (4) we expect that both moral and non-moral negative emotions occur 
most frequently in case of non-attained goals given that effort was not expended; 
however, negative moral emotions should also be reported for attained goals given lack of 
effort, whereas negative non-moral emotions should also be reported in case of non-
attained goals given high effort. 
Furthermore, (5) we expect longer reaction times for moral emotions as compared 
to non-moral emotions, especially in case of imbalanced situations. 
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Moreover, (6) we expect that reaction times for moral emotions are longer than for 
moral cognitions (as these are assumed to precede moral emotions). 
Finally, (7), we expect that reaction times for moral cognitions correlate more 
strongly with moral than with non moral emotions.  
 
6. 3 Method 
6.3.1 Participants 
The sample included 52 participants (36 female, 16 male). Their age ranged from 19 to 36 
years (M = 23.46, SD = 3.87). All participants were students of psychology and received 
course credit for participation. All participants had normal or corrected-to normal vision. 
 
6.3.2 Experimental Design 
A 2 (goal attainment: goal attained vs. not attained) x 2 (effort: high vs. low) within-
subjects design was used. The experiment was conducted in two sessions, with one 
session containing short scenarios describing balanced conditions (goal attained given 
high effort, goal not-attained given low effort) and another session containing short 
scenarios describing imbalanced conditions (goal attained given low effort, goal not-
attained given high effort). Half of the participants received the balanced conditions first, 
whereas the other half first received the imbalanced conditions. Reaction times for eight 
actor emotions (pride, self-respect, joy, guilt, shame, anger, sadness, self-pity) and two 
cognitions (responsibility and deservingness) were assessed as dependent variables. 
Within the entire experiment, each of the dependent variables was assessed 8 times 
(twice for each of the experimental conditions). The following constraints were made: 
Repetitions of emotions or cognitions were separated by at least six intervening trials. 
There were no more than two consecutive trials with the same scenario representing the 
same experimental condition (each followed by a different cognition or emotion). Trials 
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containing cognitions were separated by at least four intervening trials containing 
emotions. To avoid order effects, the experiment was presented in two different 
randomized versions (containing different presentation orders of both scenarios and 
items). Half of the participants received Version 1 and the other half received Version 2. 
Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions, with the exception that it 
was assured that there was the same amount of male versus female participants (4 male, 
9 female) in each experimental conditions. 
 
6.3.3 Materials and Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in two sessions (each lasting about 20 minutes, 
separated by at least one day). After a short general introduction, followed by written 
consent, participants were seated in front of a computer screen. Viewing distance was 
approximately 50 cm. The presentation of visual stimuli (scenarios and emotion words 
written in black letters on a white background presented on a green screen) was 
controlled by a standard PC (Windows 2000) using E-Prime® (2002). The entire 
experiment was presented on a NOKIA® CRT – display (21 inch, 640 x 480 pixels, 75 Hz 
refresh rate). 
 First, participants read a short introduction (on the computer screen) advising them 
about the proceedings of the experiment as well as how to give the required ‘yes or no – 
answers' by pressing different keys on the keyboard. Participants were asked to put 
themselves in the position of the person described in the subsequent scenarios. After six 
test trials (containing different scenarios and different emotions), the first 20 experimental 
trials were presented, followed by a short break as well as the remaining 20 experimental 
trials. Participants were free to choose when to start the second block of trials after the 
break (within a maximum time of 60s). Each of the trials was structured as follows. 
Participants read one of the scenarios in which an acting person (imagined to be 
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themselves) either expends or does not expend effort to attain her/his goal, resulting in 
either the attainment or non-attainment of this goal (organizing a birthday-party for 
children, preparing for an exam, writing a thesis, preparing for an audition). An example 
scenario is presented in Appendix D. They then indicated to have read and understood 
the respective scenario by pressing the space bar. Then, an emotion word (e.g., guilt) or 
cognition (e.g., responsibility) was presented and participant’s task was to indicate 
whether or not they would experience the respective emotion or cognition in the 
respective scenario by pressing the ‘yes’ (letter v) or ‘no’ (letter n) keys. Reaction times 
were measured starting from the beginning of the presentation of the word representing 
the respective emotion or cognition and ending at the moment when participants made a 
decision by pressing a key. When a decision was not made within 10.000 ms, this trial 
was coded as erroneous. Finally, a blank page was presented for 1.000 ms and then the 
next scenario appeared on the screen. As has been mentioned, after the first 20 trials, 
participants were allowed to make a short break. Participants started the second 20 trials 
by pressing the space bar. After 40 trials, a short text was presented informing the 
participants that the experiment was finished. Participants were then given the opportunity 
to ask questions and to make comments. One session lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
The obtained data were part of a larger research project for which further correlates of 
cognitive effort (e.g., heart rate and scin conductance level) were assessed (see Friedel & 
Schurig, 2010; Ludwig & Szonn, 2010; Wehner, 2012, Tscharaktschiew & Rudolph, 
2014e). (These studies also include the analysis of reaction times, however, apart from 
Tscharaktschiew & Rudolph, all studies were conducted as pilot studies including smaller 
sample sizes.)  
 
6.3.4 Data Analysis 
To analyze the frequency of choice (yes-answer) for each of the dependent variables, 
chi²-tests were conducted separately for each of the experimental conditions. For each of 
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the cognitions and emotions, a maximum of 104 choices per condition and a total number 
of 416 choices could be reached, resulting in 4160 possible choices across participants 
and conditions. Effect sizes (φ) are reported for each of the chi²-tests. Following Cohen 
(1988) effect sizes φ ≥ .10 are regarded as small, ≥ .30 as medium and ≥ .50 as large 
effects. To analyze reaction times for each of the dependent variables, reaction times 
were averaged for each of the conditions and submitted to within-subjects ANOVAs. 
Effect sizes η² are provided. Following Cohen (1988) effects with η² = ≥ .01 are 
considered as small, η²  .59 as medium and η²  .138 as large. As only 11 cases (0.26 
%) of choices were erroneous, for both frequency and reaction times we did not analyze 
the frequency of errors. Missing cases are reported when analyzing frequency of choice. 
For the analysis of reaction times, the imputation of missing values was conducted using 
the expectation-maximization algorithm (Enders, 2001). 
 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Frequency of Choice 
There was no influence of age on the frequency to which a cognition or emotion was 
indicated to be experienced (all r ≤ .04). Self-pity was indicated slightly more often by 
female than male participants (chi² = .387, p = .049, φ = .10). There were no other 
influences of gender on frequency of choice (all φ ≤ .10). Furthermore, there was no 
influence of presentation order or session (all φ < .10). For a better readability, we do not 
report all statistical key figures in the text. Complete results of the chi-square tests are 
presented in Tables 6.2 to 6.4. Please note that there are cases where all participants 
have chosen either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers. Here, chi² tests cannot be conducted as these 
results represent a constant variable. 
6.4.1.1 Moral Cognitions 
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With regard to attained goals, people regard themselves more frequently as responsible 
for the attainment, when effort was expended (97.1 %) than when it was not expended 
(34.6 %). Similarly, the attainment of a goal is more frequently regarded as deserved 
when effort was expended (97.1 %) than when it was not expended (29.8 %). Thus, all 
chi² - tests were significant; however, please note that the obtained effects are larger 
given that effort was invested and that more ‘yes – answers’ are obtained given high 
effort, whereas more ‘no – answers’ were obtained given lack of effort.  
Furthermore, the perception of responsibility for non-attained goals is more likely 
given low (97.1 %) as compared to high (17.3 %) effort expenditure. Similarly, the non-
attainment of goals is more often regarded as deserved given low (93.3 %) versus high 
(3.8 %) effort. Again, all chi²-tests are significant, with higher values and greater amounts 
of ‘yes-answers’ for the balanced conditions and lower values and greater amounts of ‘no-
answers’ for the imbalanced conditions. 
Table 6.2 Chi2-Test (Cognitions) 
          Yes            No   Missings  Chi²      p      φ 
  n % n % n %    
EC Cognition          
           
GA+E+ responsibility 101 97.1 3 2.9 - - 92.35 .000 .94 
 deservingness 101 97.1 3 2.9 - - 92.35 .000 .94 
           
GA+E- responsibility 36 34.6 67 64.4 1 1 9.33 .002 .30 
 deservingness 31 29.8 71 68.3 2 1.9 15.69 .000 .39 
           
GA-E+ responsibility 18 17.3 86 82.7 - - 44.46 .000 .65 
 deservingness 4 3.8 99 95.2 1 1 87.62 .000 .92 
           
GA-E- responsibility 101 97.1 3 2.9 - - 92.35 .000 .94 
 deservingness 97 93.3 7 6.7 - - 77.89 .000 .87 
           
Note. EC = experimental condition, GA+ = goal attained, GA- = goal not attained, E+ = high effort, 
E- = low effort; Yes = emotion experienced, No = emotion not experienced, Missings = decision 
was not made. 
 
6.4.1.2 Positive Emotions 
When positive goals are attained on condition that effort was expended, pride and self-
respect are experienced by almost all participants. Thus, the two chi²-tests are significant. 
Joy was indicated by all participants. In short: both moral (pride, self-respect) and non-
6 Moral vs. Non-moral Emotions: Further Differentiation Based on Cognitive Effort 173 
 
moral (joy) emotions are likely given high effort expenditure in case of attained goals. 
However, when effort was not expended given attained positive goals, only the chi²-test 
for the non-moral emotion of joy is significant, whereas the chi²-tests for the moral 
emotions (i.e., pride and self-respect) were insignificant. Thus, whereas only about half of 
the participants indicated to feel positive moral emotions (pride: 51.9 %, self-respect: 45.2 
%) given lack of effort in case of attained goals, joy is felt by almost all participants (95.2 
%). Hence, in case of attained goals given lack of effort, the positive non-moral emotion of 
joy is more likely than positive moral emotions (pride, self-respect). 
In case of non-attained goals, both pride and joy were not indicated by any of the 
participants given lack of effort. Only 5.8 % of the participants indicated to feel self-respect 
here. Thus, the chi²-test for self-respect is significant. However, given high effort 
expenditure, more than one third of the participants (34.6 %) indicated to feel self-respect, 
6.7 % of the participants indicated to feel pride and only 1.9 % indicated to feel joy. Thus, 
all three chi² tests are significant given high effort in case of non-attained goals. However, 
the effect for self-respect is considerable smaller than the effects for pride and joy. 
 
Table 6.3 Chi2-Test (Positive Emotions) 
  Yes         No               Missings Chi²         p     φ 
  n % n % n %    
EC Emotion          
           
GA+E+ pride 100 96.2 4 3.8 - - 88.62 .000 .91 
 self-respect 102 98.1 2 1.9 - - 96.15 .000 .96 
 joy 104 100 0 0 - - - -  
           
GA+E- pride 54 51.9 50 48.1 - - 0.15 .695 .04 
 self-respect 47 45.2 55 52.9 2 1.9 0.63 .428 .07 
 joy 99 95.2 5 4.8 - - 84.96 .000 .90 
           
GA-E+ pride 7 6.7 96 92.3 1 1 76.90 .000 .86 
 self-respect 36 34.6 65 62.5 3 2.9 8.33 .004 .28 
 joy 2 1.9 102 98.1 - - 96.15 .000 .96 
           
GA-E- pride 0 0 104 100 - - - -  
 self-respect 6 5.8 98 94.2 - - 81.39 .000 .88 
 joy 0 0 104 100 - - - -  
           
Note. EC = experimental condition, GA+ = goal attained, GA- = goal not attained, E+ = high effort, 
E- = low effort; Yes = emotion experienced, No = emotion not experienced, Missings = decision 
was not made. 
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Table 6.4 Chi2-Test (Negative Emotions) 
         Yes                    No                      Missings Chi²          p          φ 
  n % n % n %    
EC Emotion          
           
GA+E+ guilt 0 0   104 100 - - - - - 
 shame 3 2.9   101   97.1 - - 92.35 .000 .94 
 anger 1 1   103 99 - - 100.04 .000 .98 
 sadness 1 1 103 99 - - 100.04 .000 .98 
 self-pity 2 1.9 102 98.1 - - 96.15 .000 .96 
           
GA+E- guilt 13 12.5     91 87.5 -  - 58.50 .000 .75 
 shame 35 33.7     69 66.3 - - 11.16 .001 .32 
 anger 3 2.9 101 97.1 - - 92.35 .000 .94 
 sadness 2 1.9 102 98.1 - - 96.15 .000 .96 
 self-pity 1 1 102 98.1 1 1 99.04 .000 .98 
           
GA-E+ guilt 14 13.5 90 86.5 - - 55.54 .000 .73 
 shame 34 32.7 70 67.3 - - 12.46 .000 .35 
 anger 103 99 1 1 - - 100.04 .000 .98 
 sadness 103 99 1 1 - - 100.04 .000 .98 
 self-pity 86 82.7 18 17.3 - - 44.46 .000 .65 
           
GA-E- guilt 101 97.1 3 2.9 - - 92.35 .000 .94 
 shame 92 88.5 12 11.5 - - 61.54 .000 .77 
 anger 94 90.4 10 9.6 - - 67.85 .000 .81 
 sadness 91 87.5 13 12.5 - - 58.50 .000 .75 
 self-pity 33 31.7 71 68.3 - - 13.89 .000 .37 
           
Note. EC = experimental condition, GA+ = goal attained, GA- = goal not attained, E+ = high effort, 
E- = low effort; Yes = emotion experienced, No = emotion not experienced, Missings = decision 
was not made. 
 
6.4.1.3 Negative Emotions 
In case of attained goals, none (as is the case for guilt) or almost none of the participants 
(shame: 2.9 %, anger: 1 %, sadness: 1 %, self-pity: 1.9 %) indicated to feel any of the 
negative emotions given high effort expenditure. Thus, large effects for all emotions were 
obtained in the chi²-tests. However, despite the fact that all chi²-tests were also significant 
given low effort expenditure for attained goals, negative moral emotions were indicated 
more frequently (guilt: 12.5 %, shame: 33.7 %) than non-moral emotions (anger: 2.9 %, 
sadness: 1.9 %, self-pity: 1 %) resulting in smaller effects obtained in the chi²-tests for 
moral as compared to non-moral emotions. 
When effort was not expended in case of non-attained goals, with the exception of 
self-pity (31.7 %), all negative emotions were reported by the vast majority of participants 
(guilt: 97.1 %, shame: 88.5 %, anger: 90.4 %, sadness: 87.5 %) resulting in large effects 
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in chi²-tests (with a higher frequency for yes-answers for guilt, shame, anger and sadness, 
and a higher frequency for no-answers for self-pity). Given high effort expenditure in case 
of non-attained goals, moral emotions (guilt: 13.5 %, shame: 32 %) are less likely than 
non-moral emotions (anger: 99 %, sadness: 99 %, self-pity: 82.7 %), resulting in smaller 
effects in the chi²-tests. 
 
6.4.2 Reaction Times 
With increasing age, there was a slight increase in reaction time for pride, joy, guilt, anger, 
sadness, self-pity, responsibility and deservingness (ranging from r = 10. to r = .26). There 
were no influences of gender or presentation order on reaction times (all η² < .01). Across 
all items, reaction times were generally shorter in session 2 as compared to session 1, 
F(1,4148) = 106.36, p < .001, η² = .03). This effect was probably caused by learning 
effects, as both sessions contained generally similar tasks. However, as we are not 
interested in learning effects, we do not include session as an additional variable in our 
further considerations. Please note that there are several significant effects which we do 
not consider as statistically meaningful. We rely on effect size – not significance – when 
reporting the subsequent results. 
6.4.2.1 Moral Cognitions 
Results of 2 (goal attainment: attained vs. not attained) x 2 (effort: high vs. low) within-
subjects ANOVAs are reported for both cognitions responsibility and deservingness. Mean 
values and standard errors of reaction times for the respective cognitions are depicted in 
Figure 6.1. 
As expected, both moral cognitions are predominantly determined by the 
interaction of goal attainment and effort: For responsibility, a small main effect of goal 
attainment (F = 6.43, p = .014, η² = .02) is obtained, which is further qualified by a large 
interaction effect of goal attainment and effort (F = 59.35, p < .001, η² = .23). There is no 
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main effect of effort (F < 1, p = .556, η² = .00; all df 1,51). For deservingness, we observe 
a small main effect of effort (F = 11.23, p = .002, η² = .03) and a medium interaction effect 
of effort and goal attainment (F = 32.11, p < .001, η² = .09). There is no main effect of goal 
attainment for deservingness (F = 3.71, p = .060, η² = .00; all df 1,51). 
Figure 6.1 Mean Values and Standard Errors for Moral Cognitions (Reaction Times in ms) 
responsibility deservingness 
 
 
Note. GA+ = goal attained, GA- = goal not attained, E+ = high effort, E- = low effort 
 
Thus, as can be seen in Figure 6.1, in case of attained goals, the longest reaction 
times for both responsibility and deservingness were obtained given lack of effort, 
whereas for both cognitions reaction times were shorter in case high effort. The second 
highest reaction times for both cognitions are obtained for non-attained goals given high 
effort; however, for deservingness almost equally long reaction times are obtained for 
non-attained goals given lack of effort, whereas for responsibility reaction times are 
considerably shorter here. 
6.4.2.2 Moral and Non-Moral Emotions 
We now report the results of 2 (goal attainment: attained vs. not attained) x 2 (effort: high 
vs. low) x 2 (type of emotion: moral vs. non-moral) within-subjects ANOVAs. We 
conducted separate ANOVAs for positive and negative moral emotions and averaged 
across moral (positive: pride, self-respect; negative: guilt, shame) versus non-moral 
(positive: joy; negative: anger, sadness, self-pity) emotions. Mean values and standard 
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errors of reaction times for positive versus negative emotions are shown in Figure 6.2. 
Reaction times for individual emotions are depicted in Figure 6.3. 
Figure 6.2 Mean Values and Standard Errors for Averaged Moral versus Non-Moral 
                 Emotions (Reaction Times in ms) 
positive emotions negative emotions 
  
Note. GA+ = goal attained, GA- = goal not attained, E+ = high effort, E- = low effort 
 
For positive emotions, we obtained a medium main effect for type of emotion (F = 
103.93, p < .001, η² = .08) as well as a medium interaction effect for goal attainment x 
effort (F = 37.02, p < .001, η² = .08), further qualified by a small interaction effect of goal 
attainment x effort x type of emotion (F = 22.09, p < .001, η² = .02). There were no main 
effects of goal attainment (F = 4.30, p = .043, η² = .004) and effort (F = 6.38, p = .015, η² = 
.004). We also did not observe any further interaction effects (goal attainment x type of 
emotion: F = 2.62, p = .112, η² = .00; effort x type of emotion: F < 1, p = .424, η² = .00, all 
df = 1,51). As can be seen in the left part of Figure 6.2, reaction times for positive moral 
emotions are longer than for positive non-moral emotions, especially when goals are 
attained in spite of lack of effort or goals are not attained in spite of high effort expenditure 
(i.e., imbalanced situations). 
With regard to negative emotions, results reveal small main effects for goal 
attainment (F = 19.59, p < .001, η² = .03), effort (F = 21.90, p < .001, η² = .01) and type of 
emotion (F = 15.31, p < .001, η² = .01) as well as small interaction effects for goal 
attainment x effort (F = 10.88, p = .002, η² = .02) and goal attainment x effort x type of 
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Figure 6.3 Mean Values and Standard Errors for Individual Emotions (Reaction Times in ms) 
pride self-respect joy 
   
guilt shame  
  
 
anger sadness self-pity 
   
Note. GA+ = goal attained, GA- = goal not attained, E+ = high effort, E- = low effort
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emotion (F = 37.90, p < .001, η² = .02). There are no interaction effects for goal attainment 
x type of emotion (F = 6.82, p = .012, η² = .005) and effort x type of emotion (F = 28.43, p 
< .001, η² = .009; all df = 1,51). Thus, as can be seen in the right part of Figure 6.2, as 
expected, for attained goals, reaction times are longer for moral as compared to non-
moral emotions, especially when effort was not invested (i.e., when goal attainment and 
effort are imbalanced). In case of non-attained goals, in line with our expectations, 
reaction times are also longer for moral emotions given high effort (i.e., the imbalanced 
condition with regard to non-attained goals). Unexpectedly, as is suggested by the three-
way-interaction, reaction times are longer for non-moral than for moral emotions given 
lack of effort for non-attained goals. However, if you look at reaction times obtained for 
individual emotions (see Figure 6.3), it becomes clear that this effect is mainly caused by 
self-pity, which shows considerable longer reaction times here as compared to anger and 
sadness. 
6.4.2.3 Moral Cognitions and Moral Emotions 
We conducted additional 2 (type of dependent variable: moral cognition vs. moral 
emotion) x 2 (goal attainment: attained vs. not attained) x 2 (effort: high vs. low) within-
subject ANOVAs to analyze whether reaction times obtained for moral emotions are 
longer than for moral cognitions (now averaged across responsibility and deservingness).  
With regard to positive moral emotions, unexpectedly, reaction times are longer for 
moral cognitions than for moral emotions, resulting in a small main effect for type of 
dependent variable, F(1,51) = 28.33, p < .001, η² = .03), see also Figures 6.1 and 6.2. 
There were no interaction effects for type of dependent variable with any of the other 
factors (all η² < .01). Similarly, reaction times for moral cognitions are also longer than for 
negative moral emotions (see also Figures 6.1 and 6.2). Thus, again, a small main effort 
for type of dependent variable, F(1,51) = 41.83, p < .001, η² = .02, was obtained. Again, 
there were no interaction effects with the other two factors (all η² < .01). 
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When comparing averaged reaction times for each of the experimental conditions, 
there are stronger correlations between moral cognitions and moral emotions (r = .90, p = 
.002) than between moral cognitions and non-moral emotions (r = .42, p = .287). 
 
6.5 Discussion 
As expected (1), it is more likely that people regard themselves as responsible for the 
attainment of goals, when effort was expended as compared to lack of effort. Furthermore, 
perception of responsibility for non-attained goals is more likely given low as compared to 
high effort expenditure. Similarly, the attainment of goals is more often regarded as 
deserved given high versus low effort, whereas the non-attainment of goals is more 
frequently regarded as deserved in case of low as compared to high effort. These results 
are well in line with previous research (e.g., Feather, 1999, 2006; Weiner, 1995, 2006; see 
also Chapters 4 and 5). Moreover, the present results also show that these findings 
cannot only be attained by using metrical data (as was the case for earlier studies), but 
also by using categorical data. 
Furthermore (2), in line with expectations, with regard to responsibility, reactions 
times are longer for imbalanced as compared to balanced conditions, thus corroborating 
that imbalanced situations require more cognitive effort than balanced situations. We 
argue that longer reaction times reflect more cognitive effort associated with a more 
comprehensive attributional search for additional information, as in imbalanced situations, 
goal attainment cannot be ascribed to high effort and non-attainment cannot be ascribed 
to lack of effort (see also Crandall et al., 2007; Duval & Duval, 1983; Van Kleeck, 1989). 
In line with expectations, (3) all positive moral emotions are reported most 
frequently when goals are attained given high effort. Moreover, as was expected as well, 
positive moral emotions also emerge as positive evaluations of high effort given non-
attained goals, whereas joy is more likely in case of attained goals given lack of effort 
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(thus evaluating the positive outcome). These results further underline that the evaluative 
function of positive moral emotions is directed at positive behavior (i.e., investing effort), 
whereas the evaluative function of positive non-moral emotions is directed at outcomes 
(see Chapter 3). Again, we see weaker effects for pride as compared to self-respect, 
which may be caused by reasons of social desirability (Zammuner, 1996; see also 
Chapter 3). Please note that the relatively high proportion of positive moral emotions given 
lack of effort in case of attained goals may be caused by inferences to high ability, as 
effort and ability are regarded as compensatory in the process of goal attainment (e.g., 
Binser & Försterling, 2004). Thus, when the attainment of the goal cannot be ascribed to 
high effort, the attributional search may lead to inferences of high ability or other 
exceptional qualities which can also become the target of evaluation when eliciting moral 
emotions (e.g., Feather, 2006; Tangney, 1990; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; see also 
Chapter 5). 
Furthermore, as expected, (4) (with the exception of self-pity) all negative emotions 
are most likely when goals are not attained and effort was not expended. Additionally, 
negative moral emotions (guilt, shame) are also reported for attained goals given that 
effort was not expended, thus representing a negative evaluation of lack of effort (see 
Chapters 2 and 3). In contrast, negative non-moral emotions are also frequently reported 
for non-attained goals given high effort, thus representing a negative evaluation of the 
negative outcome (see Chapter 3). Self-pity seems to be an exception, as this emotion – 
in contrast to all other non-moral emotions – is reported even more frequently in case of 
high as compared to low effort (in case of non-attained goals). Thus, we could also regard 
self-pity as a positive signal for investing effort (as is also the case for sympathy as an 
observer emotion, see Chapter 3). However, we regard self-pity as a non-moral emotion 
as – to the best of our knowledge, it has not been – related to pro-social actions or the 
welfare of others, which is usually expected from a moral emotion (see e.g., Haidt, 2003). 
In contrast, self-pity has been related to losing one’s sense of humanity because of being 
too much engrossed in one’s own suffering (Barnard & Curry, 2011), which is often 
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observed for people suffering from depression or displaying depressive personality traits 
(e.g., Hauck, 1971; Stöber, 2003; Wessler, 2001). However, future research may shed 
further light to the moral versus non-moral functions of self-pity. 
Also in line with expectations (5), generally, reaction times for both positive as well 
as negative moral emotions were longer than for positive and negative non-moral 
emotions (the only exception being self-pity in case of non-attained goals given lack of 
effort). Furthermore, as expected, the greatest differences between moral and non-moral 
emotions are observed for imbalanced situations. How can these differences be 
explained? We think that for non-moral emotions, the attributional search (see e.g., 
Crandall et al., 2007; Duval & Duval, 1983) is already stopped when information on goal-
attainment is provided. In contrast, for eliciting moral emotions, it is extended to 
processing information on effort, which requires longer reaction times. Thus, in 
imbalanced situations, moral emotions arise as means of imbalance repair towards a 
more balanced structure, guided by the valance of the behavior. That is, positive moral 
emotions add positive valance to positive behaviors (thus reducing the impact of the 
negative valence of the outcome to the overall representation of the situation), whereas 
negative moral emotions add negative valence to negative behavior (thus reducing the 
impact of the positive valence of the outcome with regard to the overall representation of 
the situation). Consequently, (1) as moral emotions are based on more complex 
evaluations of a given situation than non-moral emotions, they require more cognitive 
effort (i.e., longer reaction times). Furthermore, as moral emotions serve as a means of 
imbalance repair, the highest cognitive effort is required in imbalanced situations (resulting 
in the longest reaction times). 
In contrast to our expectations, (6) reaction times for moral cognitions were longer 
as compared to (moral) emotions. At first glance, this result appears to be in line with the 
Social Intuitionist Model regarding moral cognitions as ‘the tail’ following the ‘emotional 
dog’ (Haidt, 2001). However, we are also aware of the large body of literature 
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demonstrating that (and how) moral cognitions (e.g., responsibility and deservingness) 
precede and shape moral emotions (e.g., Feather, 2006; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; Rudolph 
et al., 2004; Weiner, 2006; see also Chapters 4 and 5). Thus, we conclude that there are 
two kinds of moral judgments involved in eliciting moral emotions: (1) Quick intuitive 
(automatic) judgments of moral cognitions (responsibility, deservingness) which might not 
be assessable by explicitly asking participants for a deliberate evaluation (as is the case 
when being asked to provide ‘yes or no-answers') and (2) deliberate considerations of 
these moral cognitions. We argue that intuitive judgments of responsibility and 
deservingness precede the elicitation of moral emotions, whereas deliberate judgments of 
these moral cognitions may follow moral emotions and influence the strength of moral 
emotions. 
(7) In line with expectations, moral cognitions show stronger correlations with 
moral as compared to non-moral emotions. This result also underlines the close 
connection between moral cognitions and moral emotions – no matter which element 
comes first. 
 
6.5.1 Shortcomings and Issues for Future Research 
The present study has only included positive and negative moral as well as non-moral 
actor emotions. Future research should analyze, whether the same mechanisms observed 
for actor emotions can be applied to observer emotions as well. 
 Emotions were assessed using categorical data (i.e., ‘yes or no-answers’). Future 
research could also try to study reaction times for metrical data, that is, assessments of 
the intensity of the respective moral and non-moral emotions.  
 Past research has successfully applied priming procedures to distinguish between 
several moral emotions (see e.g., Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). Priming procedures 
could be used to detect automatic (intuitive) processing of moral cognitions preceding 
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moral emotions. This could shed further light to the sequential order of moral cognitions 
and moral emotions in moral judgments. Furthermore, during the last years, there is an 
increasing body of literature on moral judgments using fMRI and EEG. However, most of 
this research has be dedicated to moral dilemmas or immoral actions, for example sexual 
relationships among siblings (see Chapter 6.2) or killing persons to save other person’s 
lives (e.g., Cushman & Greene, 2012; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, Sommerville, 
Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Sarlo et al., 2012; Sevinc & Spreng, 2014). Fortunately, 
in contrast to making judgments on goal attainment and effort or responsibility and 
deservingness, these situations are far away from the everyday-experience of most 
people. Nonetheless, future studies could make use of fMRI and EEG techniques to 
identify different brain circuits involved in eliciting moral cognitions and emotions based on 
information of goal attainment and effort as well as the chronological sequence of brain 
potentials elicited by assessing the respective cognitions and emotions. 
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7 Summary and Future Prospects 
In the previous chapters, findings from 10 empirical studies and one review article have 
been presented. I now summarize the most important results and will integrate these into 
a more complete picture of moral and non-moral emotions and their evaluation of actions 
vs. goals. 
 
7.1 A Classification of Moral and Non-Moral Emotions  
In Chapter 1, I summarized the most important results we obtained thus far. We have 
seen that Heider’s (1958) Naïve Action Analysis provides a useful tool for explaining the 
genesis of moral emotions: Ought (the universal moral standard of a situation or goal: 
positive vs. negative), goal attainment (goals can be attained vs. not attained) and effort 
(effort can be expended vs. not expended) are sufficient criteria for eliciting moral 
emotions. Guided by the different combinations of these three antecedent conditions, a 
person’s behavior can be evaluated as to whether it is “good and right or bad and wrong” 
(see Weiner, 2006) from a moral point of view: First, pursuing goals containing a negative 
moral standard (e.g., betraying other persons) is regarded as wrong, whereas pursuing 
goals containing a positive moral standard (e.g., achieving good results in an exam) is 
regarded as right. However, persons are not only expected to pursue morally positive 
goals, but also to expend effort to attain them (see e.g., Matteucci, 2007). Consequently, 
expending effort to attain one’s goals is regarded as right, whereas not expending effort to 
attain one’s goals is regarded as wrong. That is, if a person wants to attain a good result 
in an exam and expends considerable effort to attain this goal, this person’s behavior is 
regarded as right. In contrast, if this person does not expend much effort to achieve a 
good result in the exam, her/his behavior is regarded as wrong. Thus, both pursuing 
morally negative goals as well as not expending effort to attain morally positive goals is 
7 Summary and Future Prospects 186 
 
 
regarded as wrong, whereas expending effort to attain one’s positive goals is regarded as 
morally right. In addition, morally positive versus morally negative behaviors or actions 
give rise to positive versus negative moral emotions. Communicating whether an action is 
evaluated as good and praiseworthy versus bad and blameworthy has been considered 
as the positive versus negative evaluative function of moral emotions. 
In addition to their evaluative function, moral emotions can be classified according 
to the target at which they are directed. We have labeled emotions that are elicited by the 
actions of others, experienced by observing persons and directed at observed persons as 
‘observer emotions’. In contrast, we labeled emotions elicited by one’s own actions, 
experienced by as well as directed at the acting person her/himself as ‘actor emotions’. 
Combining evaluative function and target, the following four groups of moral emotions can 
be identified: (1) positive actor emotions (pride), (2) negative actor emotions (guilt, shame, 
regret, embarrassment), (3) positive observer emotions (admiration, pride, respect, 
sympathy) and (4) negative observer emotions (anger, indignation, contempt, 
schadenfreude). Positive moral emotions constitute positive evaluations of a person’s 
action, whereas negative moral emotions constitute negative evaluations of a person’s 
actions (see Rudolph, et al., 2013; see also Chapter 2). 
In chapter 3, an empirical distinction between moral and non-moral emotions has 
been provided, which further contributed to a more comprehensive classification. Based 
on judgments of goal attainment (goal attained vs. not attained) and effort (high expended 
effort vs. lack of effort), the elicitation of both moral and non-moral emotions was 
analyzed. We confirmed that moral emotions have a positive versus negative evaluative 
function directed at person’s actions. It becomes clear that self-respect is another positive 
moral actor emotion and that (person-related) disappointment is another negative moral 
observer emotion (see also van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002). Results also reveal that the 
evaluative function of non-moral emotions is directed at outcomes. That is, positive non-
moral emotions are likely when positive goals are attained or negative goals are not 
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attained, whereas negative non-moral emotions are likely given non-attained positive 
goals or attained negative goals. Thus, results suggest that joy and relief are positive non-
moral actor emotion, whereas anger, sadness and disappointment are negative non-moral 
actor emotions. Furthermore, joy, relief and envy are also classified as positive non-moral 
observer emotions, whereas sadness and (outcome-related) disappointment (van Dijk & 
Zeelenberg, 2002) are classified as negative non-moral observer emotions.  
Thus, as a result of Chapter 3, important enhancements of the preliminary 
classification are achieved: (1) Two additional emotions (self-respect, person-related 
disappointment) were identified as moral emotions. (2) Nine emotions (joy, relief, anger, 
sadness, (outcome-related) disappointment were identified as non-moral emotions. 
Furthermore, it becomes clear now that moral emotions are predominantly elicited by 
judgments of person’s actions, whereas non-moral emotions are predominantly elicited by 
judgments of outcomes.  
Taking up the concept of ability as another element of Heider’s (1958) Naïve 
Action Analyses, in Chapter 5, we analyzed whether moral emotions can also be directed 
at a person’s qualities or abilities. Taking up Tangney’s (e.g., 1990;Tangney et al., 2007) 
distinction of alpha- versus beta-pride, as a next step towards a more comprehensive 
classification, we have analyzed whether other moral emotions also contain both beta- 
(directed at actions or behaviors) and alpha- (directed at a person’s self or abilities) 
components. Results reveal that Tangney’s concept of alpha- versus beta-pride is 
applicable to a wide range of moral emotions, thus further contributing to a more detailed 
classification of moral and non-moral emotions. Interestingly, all moral emotions are 
elicited by judgments on a person’s actions – and can thus also be regarded as beta-
moral emotions. Additionally, some moral emotions are also elicited by judgments on a 
person’s ability – and can thus also be regarded as alpha-moral emotions: In this regard, 
pride (as both actor and observer emotion), self-respect, admiration and respect represent 
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positive evaluations of high ability, whereas, guilt, shame, regret and embarrassment 
represent negative evaluations of low ability. 
Furthermore, at first glance, sympathy is the only moral observer emotion 
representing a negative evaluation of low ability. However, as we have seen in Chapters 3 
and 5, given non-attained goals, values obtained for low ability (Chapter 5) or inferences 
of low ability (Chapter 3) were lower than values obtained for high effort. This suggests 
that sympathy predominantly represents a positive reaction to high effort. This positive 
reaction is further strengthened when ability was low (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, as 
sympathy is a discordant emotion (Heider, 1958; see also Chapter 2), it provides a 
positive signal for the receiving person (see also Chapters, 2, 3 and 5). According to our 
results, with regard to negative moral observer emotions, there are no negative 
evaluations of low ability towards other persons. This also indicates that there might be an 
“other-serving moral emotional bias” (see Chapter 3) with regard to negative moral 
observer emotions: Probably, negative signals for low ability are not sent to others, as low 
ability is regarded as rather uncontrollable and cannot easily be changed – in contrast to 
low effort (Weiner, 1995, 2006; see also Chapter 2). In this regard, negative signals 
directed at an uncontrollable negative cause cannot contribute to the welfare of others, 
which is generally expected from a moral emotion (Haidt, 2003). Therefore, these signals 
may not have developed during the course of evolution (see Darwin, 1872).  
My final classification of moral and non-moral emotions is summarized in Table 
7.1. From an attributional point of view, emotions can be classified into three main groups 
reflecting the concept at which the evaluative function of the specific emotion is directed: 
(1) a person’s action or behavior, (2) a person’s abilities and (3) outcomes. For each of 
these groups, emotions can be further distinguished with regard to their target (actor- vs. 
observer emotions). I will return to this overview in Chapter 7.5. It is open to future 
research whether further emotions can be classified according to this taxonomy.  
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Table 7.1 A Classification of Moral and Non-Moral Emotions 
                   Observer Actor 
 target of  
evaluation 
 
negative 
 
positive 
 
negative 
 
positive 
Moral 
emotions 
action – β  
 
anger 
indignation 
contempt 
schadenfreude 
disappointment 
(PRD) 
admiration 
pride 
respect 
sympathy 
 
guilt 
shame  
regret 
embarrassment 
 
pride 
self-respect 
 
ability – α  - admiration 
pride 
respect 
sympathy 
guilt 
shame  
regret* 
embarrassment 
pride 
self-respect 
Non-moral 
emotions 
outcome sadness 
disappointment 
(ORD) 
joy  
relief 
envy 
anger 
sadness 
disappointment 
(ORD) 
joy  
relief 
Note. β-variants of moral emotions refer to the evaluation of actions, whereas α-variants refer to 
the evaluation of abilities. * = regret is believed to have the comparatively smallest α-variant. PRD 
= person-related disappointment, ORD = outcome-related disappointment. 
 
7. 2 Moral Emotions and Subsequent Behaviors 
The functional value of moral emotions (see Chapter 2) is regarded as providing 
emotional reward for morally positive behaviors (positive moral emotions) and providing 
emotional punishment for morally negative behaviors (negative moral emotions). For 
example, being the target of admiration feels good. It signals the receiving person that 
her/his behavior is right and should be continued – even if it has not yet led to the 
attainment of a desired (positive) goal. In contrast, being the target of anger feels bad. It 
signals the receiving person that her/his behavior is wrong and should be stopped or 
changed. In this regard, we have seen that moral emotions send ‘stop  vs. go – signals’ 
(see Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014, see also Chapter 2).  
The relationship between moral emotions and subsequent behavior was studied in 
Chapters 4 and 5. We have found that positive moral observer emotions are related to 
help-giving, praise, and reward, whereas negative moral observer emotions are related to 
criticism and punishment. Sympathy is perceived as a positive signal for uncontrollable 
misfortunes, as has been described in case of mental disability (see Chapter 4). 
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Sympathy is typically related to help-giving and has thus been referred to as an ‘other-
suffering’ (Haidt, 2003) or ‘other-caring’ (Giner-Sorolla, 2012) emotion. Furthermore, 
admiration, pride and respect represent positive signals, making reward more likely. In 
contrast, anger, indignation, contempt, person-related disappointment, and schadenfreude 
represent negative signals, increasing the likelihood of punishment. In chapter 5, we have 
thus labeled admiration, pride and respect as ‘other-rewarding’ and anger, indignation, 
contempt, (person-related) disappointment and schadenfreude as ‘other-punishing’ 
emotions. 
However, so far, we did not explicitly ask participants whether it actually ‘feels’ 
good being the target of positive moral emotions versus bad being the target of negative 
moral emotions. Furthermore, we did not explicitly ask our participants whether an 
emotion encourages them to continue or change a specific action. And finally, we do know 
only little about whether there are specific behaviors related to reward and punishment 
following specific moral actor emotions. These issues should be addressed in future 
research. A first step for answering these questions is made in a forthcoming manuscript 
(Tscharaktschiew & Rudolph, 2014d). 
 
7.3. Moral Emotions and Personality 
As we have seen in Chapter 4, different facets of dispositional empathy (see Davis, 1983; 
Paulus, 2009) increase the likelihood for both moral emotions and helping-behavior: High 
extents of emotional empathy (i.e., empathic concern and personal distress) increase 
guilt, shame, and regret (as moral actor emotions). Additionally, high empathic concern 
also increases sympathy (as a moral observer emotion) and help-giving. Furthermore, 
high extents of perspective taking also increase the likelihood for help-giving. A 
relationship between anger or schadenfreude and empathy is not found. However, it has 
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not been studied whether other moral emotions are influenced by a person’s dispositional 
empathy. This question is open to future research.  
Moreover, there are other personality traits that influence moral emotions. For 
example, moral actor emotions (i.e., shame, guilt, embarrassment and pride) have been 
related to perfectionism (Tangney, 2002). In another manuscript (Tscharaktschiew, 
Freymann, Brüggemann, Arnold, Ullmann, & Rudolph, 2014), we report that persons 
scoring high in perfectionism (Stoeber, 1995) are more likely to experience shame and 
guilt following failures ascribed to both low effort as well as low ability. When comparing 
the two emotions, the effect of perfectionism on the extent of the respective emotion is 
even stronger for shame than for guilt. (A complete version of the manuscript is included 
on the enclosed CD.) 
Self-esteem is another personality-trait that has been related to moral emotions, 
for example to pride and shame (Tangney & Fischer, 1995), admiration (Bolch, 2004; 
Campbell, Eisner, & Riggs, 2010), envy (Barth, 1988) as well as to schadenfreude (van 
Dijk, van Koningsbruggen, Ouwerkerk, & Wesseling, 2011). With regard to the empirical 
studies at hand, returning to the cognitive antecedents of ought, goal attainment and 
effort, it is interesting that in all of the previous studies involving attained positive goals, a 
large variety of both positive as well as negative observer emotions (i.e., pride, admiration, 
respect, but also envy, anger and indignation) is elicited (see Chapters 2, 3 and 5). For 
example with regard to positive goals that were attained without effort expenditure, it could 
be analyzed whether a person’s level of self-esteem increases the likelihood for positive 
versus negative moral observer emotions. I expect that given that a positive goal was 
attained without effort, persons with low self-esteem are more likely to experience envy, 
whereas persons with high self-esteem are more likely to experience admiration. This 
question is currently addressed in a further manuscript in preparation (Tscharaktschiew, 
Albrecht, Pöthe, & Rudolph, 2014). 
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Future research could also address the relationship between other (moral) 
emotions and self-esteem. Furthermore, other aspects of a person’s personality, for 
example openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and 
neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 2008) or satisfaction with life (Pavot & Diener, 2008) could 
be addressed within the context of attribution and moral emotions. 
 
7.4 Cognitive Effort and Moral Emotions 
In chapter 6, we have seen that in addition to their evaluative function (actions vs. 
outcomes), moral emotions can also be distinguished with regard to the cognitive effort 
they require. Specifically, reaction times are longer for moral as compared to non-moral 
emotions. Thus, moral emotions require more cognitive effort than non-moral emotions. 
Probably, for non-moral emotions, information on goal attainment is a sufficient condition 
for eliciting the respective emotion. In contrast, moral emotions require the processing of 
additional information (i.e., information on effort expenditure), thus resulting in 
comparatively longer reaction times.  
 In Chapters 4 and 5, the relationships between cognitions (responsibility, morality 
of behavior), moral emotions and subsequent behaviors (help-giving, reward, punishment) 
were analyzed. From an attributional point of view, these relationships can be described 
as cognition  emotion  action sequence (see also Rudolph et al., 2004; Weiner, 2006). 
Thus, in Chapter 6, it was expected that – as cognitions are the first element of the 
sequence – reaction times for moral cognitions (here: responsibility, deservingness) are 
shorter than reaction times for moral actor emotions (here: pride, self-respect, guilt, 
shame). However, we obtained longer reaction times for moral cognitions than for moral 
emotions.  
At first glance, this result contradicts attributional theories of moral emotions and 
rather supports an intuitionist point of view: According to the Social Intuitionist Model of 
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moral reasoning (e.g., Haid, 2001; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008; see also Leffel, 2008), moral 
emotions are quick and automatic intuitions that are elicited without prior reasoning. In 
contrast, processes of moral reasoning are regarded as post-hoc decisions following 
moral emotions. Thus, shorter reaction times for moral emotions could also suggest that 
moral emotions precede processes of moral reasoning (i.e., judgments on responsibility 
and deservingness). However, given the impressive amount of empirical evidence for 
attributional cognition  emotion  action sequences, a different model is suggested: As 
a first step, (1) moral cognitions arise as quick and automatic judgments of a specific 
situation (e.g., information on effort and goal-attainment). Then, (2) they give rise to moral 
emotions. Furthermore (3), moral cognitions may be consciously re-assessed and may 
further influence the intensity of moral emotions, thus resulting in longer reaction times for 
cognitions (see Chapter 6). Future research could further investigate processes of 
cognitive effort for observer emotions. Furthermore, the cognitive effort underlying moral 
versus non-moral emotions could be studied using EEG and fMRI-techniques (for a more 
detailed discussion see Chapter 6). 
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7.5 An Empirically Based Definition of Moral Emotions 
As a result of this thesis, to the best of my knowledge, the (so far) most comprehensive 
empirically based classification of both moral and non-moral emotions has been 
developed within an attributional framework (Heider, 1959; Weiner, 1995, 2006). A 
summary of the classification, containing 25 distinct emotions, has been presented in 
Table 7.1. When summarizing the most important results, as a final step, moral emotions 
can be classified and distinguished from non-moral emotions according to the following 
concepts and considerations: 
(1) Moral emotions can be directed at self or others, and are thus be labeled as actor 
vs. observer emotions. 
(2) Moral emotions arise as evaluations of a person’s positive vs. negative actions. 
These evaluations are based on considerations of ought, goal attainment and 
effort. 
(3) Some moral emotions (see Table 7.1) arise as evaluations of a person’s high vs. 
low ability. 
(4) Positive versus negative moral emotions communicate that an action was morally 
right and praiseworthy and should thus be continued (go-signal) versus morally 
wrong and blameworthy and should be changed or stopped (stop-signal).  
(5) In contrast, non-moral emotions communicate that an outcome was good versus 
bad. 
(6) Moral emotions motivate subsequent behaviors, that is, help-giving (sympathy), 
reward (admiration, pride, respect) and punishment (anger, indignation, contempt, 
schadenfreude, person-related disappointment). 
(7) Moral emotions require higher cognitive effort than non-moral emotions. 
 
Returning to Ben-Ze’ev (2002; see Chapter 3.2), I hope that the empirical results 
discussed in my dissertation provide an important step towards a classification of 
emotions from an attributional point of view.  
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8 Zusammenfassung und Ausblick 
 
In den vorangegangenen Kapiteln wurden Erkenntnisse aus 10 empirischen Studien und 
einem Review-Artikel vorgestellt. Ich fasse nun die wichtigsten Ergebnisse zusammen, die 
zu einem besseren Verständnis von moralischen und nicht-moralischen Emotionen und 
deren Bewertung von Handlungen (Actions) und Zielen (Outcomes) beitragen. 
 
8.1 Eine Klassifikation moralischer und nicht-moralischer Emotionen 
In Kapitel 1 habe ich die wichtigsten Befunde aus bereits veröffentlichten Artikeln 
zusammengefasst, bei denen ich Co-Autorin war. Wir haben gesehen, dass Heider’s 
(1958) Naive Handlungsanalyse ein nützliches Werkzeug darstellt, um das Entstehen von 
moralischen Emotionen vorherzusagen. Ought / Sollen (bzw. der universelle moralische 
Standard einer Situation oder eines Ziels: positiv vs. negativ), goal-
attainment/Zielerreichung (Ziele können erreicht werden vs. nicht erreicht werden) und 
Effort/Anstrengung (Anstrengung kann investiert vs. nicht investiert werden) sind 
hinreichende Bedingungen für das Auslösen von moralischen Emotionen. Anhand von 
unterschiedlichen Kombinationen dieser drei vorauslaufenden Bedingungen kann ein 
Verhalten dahingehend beurteilt werden, ob es aus moralischer Sicht „gut und richtig oder 
schlecht und falsch“ (Weiner, 2006) ist. Zunächst einmal wird das Verfolgen eines Ziels 
mit negativem moralischen Standard (z.B. eine andere Person zu betrügen) als negativ 
betrachtet, während das Verfolgen von Zielen, die einen positiven moralischen Standard 
beinhalten (z.B. ein gutes Ergebnis in einer Prüfung zu erzielen), als positiv betrachtet 
wird. Jedoch wird von Personen nicht nur erwartet, dass sie moralisch positive Ziele 
verfolgen, sondern auch, dass sie Anstrengung investieren, um diese Ziele zu erreichen 
(s. z.B. Matteucci, 2007). Daraus folgt, dass es als richtig erachtet wird, sich für seine 
Ziele anzustrengen, während es als falsch erachtet wird, sich nicht für seine Ziele 
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anzustrengen. So wird das Verhalten einer Person als richtig erachtet, wenn sie ein gutes 
Ergebnis in einer Prüfung erreichen will und sich sehr anstrengt, um dieses Ziel zu 
erreichen. Hingegen wird es als falsch erachtet, wenn die Person keine besonderen 
Anstrengungen unternimmt, um ein gutes Ergebnis in der Prüfung zu erzielen. Das 
bedeutet, dass Bedingungen – das Verfolgen von negativen Zielen, sowie keine 
Anstrengung beim Verfolgen von positiven Zielen zu investieren – als falsch beurteilt 
werden, während es als richtig beurteilt wird, sich für seine positiven Ziele anzustrengen. 
Zudem werden von moralisch positiven versus moralisch negativen Verhaltensweisen 
positive versus negative moralische Emotionen ausgelöst. Die Kommunikation darüber, 
ob ein Verhalten als richtig und lobenswert oder falsch und tadelswert bezeichnet wird, 
wurde als die positive versus negative Bewertungsfunktion von moralischen Emotionen 
beschrieben (s. Kapitel 2 und 3). 
 Neben ihrer Bewertungsfunktion können moralische Emotionen nach dem Ziel 
klassifiziert werden, auf das sie gerichtet sind. Wir haben moralische Emotionen, die von 
Handlungen anderer Personen ausgelöst werden, von einer beobachtenden Person 
empfunden werden und auf beobachtete Personen gerichtet sind als Observer-Emotionen 
(Beobachter-Emotionen) bezeichnet. Demgegenüber haben wir Emotionen, die von 
eigenen Handlugen ausgelöst werden, von uns selbst empfunden werden und auf uns 
selbst gerichtet sind als Actor-Emotionen (Emotionen des Handelnden) bezeichnet. 
Kombiniert man nun die Bewertungsfunktion mit dem Ziel, auf das moralische Emotionen 
gerichtet sind, lassen sich zunächst vier Gruppen von moralischen Emotionen 
unterscheiden: (1) positive Actor-Emotionen (Stolz), (2) negative Actor-Emotionen 
(Schuld, Scham, Reue, Peinlichkeit), (3) positive Observer-Emotionen (Bewunderung, 
Stolz, Respekt; Mitleid) und (4) negative Observer-Emotionen (Ärger, Empörung, 
Verachtung, Schadenfreude). Positive moralische Emotionen stellen positive 
Bewertungen von Handlungen einer Person dar, während negative moralische Emotionen 
negative Bewertungen von Handlungen einer Person darstellen (s. Rudolph et al., 2013, 
s.a. Kapitel 2).  
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 In Kapitel 3 wurde eine empirische Analyse moralischer und nicht-moralischer 
Emotionen vorgestellt, die zu einer umfassenderen Klassifizierung beigetragen hat. 
Basierend auf Entscheidungen über Zielerreichung (Ziel erreicht vs. nicht erreicht) und 
Anstrengung (angestrengt vs. nicht angestrengt), wurde hier das Entstehen von 
moralischen und nicht-moralischen Emotionen analysiert. Wir bestätigten, dass 
moralische Emotionen eine Bewertungsfunktion beinhalten, die sich auf die Handlungen 
von Personen bezieht. Es wurde herausgearbeitet, dass Selbstrespekt eine weitere 
positive moralische Actor-Emotion ist und das (personenbezogene) Enttäuschung eine 
weitere negative moralische Actor-Emotion ist (s.a. van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002). Die 
Daten zeigten zudem, dass die Bewertungsfunktion von nicht-moralischen Emotionen auf 
Ergebnisse gerichtet ist. Das heißt, positive nicht-moralische Emotionen sind 
wahrscheinlich, wenn positive Ziele erreicht werden, oder negative Ziele nicht erreicht 
werden, während negative nicht-moralische Emotionen wahrscheinlich sind, wenn 
negative Ziele erreicht werden oder positive Ziele nicht erreicht werden. Wir haben Freude 
und Erleichterung als positive nicht-moralische Actor-Emotionen klassifiziert, während 
Ärger, Traurigkeit und Enttäuschung negative nicht-moralische Actor-Emotionen 
darstellen. Freude, Erleichterung und Neid sind positive moralische Observer-Emotionen. 
Des Weiteren werden Traurigkeit und (ergebnisbezogene) Enttäuschung (s. van Diik & 
Zeelenberg, 2002) als negative nicht-moralische Observer-Emotionen klassifiziert. 
 Als Ergebnis von Kapitel 3 wurden wichtige Erweiterungen der bisherigen 
Klassifizierung erreicht: (1) Zwei weitere Emotionen (Selbstrespekt und 
personenbezogene Enttäuschung) wurden als moralische Emotionen identifiziert. Neun 
Emotionen (Freude, Erleichterung, Ärger, Traurigkeit, und ergebisbezogene 
Enttäuschung) wurden als nicht-moralische Emotionen identifiziert. Hierbei betrachten wir 
außer Ärger alle Emotionen jeweils in ihren Actor- und Observer-Varianten. Zudem wird 
nun nochmals deutlich, dass moralische Emotionen hauptsächlich durch Bewertungen 
von Handlungen von Personen ausgelöst werden, während nicht-moralische Emotionen 
hauptsächlich durch Bewertungen von Ergebnissen ausgelöst werden.  
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 Mit dem Konzept der Fähigkeit haben wir ein weiteres Element aus Heiders (1958) 
Naiver Handlungsanalyse in unsere Betrachtungen aufgenommen, indem wir in Kapitel 5 
untersucht haben, ob moralische Emotionen auch auf die Fähigkeiten von Personen 
gerichtet sein können. Hierzu haben wir Tangneys (z.B. 1990; Tangney et al., 2007) 
Unterscheidung von Alpha- vs. Beta-Stolz in unsere Überlegungen aufgenommen. Um 
moralische Emotionen noch umfassender klassifizieren zu können, haben wir analysiert, 
ob weitere moralische Emotionen ebenso Alpha-Varianten (gerichtet auf das Selbst einer 
Person bzw. auf Fähigkeiten) und Beta-Varianten (gerichtet auf Handlungen oder 
Verhaltensweisen) beinhalten. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Tangneys Konzept von 
Alpha- vs. Beta-Stolz auf zahlreiche weitere Emotionen anwendbar ist. Interessant ist, 
dass alle moralischen Emotionen durch die Bewertung von Handlungen von Personen 
ausgelöst werden und demnach als Beta-moralische Emotionen betrachtet werden 
können. Zusätzlich werden einige moralische Emotionen durch die Bewertung von 
Fähigkeiten von Personen ausgelöst und können demnach als Alpha-moralische 
Emotionen betrachtet werden. In dieser Hinsicht repräsentieren Stolz (als Actor- und 
Observer Emotion), Selbstrespekt, Bewunderung und Respekt positive Bewertungen von 
hoher Fähigkeit, während Schuld, Scham, Reue und Peinlichkeit negative Bewertungen 
von niedriger Fähigkeit darstellen. 
 Zudem ist, auf den ersten Blick betrachtet, Mitleid die einzige moralische 
Observer-Emotion, die eine negative Bewertung von niedriger Fähigkeit repräsentiert. Wie 
wir jedoch in den Kapiteln 3 und 5 gesehen haben, sind – nicht-erreichte Ziele 
vorausgesetzt – die erhaltenen Mittelwerte für niedrige Fähigkeit (Kapitel 5) oder 
Rückschlüsse auf niedrige Fähigkeit (Kapitel 3) generell niedriger als die Mittelwerte für 
hohe Anstrengung. Dies legt nahe, dass Mitleid vorranging eine Bewertung von hoher 
Anstrengung repräsentiert. Diese positive emotionale Reaktion wird zudem verstärkt, 
wenn die Fähigkeit niedrig ist (s. Kapitel 5). Da Mitleid eine diskordante Emotion (Heider, 
1958; s.a. Kapitel 2) ist, stellt sie ein positives Signal für die Person dar, die diese Emotion 
empfängt (s.a. Kapitel 2, 3, und 4). Unsere Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass es keine 
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negativen moralischen Observer-Emotionen als negative Bewertungen von niedrigen 
Fähigkeiten anderer Personen gibt. Dies ist ein weiterer Hinweis auf einen „other-serving 
moral emotional bias“ (s. Kapitel 3), der bei negativen moralischen Observer-Emotionen 
auftritt: Wahrscheinlich werden negative Signale für niedrige Fähigkeit nicht zu anderen 
Personen gesendet, weil Fähigkeit als eher unkontrollierbar betrachtet wird und nicht 
leicht verändert werden kann – im Gegensatz zu mangelnder Anstrengung (Weiner, 1995, 
2006; s.a. Kapitel 2). Diesbezüglich können Signale, die auf eine unkontrollierbare 
negative Ursache gerichtet sind, nicht zum Wohlergehen anderer Personen beitragen, 
was jedoch generell von moralischen Emotionen erwartet wird (Haidt, 2003). Deshalb 
wurden diese Signale im Verlauf der Evolution vermutlich nicht hervorgebracht (s. Darwin, 
1872). 
 Meine endgültige Klassifikation moralischer und nicht-moralischer Emotionen ist in 
Tabelle 8.1. zusammengefasst. Aus attributionstheoretischer Sicht können Emotionen 
zunächst in drei Gruppen eingeteilt werden, die das Konzept repräsentieren, auf das die 
Bewertungsfunktion der jeweiligen Emotion gerichtet ist: (1) Handlungen oder 
Verhaltensweisen von Personen, (2) die Fähigkeiten einer Person und (3) Ergebnisse. 
Innerhalb dieser Gruppen können die Emotionen zudem dahingehend unterschieden 
werden, ob sie sich auf beobachtete (Observer-Emotionen) oder eigene (Actor-
Emotionen) Handlungen, Fähigkeiten oder Ergebnisse beziehen. Ich werde auf diese 
Übersicht in Kapitel 8.5 zurückkommen. Für zukünftige Forschung bleibt offen, ob weitere 
Emotionen auf Grundlage dieser Taxonomie klassifiziert werden können.  
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Tabelle 8.1 Eine Klassifikation Moralischer und Nicht-Moralischer Emotionen 
                   Observer                        Actor 
 Ziel der 
Bewertung 
 
negativ positiv negativ positiv 
Moralische 
Emotionen 
 
Handlung 
– β  
 
Ärger 
Empörung 
Verachtung 
Schadenfreude 
Enttäuschung 
(PBE) 
Bewunderung 
Stolz 
Respekt 
Mitleid 
 
Schuld 
Scham 
Reue 
Peinlichkeit 
 
Stolz 
Selbstrespekt 
 
Fähigkeit  
– α  
- Bewunderung 
Stolz 
Respekt 
Mitleid 
Schuld 
Scham 
Reue* 
Peinlichkeit 
Stolz 
Selbstrespekt 
 
Nicht-
moralische 
Emotionen 
Ergebnis Traurigkeit 
Enttäuschung 
(EBE) 
Freude 
Erleichterung 
Neid 
Ärger 
Traurigkeit 
Enttäuschung 
(EBE) 
Freude 
Erleichterung 
Notiz. β-Varianten moralischer Emotionen beziehen sich auf die Bewertung von Handlungen, 
während sich α-Varianten auf die Bewertung von Fähigkeiten beziehen. * = Reue beinhaltet die 
vergleichsweise geringste α-Variante. PBE = personenbezogene Enttäuschung, EBE = 
ergebnisbezogene Enttäuschung. 
 
8.2. Moralische Emotionen und nachfolgende Verhaltensweisen 
Es wird als funktionaler Wert (s. Kapitel 2) einer Emotion betrachtet, dass sie emotionale 
Belohnung für moralisch positives Verhalten (positive moralische Emotionen) bzw. 
emotionale Bestrafung für moralisch negatives Verhalten (negative moralische 
Emotionen) bereitstellt. Zum Beispiel fühlt es sich gut an, das Ziel von Bewunderung zu 
sein. Dies signalisiert der bewunderten Person, dass ihr Verhalten richtig war und 
fortgeführt werden sollte – auch wenn es bisher nicht zum Erreichen eines angestrebten 
positiven Zieles geführt hat. Im Gegensatz dazu fühlt es sich schlecht an, das Ziel des 
Ärgers anderer Personen zu sein. Dies signalisiert der Person, auf die sich der Ärger 
bezieht, dass ihr Verhalten falsch war und geändert werden sollte. In dieser Hinsicht 
haben wir gesehen, dass moralische Emotionen „Stop vs. Go - Signale“ senden (s. 
Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; s.a. Kapitel 2). 
 Die Beziehung zwischen moralischen Emotionen und nachfolgenden 
Verhaltensweisen haben wir in den Kapiteln 4 und 5 betrachtet. Wir haben gesehen, dass 
positive moralische Emotionen mit Hilfeverhalten, Lob und Belohnung verbunden sind, 
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während negative moralische Emotionen mit Kritik und Bestrafung einhergehen. Mitleid 
wird als positives Signal für unkontrollierbare Notlagen erlebt, wie wir anhand des 
Beispiels von geistiger Behinderung (s. Kapitel 4) belegt haben. Mitleid ist typischerweise 
mit Hilfeverhalten assoziiert und wurde bereits als ‚other-suffering emotion‘ (Haidt, 2003) 
oder ‚other-caring emotion‘ (Giner-Sorolla, 2012) bezeichnet. Des Weiteren 
repräsentieren Bewunderung, Stolz und Respekt positive Signale, die die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit von Belohnung erhöhen. Im Gegensatz dazu repräsentieren Ärger, 
Empörung, personenbezogene Enttäuschung und Schadenfreude negative Signale, die 
die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Bestrafung erhöhen. In Kapitel 5 haben wir daher 
Bewunderung, Stolz und Respekt als ‚other-rewarding emotions‘ und Ärger, Empörung, 
Verachtung, personenbezogene Enttäuschung und Schadenfreude als ‚other-punishing 
emotions‘ bezeichnet.  
 Bis hierhin haben wir jedoch unsere Versuchspersonen nicht explizit danach 
gefragt, ob es sich gut ‚anfühlt‘, das Ziel von Bewunderung zu sein – oder ob es sich 
schlecht anfühlt, das Ziel von Ärger zu sein. Zudem haben wir unsere Versuchspersonen 
nicht explizit gefragt, ob eine bestimmte Emotion sie dazu veranlasst, ihr Verhalten 
beizubehalten oder zu ändern. Des Weiteren wissen wir bisher nur wenig darüber, ob es 
im Zusammenhang mit Belohnung und Bestrafung auch spezifische Verhaltensweisen 
gibt, die sich speziell auf moralische Actor-Emotionen beziehen. Diese Aspekte könnten in 
weiteren Forschungsprojekten untersucht werden. Einen ersten Schritt, um diese Fragen 
zu beantworten, unternehmen wir gegenwärtig in einer aktuellen Publikation in 
Vorbereitung (Tscharaktschiew & Rudolph, 2014d). 
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8.3. Moralische Emotionen und Persönlichkeit 
Wie wir in Kapitel 4 gesehen haben, erhöhen verschiedene Facetten dispositionaler 
Empathie (s. Davis, 1983; Paulus, 2009) die Wahrscheinlichkeit für das Entstehen von 
moralischen Emotionen und Hilfeverhalten: Hohe Ausprägungen von emotionaler 
Empathie (d.h. ‚empathic concern‘ und ‚personal distress‘) erhöhen das Empfinden von 
Schuld, Scham und Reue (als moralische Actor-Emotionen) sowie Hilfeverhalten. Zudem 
wird Hilfeverhalten durch ein hohes Maß an Perspektivenübernahme (‚perspective taking‘) 
verstärkt. Eine Beziehung zwischen Ärger, Schadenfreude und Empathie wurde nicht 
belegt. Wir haben jedoch bisher nicht untersucht, ob andere moralische Emotionen von 
dispositionaler Empathie beeinflusst werden. Diese Frage bleibt offen für weitere 
Forschung. 
 Es gibt zudem weitere Persönlichkeitseigenschaften, die moralische Emotionen 
beeinflussen. So wurden moralische Actor-Emotionen (Scham, Schuld, Peinlichkeit und 
Stolz) bereits mit Perfektionismus in Verbindung gebracht (Tangney, 2002). In einem 
weiteren Manuskript (Tscharaktschiew, Freymann, Arnold, Brüggemann, Ullmann, & 
Rudolph, 2014) berichten wir, dass Personen mit hohen Perfektionismus-Ausprägungen 
(Stoeber, 1995) mit höherer Wahrscheinlichkeit Scham und Schuld empfinden, wenn 
Misserfolge auf mangelnde Anstrengung und/oder mangelnde Fähigkeiten 
zurückzuführen sind. Die Effekte von Perfektionismus auf die jeweilige Emotion sind für 
Scham noch stärker ausgeprägt als für Schuld. (Eine vollständige Version des 
Manuskripts befindet sich auf der beigelegten CD.) 
 Selbstwert ist eine weitere Persönlichkeitseigenschaft, die mit moralischen 
Emotionen in Verbindung gebracht wurde, z.B. in Bezug auf Stolz und Scham (Tangney & 
Fischer, 1995), Bewunderung (Bolch, 2004; Campbell, Eisner, & Riggs, 2010), Neid 
(Barth, 1988) und Schadenfreude (van Dijk, van Koningsbruggen, Ouwerkerk, & 
Wesseling, 2011). Wenn wir auf die vorliegenden empirischen Studien sowie auf die 
vorauslaufenden kognitiven Bedingungen moralischer Emotionen (d.h. Ought, Goal-
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Attainment und Effort) zurückkommen, erscheint interessant, dass in allen Studien, die 
sich mit positiven erreichten Zielen beschäftigten, verschiedene positive und negative 
Observer-Emotionen (z.B. Stolz, Bewunderung und Respekt, aber auch Neid, Ärger und 
Empörung) ausgelöst werden (s. Kapitel 2, 3 und 5). Diesbezüglich könnte z.B. in Bezug 
auf positive Ziele, die ohne Anstrengung erreicht werden, analysiert werden, ob die Höhe 
des Selbstwertes einer Person die Wahrscheinlichkeit des Entstehens von positiven 
versus negativen Observer-Emotionen beeinflusst. Ich erwarte, dass bei positiven Zielen, 
die ohne Anstrengung erreicht werden, Personen mit niedrigem Selbstwert stärker dazu 
neigen, Neid zu empfinden, während Personen mit hohem Selbstwert stärker dazu 
neigen, Bewunderung zu empfinden. Diese Frage wird gegenwärtig in einem weiteren 
Manuskript in Vorbereitung (Tscharaktschiew, Albrecht, Pöthe, & Rudolph, 2014) 
untersucht.  
 Zukünftige Forschung könnte sich zudem mit dem Zusammenhang zwischen 
anderen (moralischen) Emotionen und Selbstwert beschäftigen. Des Weiteren könnten 
weitere Persönlichkeitsaspekte, wie z.B. Offenheit für neue Erfahrungen, 
Gewissenhaftigkeit, Extraversion, Verträglichkeit und Neurotizismus (s. Costa & McCrae, 
2008) oder Lebenszufriedenheit (Pavot & Diener, 2008) im Kontext von Attribution und 
moralischen Emotionen untersucht werden. 
 
8.4 Kognitive Beanspruchung und moralische Emotionen 
In Kapitel 6 haben wir gesehen, dass Emotionen neben ihrer Bewertungsfunktion 
(Handlungen vs. Ergebnisse) auch aufgrund des Ausmaßes an kognitiver 
Beanspruchung, die diese Emotionen hervorrufen, unterschieden werden können. So sind 
Reaktionszeiten für moralische Emotionen länger als für nicht-moralische Emotionen. Das 
heißt, dass moralische Emotionen einen höheren kognitiven Aufwand erfordern als nicht-
moralische Emotionen. Es scheint plausibel, dass für nicht-moralische Emotionen 
Informationen über Zielerreichung ausreichend sind, um eine bestimmte Emotion 
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auszulösen. Hingegen erfordern moralische Emotionen die Verarbeitung von weiteren 
Informationen (d.h. Informationen über Anstrengung), was in vergleichsweise längeren 
Reaktionszeiten resultiert. 
 In den Kapiteln 4 und 5 wurden die Beziehungen zwischen moralischen 
Kognitionen (Verantwortlichkeit, Moralität des Verhaltens), moralischen Emotionen und 
nachfolgenden Verhaltensweisen (Hilfeverhalten, Belohnung, Bestrafung) analysiert. Aus 
Sicht der Attributionstheorien können diese Beziehungen als eine Sequenz von Kognition 
 Emotion  Verhalten beschrieben werden (s.a. Rudolph et al., 2004; Weiner, 2006). 
Daher haben wir in Kapitel 6 erwartet, dass Reaktionszeiten für moralische Kognitionen 
(hier: Verantwortlichkeit, Verdientheit) kürzer sind als für moralische Emotionen (hier: 
Stolz, Selbstrespekt, Scham, Schuld), weil Kognitionen das erste Element innerhalb 
dieser Sequenz sind. Wir beobachteten jedoch längere Reaktionszeiten für moralische 
Kognitionen als für moralische Emotionen. 
 Auf den ersten Blick scheinen diese Ergebnisse attributionalen Theorien von 
moralischen Emotionen zu widersprechen, und einen eher intuitionistischen Ansatz zu 
unterstützen: Im ‚Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Reasoning‘ (Haidt, 2001; s.a. Haidt & 
Bjorklund, 2008; Leffel, 2008) werden moralische Emotionen als schnelle und 
automatische Intuitionen bezeichnet, die ohne vorherige kognitive Bewertungsprozesse 
ausgelöst werden. Kognitive Bewertungsprozesse werden als post-hoc Entscheidungen 
betrachtet, die moralischen Emotionen folgen. Somit könnten kürzere Reaktionszeiten für 
moralische Emotionen auch bedeuten, dass moralische Emotionen moralischen 
Kognitionen (d.h., Verantwortlichkeit und Verdientheit) vorausgehen. Wenn man jedoch 
die beeindruckende empirische Evidenz für attributionale Kognitions-  Emotions-  
Verhaltens- Sequenzen betrachtet, erscheint ein anderes Modell sinnvoll: In einem ersten 
Schritt (1) entstehen moralische Kognitionen als schnelle und automatische Bewertungen 
einer spezifischen Situation (anhand von Bewertungen über Zielerreichung und 
Anstrengung). (2) Aufgrund dieser Bewertungen werden moralische Emotionen ausgelöst. 
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Anschließend (3) können moralische Kognitionen noch einmal bewusst (nach)bewertet 
werden, was in längeren Reaktionszeiten für Kognitionen (s. Kapitel 6) resultiert und die 
Intensität moralischer Emotionen weiter beeinflusst. Zukünftige Forschung könnte sich 
gezielter mit dem kognitiven Aufwand, der moralischen und nicht-moralischen Emotionen 
zugrunde liegt, beschäftigen, z.B. indem auch EEG und fMRT-Techniken (s.a. Kapitel 6) 
eingesetzt werden.  
 
8.5 Eine empirisch fundierte Klassifikation moralischer Emotionen 
Als Ergebnis dieser Dissertation wurde die (meines Wissens) bisher umfangreichste 
empirisch basierte Klassifikation moralischer und nicht moralischer Emotionen innerhalb 
eines attributionalen Rahmenmodells entwickelt (Heider, 1959; Weiner, 1995, 2006). Eine 
Zusammenfassung der Klassifikation, die 25 verschiedene Emotionen umfasst, wurde in 
Kapitel 8.1 vorgestellt. Als letzten Schritt, fasse ich nun zusammen, wie moralische 
Emotionen aufgrund der folgenden Konzepte und Überlegungen klassifiziert und von 
nicht-moralischen Emotionen unterschieden werden können: 
(1) Moralische Emotionen können auf die empfindende Person selbst oder auf 
beobachtete Personen gerichtet sein und werden demnach als Actor- vs. 
Observer-Emotionen bezeichnet. 
(2) Moralische Emotionen entstehen als Bewertungen von positiven vs. negativen 
Handlungen von Personen. Diese Bewertungen basieren auf Betrachtungen des 
moralischen Standards eines Ziels (ought), der Zielerreichung (goal-attainment) 
sowie der investierten Anstrengung (effort). 
(3) Einige moralische Emotionen (siehe Tabelle 8.1) werden zudem von Bewertungen 
von hohen vs. niedrigen Fähigkeiten von Personen ausgelöst. 
(4) Positive vs. negative moralische Emotionen kommunizieren, dass eine Handlung 
moralisch richtig und lobenswert war und deshalb fortgeführt werden sollte (Go-
Signal) vs. dass eine Handlung moralisch schlecht und tadelnswert war und 
verändert werden sollte (Stop-Signal).  
(5) Im Gegensatz dazu kommunizieren nicht-moralische Emotionen, dass ein 
Ergebnis gut oder schlecht war. 
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(6) Moralische Emotionen motivieren nachfolgende Verhaltensweisen, z.B. 
Hilfeverhalten (Mitleid), Belohnung (Bewunderung, Stolz, Respekt) und Bestrafung 
(Ärger, Empörung, Verachtung, Schadenfreude, personenbezogene 
Enttäuschung). 
(7) Moralische Emotionen erfordern einen höheren kognitiven Aufwand als nicht-
moralische Emotionen. 
 
Um noch einmal auf Ben-Ze’ev (2002; s. Chapter 3.2) zurückzukommen, hoffe ich, 
dass die empirischen Ergebnisse, die in meiner Dissertation dargestellt wurden, einen 
wichtigen Beitrag für eine umfassende Klassifikation von Emotionen aus der Sicht der 
Attributionstheorien geliefert haben.  
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Appendix A 
Appendix Chapter 3 
Scenarios: 
Study 1 
1. Max wants to attain a highly positive goal. He succeeds. He invested a lot of effort to attain this goal. 
2. Max wants to attain a highly positive goal. He succeeds. He invested only little effort to attain this goal. 
3. Max wants to attain a highly positive goal. He fails. He invested a lot of effort to attain this goal. 
4. Max wants to attain a highly positive goal. He fails. He invested only little effort to attain this goal. 
5. Max wants to attain a highly negative goal. He succeeds. He invested a lot of effort to attain this goal. 
6. Max wants to attain a highly negative goal. He succeeds. He invested only little effort to attain this goal. 
7. Max wants to attain a highly negative goal. He fails. He invested a lot of effort to attain this goal. 
8. Max wants to attain a highly negative goal. He fails. He invested only little effort to attain this goal. 
 
Study 2 
1. You want to attain a highly positive goal. You succeed. You invested a lot of effort to attain this goal. 
2. You want to attain a highly positive goal. You succeed. You invested only little effort to attain this goal. 
3. You want to attain a highly positive goal. You fail. You invested a lot of effort to attain this goal. 
4. You want to attain a highly positive goal. You fail. You invested only little effort to attain this goal 
5. You want to attain a highly negative goal. You succeed. You invested a lot of effort to attain this goal. 
6. You want to attain a highly negative goal. You succeed. You invested only little effort to attain this goal. 
7. You want to attain a highly negative goal. You fail. You invested a lot of effort to attain this goal. 
8. You want to attain a highly negative goal. You fail. You invested only little effort to attain this goal 
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Appendix B 
Appendix Chapter 4 
The following items were used to measure cognitions, moral emotions and help-giving: 
Responisibilityhelp-giver 1/2: 
To what extent are you* responsible for the fact that / was it your fault that … 
- the child suffers from a livelong mental disability? 
- the woman is homeless again? 
- the sexual offender has to go to prison again? 
Shame 1/2: 
To what extent do you* feel shame / do you feel ashamed because of the fact that … ?  
Guilt 1/2: 
To what extent do you* feel guilt / do you feel guilty because of the fact that …? 
Regret 1/2: 
To what extent do you* feel regret because of the fact that / do you regret that …? 
Responisibilityrecipient1/2: 
To what extent is the child /the homeless woman / the sexual offender responsible for the fact that 
… / was it the child’s / the homeless woman’s / the sexual offender’s fault that …?  
Deservingnessrecipient 1/2: 
To what extent does the child / the homeless woman / the sexual offender deserve that … / does it 
serve the child / the homeless woman / the sexual offender right that …? 
Sympathy 1/2: 
To what extent do you* feel sympathy for … / do you feel sorry for the child / the homeless woman / 
the sexual offender? 
Anger 1/2: 
To what extent do you* feel anger for … / are you angry at the the child / the homeless woman / the 
sexual offender? 
Schadenfreude 1/2: 
To what extent do you* feel schadenfreude for … do you feel joy about the fact that the child the 
child suffers from a livelong mental disability / the woman is homeless again / the sexual offender 
has to go to prison again? 
Help-Giving 1/2 
To what extent are you willing to help* the child (financially, e.g. by buying therapeutic toys / 
personally, e.g., by taking care of the child for a couple of hours from time to time) / the homeless 
woman (financially, e.g., by buying food or clothes / personally e.g., by trying to help the woman to 
find a new place to stay) / the sexual offender (financially, e.g., by giving him some money to buy 
personal things / personally, e.g., by offering to run some errands outside the prison)? 
*referring to the role of the midwife / the real estate agent / the psychotherapis according to the 
respective experimental condition 
 
Note: This is a slightly shortened translation of the German questionnaire, which is available upon 
request.  
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Appendix C 
Appendix Chapter 5 
 
Example Scenario Study 1: 
goal attained, high effort, low ability 
You are an employee at a research institute conducting a scientific expedition to the Himalaya. One 
member of the expedition team cannot take part on the expedition due to a sudden severe disease. 
You are asked to take her/his place. 
You don’t have any experience in mountaineering; however, you exercise very hard during the next 
months to improve your bodily fitness. 
In spite of unfavorable weather conditions, you manage to keep up with the other members of the 
expedition without help. The expedition is completely successful. The research institute received a 
highly appreciated research award.  
 
 
Example Scenario Study 2: 
Goal attained, high effort, low ability 
Lena is an employee at a research institute conducting a scientific expedition to the Himalaya. One 
member of the expedition team cannot take part on the expedition due to a sudden severe disease. 
Lena is asked to take her/his place. 
Lena has a very good experience in mountaineering. She does not particularly prepare herself for 
the expedition.  
In spite of favorable weather conditions as well as the help of the other member of the team, Lena 
does not manage to keep up with them. The expedition had to be cancelled. The research institute 
was withdrawn from badly needed research grants. 
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Appendix D 
Appendix Chapter 6 
 
Example Scenarios: 
Attained goal, high effort 
Imagine you want to become a member of the city orchestra in the city you live in. You have trained 
for weeks to prepare yourself for the entrance examination (audition). You have exercised every 
day for several hours rehearsing several demanding compositions. In the audition, you play without 
mistakes and are admitted into the orchestra. 
 
Attained goal, low effort 
Imagine you want to become a member of the city orchestra in the city you live in. However, during 
the weeks before the entrance examination (audition), you occupy yourself with other things, 
whereas other candidates have been exercising for months. You trust that it is enough to rehearse 
some compositions shortly before the audition. In the audition, you play without mistakes and are 
admitted into the orchestra. 
 
Non-attained goal, high effort 
Imagine you want to become a member of the city orchestra in the city you live in. You have trained 
for weeks to prepare yourself for the entrance examination (audition). You have exercised every 
day for several hours rehearsing several demanding compositions. On the day of the audition, your 
violin gets broken and you have to play with a borrowed one. Because of this, you make many 
mistakes and are not admitted into the orchestra. 
 
Non-attained goal, low effort 
Imagine you want to become a member of the city orchestra in the city you live in. However, during 
the weeks before the entrance examination (audition), you occupy yourself with other things, 
whereas other candidates have been exercising for months. You trust that it is enough to rehearse 
some compositions shortly before the audition. In the audition, you make many mistakes and are 
not admitted into the orchestra. 
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